AmbassadorBlog

Unintelligent Intelligence

For ten years at least and more likely 15, and most certainly since March 6. 2010 when President Mubarak of Egypt underwent gall bladder surgery, we have known that the 82 year old President of Egypt could die or be incapacitated at any moment.  We have also known that there was no clear path for succession.  Structurally, Mubarak had fixed the system so that his son Gamal could take over.  But there were serious doubts that the Egyptian military would accept a civilian like Gamal or accept the ignominy of copying Syria by passing the torch down the family line. Egyptian pride is a characteristic we know very well.  So we knew that the actuarial tables suggested an end in sight and that the process for succession was uncertain.  

So why was it a surprise when demonstrations peaked in Cairo and Mubarak was forced out by his military? Why was there no contingency plan on the shelf for an event that was unpredictable only in its timing? And why were we caught flat footed when two-thirds of the population, those who are under 30, said, Enough, "Kifayya."  And yet the Administration lurched from "Mubarak is not a dictator" to "Egypt is stable" even while the TV cameras were documenting a massive protest. Where was our intelligence community and who was advising our President, Vice President and Secretary of State? 

Prediction and sooth saying are very much the same thing - brilliant when proven correct and forgotten when proven wrong.  The signs were there - unemployment of the under 30's, an educated youth population without jobs and prospects, cultural barriers to the unemployed for marriage and family, an underpaid and undereducated police force, a judicial system that depends on confessions rather than forensics and investigation for convictions, a conscript military with the officers running a parallel state, a system of crony capitalism that enriched the connected and ignored the rest, the palliative of reasonable economic growth by the IMF's numbers that somehow never reached the people. 

But Mubarak had survived for 30 years. Our predisposition was to assume that he would survive for the next thirty.  What was the tipping point that would suggest that what had worked in the past would no longer work today? And who was paying attention to the 20 somethings who were about to lead a revolution?

Now we have another example of the failure of our intelligence.  We have just learned from Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, also known by the codename "Curveball," that he made up the reports of Saddam Hussein's mobile biological labs in Iraq.  And with those reports Secretary of State Colin Powell went before the world at the UN and accused Saddam Hussein of accumulating weapons of mass destruction - weapons that only existed in al-Janabi's mind and in his desperation to push the United State into war.  This despite the fact that the CIA's European chief had already raised doubts about the report and about al-Janabi.  Yet the Administration, through the CIA Director and others, pressed Powell hard with the absolute certainty that comes from true believers. 

In the case of Mubarak, we had a strong predisposition to accept his likely survival and so we were not prepared.  With curveball we had a key portion of our political establishment that wanted to believe in him so that we could justify the invasion of Iraq.  

We need to do better.  We need to break the chains of assumptions and expectations and predispositions and agendas.  We need to put analysis and critical thinking before ideology,political party, and the lessons of the past.  (We may have learned those past lessons too well.) And we need an analytical capability in our intelligence community that is immune from politics and changing administrations.  We have the talent.  But even if we had such an institution, would we listen to it? 

 

 

 

 

Iraq: Blame, Politics, and Retreat

Democrats and Republicans alike are struggling with the problem of Iraq and how to approach it. Within the Democratic party there may be as many ideas as there are members of Congress, but the primary split appears to be between those who believe that a proposal that sets benchmarks and a time table for Iraqi government performance will not lead to redeployment of our troops home quickly enough, while others worry that setting benchmarks and a timetable will expose the Democrats to charges of micro managing a military engagement. The discussion in Democratic circles have zeroed in on three continuing commitments after US troop redeployment that will require some continued US military presence: 1) training the Iraqi police, security and military forces; 2) protecting our forces, personnel and installations; and 3) continuing special operations against al Qaeda and other anti-American terrorists. In this context they would ramp up pressure on the Sunnis and Shiites to compromise, reduce the area of US occupation, resize the US military presence, and focus on the direct threats to US security such as a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. 

For their part, in an excess of apparent defeatism, some Republicans are hoping to keep a lid on the war and extend the problem into the next administration in the expectation that a Democratic president would have to take ownership of the Iraq war. It is hoped that this would have long term legacy implications for the Democratic Party as it faced the prospect of failure and chaos in Iraq or the necessity to commit even more troops. President Bush has made it clear in his public statements that this war will not be ended in his administration. In short, at least for some political operatives, the current discussion may have less to do with concern for our troops or US national interests than for which party is going to take the blame for Iraq. The ghost of Vietnam is hovering around these discussions. 

I do not believe that the bulk of our elected representatives are so cynical that they would put politics and Party above the lives of our troops or the national interest. But it is certainly suspicious that the Democrats have picked the target date of March 2008 for the beginning of redeployment while the President is saying the problem is up to the next administration to solve. Is it all about the timetable?

 At least one thing seems clear, I don’t hear many people still talking about democracy in Iraq as being our principle war aim. It is not surprising that inside Iraq, itself, there is a big gap on the issue of democracy between the competing political sects.  A USA Today poll published March 19 indicated that Sunnis preferred a strong leader to democracy by 41% to 38%. Kurds overwhelmingly favored democracy by 66% to 13%. Shiites broke just about even between democracy and an Islamic state. The minority Sunnis are, understandably, not enthusiastic about a democracy that would give permanent control to the majority Shiites. On a countrywide basis those opting for a strong leader have gone from 18% in 2005 to 26% now; the Islamic state has gone from 12% to 22% and democracy from 64% to 53%. It would appear that the longer we, the Americans stay, the further away we get from democracy in Iraq. 

The poll makes clear that since 2005 Iraqi confidence in the future has deteriorated with 39% saying things were bad in 2005 and 50% saying they are bad today. At the same time attitudes toward the US have dropped like a rock. Of all the countries proposed, including Iran and Syria, the US and UK had the highest negatives. What is most disturbing is that 51% felt that attacks on coalition forces were acceptable compared to 17% in 2004. More Iraqis now believe that the US invasion was wrong. Iraqis, in fact, gave the US and UK a ringing vote of no confidence with 82% saying they had no confidence in the US and UK occupation forces and 77% saying they had done a bad job. They also say that the surge will make things worse and 35% say we should leave now.  That has to raise some questions about why we are in Iraq. In fact, Iraq has sucked the air out of most talk in our government about democracy in the entire region.  Iraq so dominates the political agenda that politicians and policy makers have little time to consider the war on terror or the spread of democracy.  As we look for help from Arab governments, including Syria and Iran, it would appear that our government believes it would be churlish and counterproductive to simultaneously criticize their performance on democracy or human rights.  

 

Divining Democracy

Democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.  Plato, The Republic, bk. VIII 550-C

The United States has the reputation in the Middle East of being a status quo power, big on statements about democracy and stingy on delivery.  I am constantly reminded by critics in this country and by friends in the region that programs like the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative are Potemkin efforts that, like the Cheshire cat of Alice

in Wonderland, are receding slowly from view.  But I question whether or not the critics have taken a look at what is happing in the region or whether they have thought through the implications of an aggressive American policy of democratization. 

Qatar, one of the homes of the conservative Wahabi branch of Islam, is the site of the new branch of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Georgetown’s commitment to quality, liberal arts and its Catholic heritage have been fully respected and encouraged by the Emir of Qatar and his wife Sheikha Mooza.

Five Saudi women, for the first time in Saudi history, will be assigned to senior positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of them at the Ambassadorial level.  For the first time, Saudi women will be able to run for office in the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry elections in November.

In Egypt, our pundits and cynics here had little good to say about the first contested Egyptian presidential elections.  Of course the outcome was foreordained.  But I remember the debates that were going on among the Egyptian opposition when I was Ambassador there over ten years ago about the need for a constitutional amendment that would permit a contested election for the President.  Now they have it. 

In virtually every country in the Middle East, excluding a few like Syria, change, which five years ago I would have called revolutionary, is taking place. In Kuwait, the elected Parliament twice voted down the ruling family’s effort to enfranchise women.  On the third try the Emir succeeded. What the Parliament was saying was that change has to be digestible and it has to be digested.  When he was Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah told me that he would drive the process of political reform, but that he would do so, one step forward at a time and give his very traditional society the breathing space to adapt to change.  He did not want to go through the wrenching process of change, only to be forced by his people or parliament to backtrack. 

Surely, the Crown Prince and now King of Saudi Arabia has a better sense of what his society can take than I do, despite my 35 years experience in the region.  Or that President Mubarak knows how far he can go without unleashing forces that would drive Egypt away from America and back to confrontation with Israel.  The costs of stagnation in the region are obvious.  There is no faster way to bring on revolution and radicalism.  But the costs of insensitive and too rapid change are likely to be just as great.  To my way of thinking, the Administration today seems to be cautiously trying to do the right thing on the democracy program. To its critics, I would suggest that so long as the majority of the countries in the region are traveling the right road and moving forward, it doesn’t matter so much whether they are driving a Porsche or a Volkswagen.