The Thirteenth Palestinian Government

From the earliest days, once the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat forced the United States back in 1978 to take an active role in resolving the Palestinian problem, we have largely focused our efforts on security and the key final status issues like borders and Jerusalem.  President Bush embraced the  policy of a two state solution, but aside from some discussions in the context of the Autonomy negotiations and in the Oslo process years ago, there has been very little focus on what the Palestinian State will look like, how it will be organized and what are the premises on which it will be based. Presumably, these are questions that the Palestinians will have to answer in due course.  But, it is very hard for me to imagine that Israel, or for that matter the United States, is a disinterested party.  Will the Palestinian state look like Gaza under Hamas?  If that is the expectation then it is not very likely that negotiations on the final status, even if started, would ever result in an agreement.  

What we have all known for a long time is that Israel will not accept a hostile, independent state in the West Bank and Gaza and nor should it.  If there was ever any doubt of this, all we need to do is to examine the Israeli and US reaction to Hamas' rule over Gaza.  The Israelis will have to know who their neighbors are and will have to have a high degree of confidence that once a Palestinian state is established, it will not become a launching pad for attacks on Israel.  Without a substantial degree of mutual confidence, issues like security, settlements, borders, Jerusalem and refugees cannot be resolved.  This is not only a question of lines on a map.  It is also a question of intentions.

Certainly, the Palestinian record thus far does not fill one with confidence.  The divided polity, the clinging to rhetoric instead of reality, the record of corruption in the Palestinian National Authority,  and failure to govern effectively even in areas where the Authority has sway, creates the expectation of failure, instability, and continued hostility toward Israel as the path of least resistance.  Palestinians have been reluctant to take on the hard issues of coming to grips with their internal differences using the excuse that with the Israelis hovering over every decision and intervening at will, the Palestinians cannot determine their own vision or begin the construction of their own state.  They have been unwilling to take the difficult steps of forging a common Palestinian vision and policy in the absence of the concrete governmental structure of a State in being - until now.  

Now the Palestinian National Authority is advancing a new approach in its program of the thirteenth government entitled "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State" published in August 2009.  This is a document that has received little notice in the media, but which lays out a picture of a Palestinian state that could, if implemented, enable a constructive process of peace making.  The document includes a forward by Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian Prime Minister that sets out the objectives of the Government for the next two years as a "full commitment to this state-building endeavor" and emphasizes that such a program is "critical" to the "creation of the independent state of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital."  Fayyad's formulation in his cover letter is interesting since it is not found in the document itself.  He refers to "East" Jerualem - the document consistently refers to "Jerusalem" without any modifier.  The document itself has problems such as repeated references to UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which established the "right of return" of Palestinian refugees to their homes based on their free choice.  However, the document assigns responsibility of dealing with the refugees to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and not to the Palestinian Authority or its government.  

The agenda that the program of the 13th government has set out is surprisingly detailed, which is unusual for political documents that have to appeal to a broad constituency.  What is even more surprising is the level of self-criticism that is implied by the document. Repeated references to the need for auditing government functions would appear to be in response to the heavy criticism of the Authority as being corrupt.  It would also tend to indicate that over the 17 years that the Palestinian Authority has been in existence, virtually no reforms have taken place, no strategic plan has been developed, no consensus on goals and vision has been reached, and that there has been little or no effort to establish the foundation for a viable Palestinian state.  A lot of the credit for this dysfunctional history has to be laid at the feet of Yasser Arafat whose style of governing was divide, conquer and never decide. 

While one could nit-pick the program. Certainly there are aspects that will cause heartburn particularly within the Palestinian community, but also among some Israelis.  Furthermore, there is a long distance between statements of intention and facts on the ground.  It remains to be seen if Abu Mazen and Salam Fayyad can deliver on the vision and reform.   But it is virtually certain, in my view, that without such an effort on the part of the Palestinians, there will be no peace agreement, no Palestinian state, and no respite from terrorism.  The program's success is, as Prime Minister Fayyad says, essential if a peace agreement is to be reached. The program is predicated on and designed to help achieve the unification of the Palestinian polity, without which I do not give the peace process a snowball's chance of succeeding.  This is the very first time that we have seen a concrete, rational, official Palestinian projection of what a Palestinian state might look like and how it could sustain peace as a democracy based on the rule of law. That has been an important missing ingredient in all the past efforts to concoct a peace between Israelis and the Palestinians. We should give Salam Fayyad our full support and help him make his vision real.  

Comments

[Katie Donlevie]

The very existence of the program for state development proposed by the 13th government represents a critical departure from past Palestinian policy. Unlike Arafat, who rejected Israeli self-deterrence and failed to engender a sense of unity in the Palestinian people, Salam Fayyad and the Palestinian National Authority are attempting to approach the future peace making process in a practical and feasible manner. The PNA's concept of focusing primarily on internal state development rather than final territorial definitions is a necessary first step; the PNA cannot expect to garner a peace agreement without first ensuring a united polity and a structured blueprint for post-treaty state structure. There are, however, significant contentions that the PNA will need to address.

First, the task of uniting the Palestinian people behind this proposal will prove extremely onerous. The opinion poll we read for class delineated the fact that 43.8% of Palestinians have negative outlooks on the prospect of peace with Israel. Furthermore, The Israelis will most likely be reluctant to enter into an agreement unless and until they are assured that the proposal's goal of "sustain[ing] peace as a democracy based on the rule of law" is a feasible achievement for the notoriously corrupt Palestinian National Authority.

Although this "state-building endeavor" will undoubtedly encounter many roadblocks, I agree that the proposal for such a project represents a groundbreaking step in the process of peace negotiations. Instead of continuing Arafat's recalcitrant policy of denial and inaction, Fayyad and the PNA are approaching the conflict with a fresh outlook that could, if successful, provide the necessary push towards eventual peace.

[Zack Pych]

The publication of this program by the Palestinian National Authority is certainly a step in the right direction for Palestine, as it attempts to become an independent state. Both developmental economists and political scientists generally agree that sound institutions are vital in the creation of a peaceful and economically sound state, which is what Palestine will need to become in order to fully appease Israel and the international community. By creating this program, the PNA has established a framework for what these institutions will be and how they will be established.

Although the program is definitely a positive, I am skeptical as to how effective it will be in the short term. First off, I believe that setting a 2-year time span for the program to be carried out is a bit ambitious, especially considering the PNA’s relative impotency in the past. Successful institutions are not established overnight and it takes time for institutions to establish legitimacy within a population. This legitimacy will be needed in Palestine in order to dissuade young men from joining terrorist organizations that threaten to create additional strife with Israel and derail the PNA’s goal of establishing a legitimate peaceful autonomous state.

Additionally, the program will certainly hit roadblocks if Hamas and other terrorist or paramilitary organizations are unhappy with the institutions being created or the concessions being made to Israel. I believe it is imperative to make certain that the leaders of these groups are involved in the process. Without their support terrorist attacks will continue to occur in Israel on a regular basis which will make the Israelis less likely to form any type of agreement with Palestine.

[Mia Cakebread]

With a security-based mindset so prevalent in the Israel-Palestine case, it is often hard to know exactly what are realistic expectations of both parties. The very question as to how these two states would be formed, and more importantly what would they look like, are currently overlooked elements that are essential to the peace negotiating process. In order for this, along with other problems such as refugees, access to natural resources, and religious pilgrimage rights to be solved, each party needs to do some serious self-assessment. An open and candid conversation needs to take place in order peace to occur.
I agree with Professor Walker that the report recently published by the PNA is a good start. Taking the first step and having the Palestinian intentions and goals put down in writing is a very positive step. I am skeptical though about the affect that this report will have and think that only time and the Palestinian’s actions will tell how serious they are about implementing what is written in this report. This war has been going on for decades and false hopes have been raised before. If Palestine is really serious about promoting this agenda and then actions are going to need to be taken in order to prove this. Too many times have there been handshakes and agreements written up, only to be reneged days later.
Additionally, as mentioned in several of the articles we read, change needs to be widely supported. The lack of media attention that Professor Walker mentioned means that few people know about this report. If the Palestinians are serious about coming to a peace agreement it must be supported by more then just the one small elite group. Citizens, the military, and politicians must be really willing to SHOW their support in order to convince the Israelis that they are serious and gain their trust. However, even with these doubts I do think that this report a good start and if the Palestinians continue on with this track they could make some serious progress towards peace.

[Biff Parker-Magyar]

I agree with Ambassador Walker that a blueprint of what the Palestinian State will look like is of fundamental importance in any peace settlement, and that the new approach documented in “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State” seems promising. The document’s title, which assumes an eventual peace settlement, contradicts Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s June 14th assertion that, “The closer we get to a peace agreement with them (the Palestinians), the more they are distancing themselves from peace. They raise new demands. They are not showing us that they want to end the conflict.” Although the document makes statements that would be far from acceptable to Israelis on many issues, including statements about ownership of Jerusalem, it nevertheless presents a step in the right direction.

However, what remains to be seen is whether the thirteenth government can begin to deliver on some of its promises for more effective government of the Palestinian Authority. The consolidation of a national political identity that clearly transcends simple hostility toward Israel would help assuage Israeli fears of an independent Palestine as merely a training ground for suicide bombers. While the creation of that national identity will be difficult and intangible, there are concrete steps that the Palestinian Authority can take help build a stable state (even in a recession), such as cutting down on corruption. The heavy self-criticism in the document, which Ambassador Walker notes, would seem to indicate a departure from inaction and corruption, but every political document promises action and only some follow through.

Salam Fayyad’s newly documented policy is a promising and critical but as of yet incomplete step in any peace agreement. While it lays out a framework for the creation of a stable Palestinian democracy, only visible steps in the consolidation of that democracy will assuage the fears of Israel’s security-oriented national subculture and encourage them to make a settlement. In the meantime, Israel should attempt to work with Fayyad and encourage him to achieve the objectives targeted in “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State.”

[Will Leubsdorf]

Ambassador Walker’s overall point is sound, although I would question whether the Palestinian government has the political capacity to implement this program. Israeli concerns with Palestinian intentions are a clear impediment to any serious negotiations, as over 50% of Israelis support the statement that neither the Palestinian public nor their leaders are ready to make concessions necessary to make peace. If the Palestinian Authority can’t enforce the terms of a peace treaty, Israel would be putting its security at risk with no appreciable benefits. With such pervasive doubts about Palestinian intentions and capacities, it is difficult if not impossible to ask Israel to negotiate in good faith.
The proposed reforms show that some democratic norms are evident within Palestinian political culture. The plan shows responsiveness to critique and accountability to the Palestinian public, crucial norms in any democratic political culture. The current Palestinian government got the proper message from the rise of Hamas, as competition forced the Fatah leadership to proclaim clear strategic goals with details illustrating how those broad goal would be implemented. The level of self-critique in the document would suggest a major positive step forward, an implicit acknowledgement of democratic accountability.
The one necessary note of caution is that this program doesn’t address one critical issue: whether the Palestinian government has the political capacity or support to implement this program. The legitimacy of the current Fatah government is questionable at best, and it’s a valid question whether the Palestinian public would see this program as a serious plan of reform or yet another package of broken promises. Furthermore, institutional inertia could retard this program, with bureaucrats stalling and placing roadblocks in the way of creating accountability mechanism in order to maintain their own power. A further impediment is Israel continuing construction of settlements in the West Bank. Behaviors like these make it political difficult for the current Palestinian government, whose legitimacy is already questionable, to take the risk and follow through on this program. Israel needs signs of positive intentions, and in turn Palestinians need reciprocation when they do show good intentions, even on a small scale like this program.

[Sophia Boehm]

As Ambassador Walker’s blog suggests, without a legitimate proposal to assuage Israeli fears of a hostile neighbor, negotiation on key issues will fail and peace will remain unobtainable. Israel’s past reluctance to negotiate with Hamas indicate that the nation will continue to reject any Palestine that resembles a terrorist state or still requires a coherent national outline. This behavior, Walker asserts, reflects Israel’s lack of confidence in the Arab government, and any attempts at peace without such assurances will only fail.

However, the document “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State” demonstrates at the very least the nation’s commitment to establishing a strong, stable, and democratic state. The paper suggests that the Palestinians are ready to make the difficult choices that nation-building demands. Salam Fayyad’s policy objectives are more than just rhetorical devices designed to mobilize political support. The self-criticism and immense detail of the document indicate a true intention to create an independent Palestine. For instance, the paper not only outlines broad national goals but also specifics the actions that individual departments must take. Specifically, the document calls on the Ministry of National Economy to diversify markets, modernize the productive base, and develop investment-enabling infrastructure. Moreover, the papers give power and responsibility not to the PNA which many view as a corrupt institution but to the PLO, which maintains a strong sense of legitimacy amongst the public. Yet, whether or not Palestine has the means to actually follow through on such ambitious aims remains unknown.

Although the paper symbolizes a step in the right direction, the document still addresses many of Israel’s “red lines.” Specifically, Fayyad writes that Jerusalem will be the capital of Palestine, but relinquishing such a holy city remains a non-negotiable issue for the Israelis. Similarly, while Netanyahu’s speech calls for a demilitarized Palestine, Fayyad vaguely discusses the development of security services. Headway on these issues, then, requires a serious Palestinian commitment to this document even with its “red lines.” Ultimately, it comes down to which state will be willing to make the first move. Israel refuses to withdraw without serious and concrete commitments while Palestine argues that the nation can only begin this transition to democracy when it obtains its independence.

[Charlie Warzel]

With Salam Fayyad’s recent proposal to establish a Palestinian state, prospects for a two state solution may be as strong as ever. Yet, while it is easy to remain hopeful for a transition to peace, the program of the Thirteenth Government is only the first small step in what must be a sweeping change in attitude for both Palestine and Israel.
Fayyad’s recent program is an inspiring and detailed proposal to, for the first time, set a strict deadlines and guidelines for a sustainable Palestinian state. The proposal undoubtedly shows signs of progress for the Palestinians as it outlines with great depth plans to promote national unity as well as economic prosperity and independence. Fayyad understandably and lucidly outlines the program as a plan to create and preserve basic rights such as shelter and education for Palestinians; yet the proposal shows no real signs in the rhetoric that is necessary to foster change.
Though there is nothing strikingly forceful about Fayyad’s language, the fact remains that the conversation has not changed much after this proposal. The Palestinian National Authority contends that Jerusalem “cannot be anything but the eternal capital of the future Palestinian state”. This sentiment along with Fayyad’s hope for territory in the West Bank and Gaza is certainly nothing new, and will continue to remain a roadblock in any future peace negotiations. This is already apparent as Israeli’s begin to rebuke the proposal and deem it unacceptable. One Israeli official told the New York Times that without guarantees of Israeli security, there would be no Palestinian state at all.
The most important thing missing from Fayyad’s program, however, is a call for multilateral negotiation. Israelis will most likely see unilateral proposals as a threat to their sovereignty and the stalemate will continue despite efforts on the part of the Palestinians. Like most Israeli attempts for peace, this Palestinian definition of their future state looks to rob Israel of meaningful sovereignty. For Fayyad and the Palestinians the importance of defining a Palestinian state cannot be undervalued, however, there can be no true success in this process if Fayyad doesn’t begin to define and negotiate the Palestinian view of a peaceful Israeli state.

[Guillaume Boisseau]

In the fragmented and tormented land of Palestine, the need to establish new goals is obvious. Salam Fayyad’s program is, as noted by Ambassador Walker, a key ingredient, if it can actually translate to action. Fayyad’s ambitious plan to build a state in two years’ time, and basically to impose its existence to the rest of the world by achieving economic independence, shows his understanding that time is running out as well as his will to accelerate negotiations in the Middle East. Whether or not such a project can be conceivable without a peace agreement with Israel remains to be seen however, and Fayyad might have to wait for the situation to stabilize itself before obtaining results, but his efforts could also spark a momentum towards more cooperation and understanding between Palestine and Israel. By applying pressure to representatives of Israel, Fayyad adopted a stronger tone and showed a sense of initiative.

Nevertheless, I believe that we need to keep in mind that the Palestinians remain in a position of weakness and occupation, which considerably limits their power and restrains their room of maneuver, ever since the war that claimed hundreds of lives and made thousands of people homeless. It is self-evident that the full commitment of the Palestinian National Authority is required to reach the goals of peace and establish a coherent state. The Palestinian Authority mostly remained passive during the war, which only contributed to make its government appear more marginal, and to this day, sovereignty over the West Bank has not been achieved and Palestine does not have international recognition. In the current situation, the full responsibility of the matter should not be given to Palestine. Such a conflict must not be considered solely a regional issue, but one that calls for a global answer, as an incredible number of issues arise. The roles of the United States and of the European Union are indeed as crucial as ever.

[Hilary Weiss]

The United States, the international community, Arab states and Israel would be wise to support Salam Fayyad’s program of the thirteenth government, “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State,” as an opportunity to enable a constructive process of obtaining peace. Fayyad has devised a two-year plan that is consistent with President Obama’s intention of achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Although there are some inconsistencies in the language used in the program, as Ambassador Walker points out, in regards to issues of reclaiming East Jerusalem verse Jerusalem and the role of refuges and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, this program offers a clear and practical alternative to the violence and armed resistance that continues. More important than the actual implementation and success of this program is the need for these nations to embrace Fayyad’s efforts towards creating a means of establishing peace amongst Palestine and Israel.
Salam Fayyad’s plan to make the Palestinian state a functioning, organized entity shows vast progress in comparison to the past 17 years of Palestinian Authority in which “virtually no reforms have taken place, no strategic plan has been developed, [and] no consensus on goals and visions has been reached.” I think the most serious concern is that, as Ambassador Walker put it, “there is a long distance between statements of intention and facts on the ground.” However, it does seem as though Salam Fayyad has embraced a much different philosophy regarding the issues of good governance, accountability and transparency than those of his predecessors, particularly Yasser Arafat. Nevertheless, because of an instable and tumultuous history between Israel and Palestine it will be a challenge for both sides to accept written words at face value: Thus it is especially important that Fayyad, Palestine, and those under Israeli occupation prove their commitment to the success of the Program of the Thirteenth Government.
Salam Fayyad’s Program of the Thirteenth Government offers an articulate solution to peace, or at the very least, progress between Israel and Palestine. I think it would be foolish to dismiss a program that could offer such hope and inspiration on a national and global scale. It is obvious that there will be many kinks that will need to be worked out; yet, it would be unwise to overlook any efforts made by either side towards establishing peace.

[Diana Stern]

I agree with Professor Walker’s statement that we must support the PNA’s attempt pass this document, not because I believe passing is necessarily possible or will produce the desired outcome, but I think the act of attempting requires unification of Palestinian polity; a goal, if reached will help curb violence. One of the biggest obstacles the PNA faces in terms of successfully implementing the approach are the groups of extremist parties that will oppose the PNA’s suggestion. Yet if the PNA can rein these groups in with the objective of implementing its program, I believe it will help control violence.

One of the major issues currently is how to deal with Palestinian extremist’s use of terrorism. With the amount of violence that is currently taking place, there is no way that Israel will feel safe regardless of the promising rhetoric. Unification will take the pressure off of Israel and outside forces to control Palestinian extremist groups. There are so many cases where international forces have unsuccessfully attempted to reconstruct smaller country’s governments, when internal reconstruction would be more useful. Even if this international nation-building approach was successful, Israel, the country currently trying to do so, does not have the power or resources to fully control Hamas or it would have never given Gaza up in 2005. Therefore, it sounds promising that it is in the best interest of the PNA to control the extremist groups themselves, instead of Israel trying to end the violence and illiberal practices by way of economic sanctions and defensive attacks. Palestine will have to control the factions themselves – a more realistic approach.

[Sam Gomez]

Since the advent of western liberal democracy, the right of self-determination for any free people has been the cornerstone of the modern state. Nationalism, while useful for creating a unified identity for a community of people, frequently results in conflict, violence and war. The concept of two sovereign nations—Israel and Palestine—occupying such a geographically small area is problematic for several reasons. The most salient problem with the long-term viability of the two-state solution is simple; Israelis and Palestinians do not trust each other, nor will they any time soon. Even if the negotiating process was able to progress to the point of establishment of two sovereign nations, their distrust of each other would lead the two peoples into inevitable conflict. Reaching neighborly and cordial relations will be necessary if the two-state solution is to succeed. Two independent sovereign states with open hostilities in such a small region would hamper economical, technological and social progress in both. In order to ensure the long-term safety and security of both Israelis and Palestinians a certain level of social and cultural integration must occur. As stated earlier, the development of nationalism can unite disparate communities around a common goal. This phenomenon has been a key driving force for progress in the modern world. A national identity must be forged in this region that allows for peaceful cooperation and the establishment of common goals between Israeli and Palestinian citizens. Things like common works projects, shared resource development and an integrated economy would go far toward fostering solidarity and friendship between these different ethnic and religious groups.

To draw a parallel here, the United States originally weren’t that united. Each of the thirteen colonies held sovereign powers such as police powers, printed their own currency, etc… The Articles of Confederation loosely held the various states together under a quasi-national banner. While a more integrated federal system was ultimately necessary, this model of a confederacy could be useful if applied to the Israel-Palestine problem. I am not trying to say that the Israelis and Palestinians correspond to late 18th century Americans in any way, not by a long shot. I am simply offering the following thought experiment to ponder what the future may look like for the region. Two central problems are preventing the peace process from proceeding: Jerusalem and continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Establishment of an independent sovereign nation of Palestine, as we have seen, may be problematic. What if, however, Israel and Palestine were each states within the sphere of a unified federal government which regulated things like commerce, public works and, most importantly, Jerusalem. This Israeli-Palestinian federal district would be found within and around the ancient city of Jerusalem, which both the Israelis and Palestinians wish to claim as their capitol. Having an east and west Jerusalem, such as Fayyad seems to propose in his opening to his program is not a long-term viable solution. Constructing a Cold War Berlin-style wall with an Israeli and a Palestinian bloc would destroy the unity and common religious aura that the city exudes. As the center of the three world monotheistic religions, Jerusalem will serve as an example to the rest of the world that peace and cooperation are always possible, even in the face of what (would have been) recent conflict. A unified economy would link Israel and Palestine inextricably and common projects would bolster the welfare of both the Israeli and Palestinian people. This new confederacy would be comprised of representatives from the respective state delegations, and decisions about Jerusalem would be made in a democratic fashion. The newly confederated states of Israel and Palestine would retain the majority of their sovereignty as things like police powers, defense, education etc... would remain in the hands of the established state authorities. Within their state, the PNA would be free to carry out all of the policies which can be found in their 2009 program. Much like the various state governments of the US, Israel and Palestine would have justice systems and legislatures which would be independent of each other but both subject to federal authority. While compromise and cooperation are never easy, I believe that in order to achieve a viable solution each side must be willing to give up some of their demands in favor of a mutual understanding. Their commitment to peace and progress would be represented by the new Jerusalem, capitol of the Judean Confederacy of States.

[Margaret Smith]

Israeli opposition to Palestine’s Program of the Thirteenth Government stems from many facets, but distinctly from the plan’s unilateral nature and bold interest in Israel's sacred city. How can Israelis immediately condemn this extensive drafted plan outlining a future built on equality, non-violence, and human development – created by the Palestinians for the Palestinians? The current incompetent and dependent Palestinian government has resulted in inadequate progression and violent ideologies. The Israeli accusation of Palestinian incapability is void of creditability if the Thirteenth Government isn’t given a chance to prove itself – yes Palestine’s recent past allows for questionable predictions for their Thirteenth Government’s success, but when is the right time for their new beginning? Nation-building has to start somewhere and at sometime.
There are obvious negotiations to be had in order for Palestine to invest itself fully in the creation of their own state without immediate backlash. The imprecise reference to East Jerusalem by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad versus Jerusalem in the body of the document’s text is an area of great concern. It is clear that Israel is in no position to allow Jerusalem to return solely to Palestine, resulting in necessary negotiations regarding the sacred city. Is it so erroneous to imagine Jerusalem as a dual capital, a place where two nations can co-exist without opposing ideologies threatening the streets? Could it be a place of peace, justice, and an ultimate example to the world as putting differences aside to establish the stability of two nations?
Palestine’s program for its Thirteenth Government is clear evidence of hopeful national aspirations and a sincere commitment to the foundation of a just state. The plan highlights its vow to foster acceptance of Israel as an independent state and to coexist peacefully as neighbors. Isn’t this what Israel ultimately wanted? Yes there is work to be done on the topic of borders, East Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees, but the plan realizes such grey areas and has left them up for negotiation. The question now remains; is Israel up to the challenge? Are they willing to find peace where there has always been violence, are they willing to find common ground where opposing ideologies need to be put aside? Ultimately, is Israel ready to allow Palestine a new beginning, where a nation can be built off of freedom, justice, and prosperity rather than oppression, violence, and chaos?

[Amy Goldstein]

I too applaud Salam Fayyad and fully support the pursuit of a common Palestinian vision. In fact, it is imperative. There have been countless failed attempts at negotiating peace in the region largely due to the lack of a Palestinian consensus. One component of negotiation that we discussed in class, knowing the negotiating parties’ ideologies, constraints, perceptions, stereotypes, etc., is overpowered by another component: third party interests. For Palestinians, there is no single ideology that is brought to the negotiating table. Israel is left to essentially negotiate with several Palestinian ideologies (multiple third parties) making it exceptionally difficult to come to an agreement (trying to find middle ground between two parties/ideologies is hard enough!).

Salam Fayyad’s acknowledgement of the need for a single Palestinian vision is encouraging. But before a consensus is reached, a sense of stability is required. Prominent, influential, visionary leadership is needed to command the direction of the Palestinian people and consequently negotiations of a two-state solution.

In “negotiations” for a Cultural Education Center (CEC) at Hamilton, I was frustrated by the lack of consensus on behalf of the students advocating for the Center. Meetings would sometimes go around and around trying to define the Center’s purpose and character, making it difficult to come to conclusions to ultimately present to the Board of Trustees. This provincial example mirrors that of the Palestinian condition. Since a CEC director has been appointed, strides have been made to come to consensus by carefully combing through the multitude of ideas to produce concrete solutions. Similar action needs to occur on behalf of the Palestinians to promote successful peace negotiations.

[Tim Eismeier]

Much of the information in this post underscores the inherent fragility of any future peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. For instance, the Palestinians themselves are not unified in terms of their support of either the Palestinian Liberation Organization or the Palestinian National Authority. At the same time, Israel is understandably reluctant to agree to the formation of any Palestinian state that will be hostile and belligerent toward Israel.

It is heartening, however, to see a concerted effor on the part of Palestinian National Authority toward working on a viable two-state solution, regardless of the flaws in the document. These flaws can be worked out during the course of peace negotiations.

[James Lacy]

One of the major reasons that Israel has been able to endure, and prosper, in a hostile environment is because of its strong foothold. The Israelis developed their State by building infrastructure, establishing strong governing principles, and forging international standing. The result was that, after all that Israel had invested, it was hard to deny their claim to the land. The Israelis were better organized, and more determined. By contrast, the Palestinian “state” lacked legitimacy; it could not provide for or govern its people, and almost seemed to invite further Israeli expansion. In fact, a serious concern of the Palestinians is that the Israeli settlers (with the tacit support of their government) will occupy and colonize all disputed territories before the Palestinian Government and people can get organized.
The Palestinian National Authority's new program, seeks to remedy this situation within the next two years. “Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State”, is both the blueprint for a sovereign Palestinian state, and a defensive strategy to prevent further Israeli expansion. After all, one necessitates the other. The PNA has realized that they will not be able to drive the Israeli occupiers out by force, but they can and must build up their own government and infrastructure, thus solidifying their claim to the land, and in doing so, give the Israelis less room to expand into. Additionally, as the new Palestinian State grows and matures, the Israeli settlers will look more and more like an incursion, and less and less like pioneers settling feral land. If the Palestinians can present a strong central Government that provides services for, and has the support of, its people, as well as an independent economy and vibrant public infrastructure, they will finally be able to make a legitimate claim to sovereignty. What it comes down to is a race. Israel is seeking to monopolize territory and legitimacy, and the PNA needs to assert itself before it is too late.

[Caroline Maran]

History has confirmed, that Israel is suspicious of its neighbor’s motives and governance until it is given reason to believe otherwise, as exemplified by peace agreements and negotiations with former adversaries Egypt and Syria. According to Dennis Ross author of The Missing Peace, Israel is ready to make “far reaching concessions” only when it is obvious that they have a “real partner” who will acknowledge the state of Israel and promote peace (Ross, 28). In other words, if the Israelis are given reason to trust the Palestinians they will.

I agree with Ambassador Walker that the Palestinian Prime Minister Salem Fayyad's blueprint to construct a peaceful Palestinian state in two years marks immense progress in a historic stalemate between Israel and Palestine. In his plan Fayyad instructs his people to unite and stresses the importance of establishing a state built on principles of human rights, international law, and religious tolerance. However the plan seems too good to be true for many Israelis. After all, this is exactly what Israel has wanted since the creation of their state. Skepticism in Israel about the plan revolves around distrust of the Arab world as well as the trauma caused by constant warfare between Palestine and Israel. As Ambassador Walker states, Israel will have to trust their neighbors and “have a high degree of confidence that once a Palestinian state is established, it will not become a launching pas for attacks on Israel”.

Despite Israeli hesitation I strongly believe that the international community should support Fayyad's blueprint for a peaceful Palestinian state in order to promote the resolution of the conflict. Both the Obama administration and Netanyahu’s government need to embrace this document for peace and move forward with plans for a two state solution. If Israel rejects the plan they risk further exacerbating the conflict by sending a negative message to extremist organizations such as Hamas that the Israeli people are against creation of a democratic Palestinian state. Israel needs to consider Fayyad’s plan for a new democratic government as a reason to trust the Palestinians and the international community needs to hold the prime minister to his promise for peace.

I believe that the international community should push for a two state solution to solve the Palestinian problem and secure interests in the Middle East. In order to solve the conflict, the Israeli and Palestinian desire for peace needs to surpass a history of hatred and conflict.

[Margaret Kremer]

The program of the Thirteenth Palestinian Government is by and large an impressive document. Its comprehensive set of milestones and goals to be accomplished in just two years’ time is ambitious for any group and especially notable considering the Palestinians’ traditionally fractured and disorganized political environment. These goals, particularly institutional reform and economic development, seem to represent a new phase for the Palestinians as well as an intent to increase domestic stability and perhaps curry international favor by extension.

While the program is impressive on paper, its true test will come as action translates theory into reality.
It is a question, though, if the goals expressed in the document could be achieved in such a short period of time. Any number of unforeseen events could thwart the ultimate success of the plan; as such, public support is vital to the success of such a major reform program. A failure to accomplish these goals would reflect poorly on the Palestinians and could potentially damage morale and domestic support for the program.

I am optimistic about the peace-making implications of these reforms and agree with Ambassador Walker’s statement that the Palestinian government’s goals as presented in the program could “enable a constructive process of peace making.” Israel should rightly be worried about any and all changes made to the government in Palestine and how they will affect Israel’s national security. The emerging government must be sure that its actions and rhetoric towards Israel will not increase the divide between the two, rather than open the door for future negotiations if the situation of the Palestinian people is to truly improve.

[E. Alex Singh]

The Israeli government will refuse to negotiate with the Palestinians to make a two state solution as long as little trust and hostility continues. Ambassador Walker notes that Israel will not acknowledge an aggressive, instable and independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, especially if Hamas’ rule over Gaza is to be of any example. In order for negotiations to continue between Israelis and Palestinians, a minimal level of trust must be maintained.

On a recent trip to the Middle East President Obama reaffirmed the Bush administration’s policy of creating a two-state solution. As in the past, Jerusalem remains a large point of contingency for both parties. As Walker observes, Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian Prime Minister refers to Jerusalem as “East Jerusalem” in his forward, however the actual document simply mentions “Jerusalem”. The difference of wording, whether it means if and how Jerusalem could become divided or shared, could prove to be pivotal to both sides during negotiations.

Ambassador Walker argues that it is unclear if Salam Fayyad’s detailed program of the Thirteenth government to create a two-state solution can become a reality. I agree with this, because history has shown that negotiations between the Palestinian and Israeli governments have yet to succeed in making a lasting peace agreement. Israel must recognize how their settlement policies affect the Palestinian government’s willingness to cooperate at this level. In his forward, Fayyad appears optimistic that an agreement can be reached within two years, however both Israeli and Palestinian governments must recognize the fragility of the situation that these negotiations are taking place in. While it is easy to remain sceptical of this round of negotiations, such a detailed document outlining a peaceful democracy for an independent Palestinian state in a stable environment must be supported by the US as well as the international community.

[David Sadove]

The groundwork for a viable Palestinian state is certainly a welcome step in the process of creating lasting peace in the region. A far cry from calls for the death of Israel, this document offers a legitimate attempt at nation building. Any attempt at peace will only prevail if moderates on both sides work towards mutual respect and recognition. This document is evidence that a solution can emerge, at least on paper. My concern is over the practical implementation of such a plan. The greatest challenge facing this plan is the lack of unity within the Palestinian community. This may look promising on paper, but I am skeptical over the ability of any party to exert enough clout to enact the changes needed to develop a true unified state. The dangers of autonomy before unity occurs are grave. A civil war between factions vying for control over this new state could be disastrous for the population, not to mention a haven for terrorists. The mention of rampant corruption throughout the existence of the Palestinian Authority would also raise questions of legitimacy for anyone who tried to lead the creation of this state.
While I applaud the effort of an organized plan, I question whether this document is really a game-changer. The formation of a state still hinges on unity. While this document is said to represent Palestinian interests, it is unclear whether those interests are shared by a willing majority of Palestinians. It is a futile effort negotiating with a moderate who doesn’t have the power to govern over extremists. I do not share the optimism that this plan is a major step towards an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, because I do not foresee Israel relinquishing control to warring factions. Until there is unity and a document is created by a coalition, others will fell excluded from the democratic process at the inception of a new state.

[Marcello Maceira]

In order for the thirteenth Palestinian government to triumph in creating an independent state it must hurdle some difficult obstacles. The largest obstacles to a two-state solution is differing political factions on both sides and a lack of trust between the sides. On both the Palestinian and Israel side there is a wide range of discourse on how to achieve peace. The Issue is that these factions have a wide range of political ideologies making their resolutions quite different. Palestinian president Abbas is a member of the Fatah political party. When the party meet they approved a program that called for no negations with Israel as long as settlements continued to built. After pressure from the international community Israel agreed to a freeze but shortly after the announcement they announced that 455 new housing units would be built. This is a serious obstacle to the peace process and underlines the difficulty Prime minister Netanyahu will have between competing domestic and international pressures. It is instances like this that increase the lack of trust between Israeli’s and Palestinians. This is a double edge sword that both groups are responsible for. Israel fears that a liberated Palestine could become a hot bed for terrorist activity and for good reason. While these obstacles make the situation look bleak I believe we should have a brighter outlook.
The unification of the Palestinian people is essential to the process of establishing an independent state. If the differing factions can unify with the aim of peace in mind progress is inevitable. The 13th government calls for Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians, i.e. give the Palestinians East Jerusalem as it’s capital, this will only occur if relations between the two groups runs smoothly. If Palestine is not unified and a faction decided to resort to violence Israel will back out of the agreement and respond with violence, and rightfully so. The key is strong leadership on both sides but more importantly on the Palestinian side. I think the 13th government is a positive step but in the end I believe it will prove fruitless. Israel has shown itself to be fickle in its policies as demonstrated by the 455 additional housing units. On the other side, who is to say more radical groups within Palestine will follow Prime Minister Fayyad’s call for peace. We will simply have to wait and see.