AmbassadorBlog

Unintelligent Intelligence

For ten years at least and more likely 15, and most certainly since March 6. 2010 when President Mubarak of Egypt underwent gall bladder surgery, we have known that the 82 year old President of Egypt could die or be incapacitated at any moment.  We have also known that there was no clear path for succession.  Structurally, Mubarak had fixed the system so that his son Gamal could take over.  But there were serious doubts that the Egyptian military would accept a civilian like Gamal or accept the ignominy of copying Syria by passing the torch down the family line. Egyptian pride is a characteristic we know very well.  So we knew that the actuarial tables suggested an end in sight and that the process for succession was uncertain.  

So why was it a surprise when demonstrations peaked in Cairo and Mubarak was forced out by his military? Why was there no contingency plan on the shelf for an event that was unpredictable only in its timing? And why were we caught flat footed when two-thirds of the population, those who are under 30, said, Enough, "Kifayya."  And yet the Administration lurched from "Mubarak is not a dictator" to "Egypt is stable" even while the TV cameras were documenting a massive protest. Where was our intelligence community and who was advising our President, Vice President and Secretary of State? 

Prediction and sooth saying are very much the same thing - brilliant when proven correct and forgotten when proven wrong.  The signs were there - unemployment of the under 30's, an educated youth population without jobs and prospects, cultural barriers to the unemployed for marriage and family, an underpaid and undereducated police force, a judicial system that depends on confessions rather than forensics and investigation for convictions, a conscript military with the officers running a parallel state, a system of crony capitalism that enriched the connected and ignored the rest, the palliative of reasonable economic growth by the IMF's numbers that somehow never reached the people. 

But Mubarak had survived for 30 years. Our predisposition was to assume that he would survive for the next thirty.  What was the tipping point that would suggest that what had worked in the past would no longer work today? And who was paying attention to the 20 somethings who were about to lead a revolution?

Now we have another example of the failure of our intelligence.  We have just learned from Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, also known by the codename "Curveball," that he made up the reports of Saddam Hussein's mobile biological labs in Iraq.  And with those reports Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the world at the UN and accused Saddam Hussein of accumulating weapons of mass destruction - weapons that only existed in al-Janabi's mind and in his desperation to push the United State into war.  This despite the fact that the CIA's European chief had already raised doubts about the report and about al-Janabi.  Yet the Administration, through the CIA Director and others, pressed Powell hard with the absolute certainty that comes from true believers. 

In the case of Mubarak, we had a strong predisposition to accept his likely survival and so we were not prepared.  With curveball we had a key portion of our political establishment that wanted to believe in him so that we could justify the invasion of Iraq.  

We need to do better.  We need to break the chains of assumptions and expectations and predispositions and agendas.  We need to put analysis and critical thinking before ideology,political party, and the lessons of the past.  (We may have learned those past lessons too well.) And we need an analytical capability in our intelligence community that is immune from politics and changing administrations.  We have the talent.  But even if we had such an institution, would we listen to it? 

 

 

 

 

Arab gestures, facts on the ground, and the shrill hysteria of incitement.

As a part of the package the Obama Administration is working out with Israel on the settlements freeze and return to negotiations, there is reportedly a promise of some gestures from the Arab world in the form of opening trade offices and providing overflight rights for Israeli commercial aircraft to link Israel to Asia. Arguably, these would be positive steps in creating a better atmosphere for peace, but would they make a significant difference? In fact, they are not likely to change attitudes where they count the most - in Israel and Palestine.

Last June, The Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace published a poll of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian attitudes toward peace (http://truman.huji.ac.il/poll-view.asp?id=279). The results were not very encouraging.  While the majority of Israeli Jews felt that the conflict with the Palestinians imposed a high to unbearable cost on Israel, a similar number believed that Israel could bear that price for decades and even forever.  What those numbers should be telling the Arab rejectionists and the hostile regime elements in Gaza is that Israel can live with a sustained level of violence indefinitely.  Too many Palestinians got the wrong message from the Israeli excursions into Lebanon and their withdrawal under pressure.  In fact, if the shelling from Gaza starts up again, most Israelis believe a military solution to that problem is possible.  30% would reoccupy Gaza and over half of all Israelis think that Israel can overthrow the Hamas regime in Gaza if it so desires.

What I found striking about the poll was the fact that 62% of Jewish Israelis thought that the aspiration of the Arabs, in the long run, was to conquer the state of Israel and of that number, 42% thought the goal was to destroy a significant part of the Jewish population in Israel.  If that is your assumption about the people you are expected to negotiate with, then the price for any concessions would seem to be too high. This cynical attitude about the prospects of living in peace is reflected at many points in the survey on both sides.  65% of Palestinians and 63% of Israelis believe it is impossible to reach a final status settlement these days.

Gestures by the Bahrainis or Qataris, or any other Arab state, are not going to change these numbers.  To imagine that peace is possible on this foundation of deep mutual antipathy and mistrust really stretches credulity. Peace may be a function of Prime Ministers and Presidents, but it is ultimately dependent on the people of both sides.  Confidence has to be built from somewhere below zero where it currently resides.  That will only happen when the voices of reason can out-shout the voices of intolerance and irrationality, when children are taught facts rather than slogans, when the media no longer points the camera at the loudest voice in the room, and when we get back to efforts to purge ourselves, our schools and our media of incitement.

We tried it once in 1998 as a result of the Wye agreement.  We formed an anti-incitement committee and even had meetings for several months.  Unfortunately, only the Americans took it seriously. As a result, it was still born. Perhaps the Obama Administration should consider leading a new effort, but this time with the energy and eloquence of the President of the United States. Peace is not going to come from clever formulas and untenable compromises.  It will only come when the people who are most affected want it to come, and believe in it.  That is not the case today.   

Bad Image = Bad Business

According to polls the image of the United States in the Middle East is about as low as it has ever been.  Subjective reporting from the region indicates that the negative attitude toward America has, until recently, been directed against President Bush and his Administration.  I am now getting reports from friends in the region, however, that indicate the mood is shifting.  Arabs in the region are increasingly coming to believe that the problem is deeper in our society.  It’s not the President, it’s the people.

The question is what impact this mood shift is having on American business?  Most companies are reporting no loss of markets. And if you look at the trade statistics of Saudi Arabia our total exports since 2000 have remained relatively constant.  But these statistics may mask some essential facts.  If we look at the balance of trade with Saudi Arabia, we have gone from a deficit of eight billion one hundred and thirty million in 2000 to fifteen billion seven hundred and one million in 2004.

This would tend to indicate that we are getting no benefit from the massive influx of capital into the region generated by the increase of oil prices.  By contrast, China increased its exports to Saudi Arabia by 21% in 2000, 18% in 2001 and 23.5% in 2003, the latest figures I have available.  So while we may not be losing markets yet in the Middle East, we may be losing our share of the markets. 

Several factors tend to soften the impact of the negative US image. For one thing, supplier relationships are strong and long standing.  Business friends of mine in the Middle East say they are reluctant to change suppliers based on the trust they have built up over the years.  However, they also say that unless US travel and other business restrictions are reduced, they will make the move to European suppliers.  In this case it is not image that is the problem, it is the ease of doing business. 

A second factor is that so many of the contracts for goods and services in Middle Eastern countries are controlled by the state.  And in virtually every Middle East country, the current leadership is far more supportive of and, in a number of cases, beholden to the United States than the population at large.

This is not to say that there is no corrosive effect from US negatives.  In virtually every Arab country the King or President is out in front of his people and more willing to support us than his people would be.  But some of these leaders are getting tired of being exposed.  Some are ready to wash their hands of us.  And that is not a good sign for our future ability to drive policies in the region to our advantage or to guarantee a substantial share of their markets. 

Every recent administration has struggled with this problem of image and every one of them has failed to mount an effective effort.  Unfortunately, rearranging the deck chairs or throwing money at the problem won’t help.

Obviously, government has a role to play, but it may be more effectively exercised in the area of policy than of public relations.  If US policy ignores the issues the region considers most important, like the Palestinian problem, our image suffers.  What people want to see is that we care about their concerns, not just our own agenda. And they want us to live up to our own democratic principals and human rights values – not copy the behavior of autocratic regimes in the region. 

In short, we have an image problem that is persistent and that will be exploited by our enemies and competitors whether they be in business or politics.  We need to pull together to turn the situation around and restore and sustain the confidence that people around the world have placed in American values, our entrepreneurial spirit and the quality of our goods and services.