305 - A New Al Qaeda Strategy?

On Friday, March 27, President Obama announced his plans for Afghanistan focusing on the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  “The situation is increasingly perilous,” he said. He also warned that al Qaeda “is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan.”  He added: “We have a clear and focused goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”  Obama will deploy 4,000 more troops in addition to the 17,000 he has already commited adding up to more than 60,000 troops.  Expenditures will increase about 60% above the current $2 billion a month to about $3.2 billion a month.  The 82nd Airborne Division, rather than reservists, will act as trainers to double the Afghan army to 134,000 by 2011.  He also called for a dramatic increase in US development assistance for both countries, significantly increased US civilian presence on the ground and a five year program for Pakistan of $1.5 billion a year.  Finally, he said that we would establish benchmarks as we had done in Iraq over the past two years. 

If all of this sounds vaguely familiar, it is no surprise since the team that gave you Iraq over the past two years is the same team that is now in charge in Afghanistan. While we have certainly made progress in Iraq and the team deserves considerable credit for the change, the question is whether or not the same medicine will work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The conditions are quite different.  The topography in Waziristan and Afghanistan is a terrorist’s dream compared to the topography in Iraq.  The tribal culture is far more intense and tightly knit in Afghanistan than it was in Iraq.  The poverty level is considerably greater in Afghanistan and the educational level lower.  If you want to fuel terrorism, what you need is poverty and money.  And the Taliban has both.  The money comes from the drug trade, the poverty is a given.  And with money, you can buy support and corrupt the institutions of government that could stand against you. 

One wonders whether or not with $3.2 billion a month we could not outspend, out-corrupt and out-buy the Taliban.  That is not the way we want to operate, but until we can dry up the Taliban and al-Qaeda financial resources and immunize the local population from the Taliban’s bribary and barbarity, it is hard to see how we will be able to develop the system of intelligence and local reporting that can defeat our enemies.  NATO continues to be divided on how to deal with the Opium industry since it is the lifeblood of so many Afghanis.  But unless we can come up with an effective strategy for strangling Taliban and al-Qaeda resources, any gains we may make are likely to be subject to reversal.

But lets look on the positive side.  Let’s say we are fully effective and we can blunt the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the question I have to ask is whether or not we will have solved the problem of al Qaeda? There are some clues that are worrisome.

March 17, 2009, Yemeni security authorities said that a suicide bomber who killed four South Korean tourists in Yemen was trained in Somalia.  Acording to a Reuters report, tens of thousands of Somali refugees arrive in Yemen each year while the Yemen government fights an insurgency in the north putting Yemen at risk of becoming a failed state.  Yemen’s problems could then spill over into Saudi Arabia.  Yemen authorities have rounded up dozens of militants linked to al-Qaeda.

On March 18, 2009 another man blew himself up in Yemen trying to attack South Korean investigators.  These attacks followed calls by Al Qaeda leaders for attacks on non-Muslim foreigners in the Arabian Peninsula.

On February 25 the press reported that Islamist militants in Somalia have rejected any compromise and will fight until Somalia is a strict Islamist state.  Meanwhile educated Somalis are leaving the country in droves.

On March 25 the press reported that a tape released by the al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahri called on the Sudanese to undertake jihad against the “crusade” being orchestrated by the West against Sudan. 

In January 2009 the press reported that a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, Abu Sayyaf al-Shihri, released to Saudi Arabia, had shown up in Yemen as the deputy leader of al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch.

According to the Timesonline in July 2008, success in Iraq against al-Qaeda has led the terrorists to flee to Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Thailand with the largest contingent going to North Africa.  An arc of terror is taking shape in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, according to the article. 

There is more, but on the face of it, victory in Iraq has led to an enhanced al-Qaeda presence in failed states where Islamic fundamentalism has taken root and training facilities can sustain a steady conveyor belt of suicide bombers and fighters. So the question is, can we afford to focus all our attention and resources on Pakistan and Afghanistan while al-Qaeda turns its attention to the more accommodating environments of failed states?  In short, can we afford to turn our backs on Darfur, Somalia, Yemen and a number of other states that are at risk?  

Comments

[Lachlan Markay]

Although I agree with Ambassador Walker's analysis of the challenges and policy objectives of the Obama Administration and American foreign policy generally, I disagree with the implications of his concluding question. Though failed states and the violence that they often foster are of course major concerns for any military foreign policy, extremist activity in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen must not distract from the immediate objectives in Afghanistan.

Were we (the United States) to go back to the morning of September 11, 2001 with the knowledge we now have of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, their tactics, and their objectives, we would most likely pursue a military campaign quite different form the ones we now see in Afghanistan and Iraq. Though our tactics have changed, first in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, we realize now that the initial invasion of the two countries (and the strategic decisions that were made by our commanders at the time) may not have been the optimal choices in combating extremist elements in the two nations. We may have chosen a more multi-pronged approach--and given State a larger role, for instance--or invaded with a stronger troop contingent.

But hindsight is 20 20, and though we are finally making headway in Iraq, we seem to be stumped when it comes to Afghanistan. If we do succeed there, it will most likely take more than 10 years, and will require a malleable strategy that can be shifted to accommodate changing conditions on the ground and revelations in the theory of counter-terrorist operations. Given the seeming confusion and exasperation of NATO and the United States in trying to find a workable strategy in Afghanistan, it is simply ludicrous to consider an additional military intervention in another hostile failed state where, like Afghanistan, no government wields an effective monopoly over the use of violence, and where Islamist radicals and tribal leaders hold considerable power.

So no, we cannot "afford to turn our backs on Darfur, Somalia, Yemen and a number of other states that are at risk," but we also cannot afford to bring the fight to them. At least not yet. If the Administration's new Afghanistan strategy is effective, and if the United States can form a general and generally workable strategy for combating terrorism in failed states, THEN we can consider moving into Somalia, Sudan, or Yemen. But until that day, our efforts must remain in Afghanistan.

[Hilary Weiss]

While President Obama’s plan to fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a measure America feels it must take, it does not take into consideration the costs that countries like Darfur, Somalia, and Yemen pose to the security of America. I am not opposed to the idea of ridding Pakistan and Afghanistan of the Taliban and al Qaeda; yet, I do not believe that this will effectively address the issue at hand. Since terrorism is without borders, due to easy and quick means of communication, Bin Laden can effectively convey his message to anyone, anywhere. Although President Obama’s strategy draws a nice compromise between those individuals who wish to target and destroy the Taliban and those who want to take on the task of building institutions and protecting Afghan civilians, the U.S. needs to do more than invade and occupy other countries to ensure that American’s security remains intact.
We have suffered failures in both Vietnam and Iraq; it does not make sense to engage in another endless war against terrorism when there are catastrophes going on elsewhere that ought to be dealt with. Obama’s efforts to offer humanitarian aid are sound however, offering military support to the existing regime in Afghanistan is pointless. Although Obama claims that he has established a three-to-five year plan with checkpoints, we have learnt from the past that these time periods to not usually pan out as intended. There have been adverse responses to the United States’ occupation of the Middle East as it continues to anger not just the Taliban and al Qaeda, but the people who inhabit these areas as well. Increasing our numbers will inevitably lead to more resistance and, in return, will thwart the success of humanitarian aid.
The selective concern the United States pays to areas in the Middle East verse other areas suffering great atrocities is unparalleled. The United States seems to be pouring time, money, people, and other resources into the Middle East in return for a small payoff. As Gilles Dorronsoro, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said, “We still have this idea that with more resources, more men, more money, we can do the job. And we cannot, actually. We need a new strategy. And there is nothing clearly indicating that we are at that point right now”. If we wish to see peace in the Middle East we need to trade in our armed security forces for improved education, agricultural aid, and a healthier infrastructure.

[David Riordan]

Al-Qaeda has been called many things in the past, not the least of which is "a hydra"; stamp out one cell, and another two spring up elsewhere. It's a decentralized network which allows disaffected individuals to channel their energy toward producing disastrous outcomes far more impactful than the organization's structure would traditionally imply it could. Frankly the "organization" al-Quaeda barely even exists, nor could it within a traditional economic model. It's not a centralized firm nor is it part of a market production.

Al-Qaeda is simply a form of Commons-based peer production [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commons-based_peer_production], a new economic model developed by Harvard Law professor Yochai Benkler. Under this model, large numbers of people are able to coordinate to produce, but without the need for traditional organizations. It's a model that applies directly to many internet-related activities and products including open-source software development and peer-to-peer file sharing.

This latter example of peer-to-peer file sharing is frequently associated with terrorist networks insofar that shutting down filesharing networks does nothing to stop the cheap proliferation of newer, more difficult to stop networks. Think Napster - within weeks of its shutdown by court order, most of its users, via word of mouth, had moved onto its newer spiritual successors, which were more decentralized than its inspiration, and eventually completely decentralized. These successors were never able to be shut down, but only infiltrated and made marginally less efficient. Cut the head off of Napster and Kazaa and Gnutella sprout up in its place, followed by a whole host of other newer technologies that are more efficient and harder to capitalize than Napster ever was. The shutdown of Napster was less a victory for the music industry than the cutting off of the hydra's first head.

How then, to disrupt these activities? Change the rules of the game. If there's no centralized way to shut these things down (the entire purpose of the Internet when it was developed by RAND & DARPA), then you change the parameters by which these systems operate. You rearchitect the internet to police its own traffic so that filesharing programs can't operate. You ensure countries where al-Qaeda might thrive don't have the conditions of failed statehood which enable it to take off. To tackle these problems is a tremendous undertaking. Either new methods will emerge to thrive in the new economy's ecosystem, as have on the internet, or massive changes must be made to preserve the previously disrupted system. To fix al-Qaeda means doing in Yemen, Darfur, Somalia and every other failed state what has been done in Afghanistan - which is to say bring them back from being failed states to having functional governments providing for their citizens - but whether we have the resources to do this is unknown.

[Patrick Hines]

It is undeniable that the United States has made progress in Iraq in recent years; however that is not to say that we have gained as much ground in the war on terror, specifically against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Due to the Bush administration’s relentless refusal to yield, the vast majority of United States forces have been invested in stabilizing Iraq. While the future of Iraq was appearing more optimistic towards the end of Bush’s presidency, as well as the beginning of Obama’s, our immense commitment of manpower has allowed the Taliban to gain ground in the countryside’s of Afghanistan. Furthermore, a stabilizing Iraq has demonstrated that a pro-American government does not wipe out harboring terrorists of that state, but instead forces them to flee and set up camp elsewhere. As Ambassador Walker has pointed out, areas in Northern Africa, as well as fragile states in the Middle East, have become appealing stations for militants seeking to establish fully Islamic states.
For this reason, the United States cannot afford to direct all of its resources in the area of Pakistan and Afghanistan, if we are to undermine the al Qaeda network. Obama will face an extremely uphill battle completely extinguishing the Taliban for obvious reasons. As mentioned in the blog, the tribal culture is extremely close within Afghanistan and Pakistan, unlike Iraq. History is on the side of the Taliban, who have proven themselves against world powers before with the defeat of both the British and the Russians. Therefore it is likely that the Taliban can rely on crucial tribal support for protection, as well as providing intelligence on the movement of the increasing US troops. Furthermore, Obama will have a very difficult time attaining ally support in the war against the Taliban, as this political faction has managed to endure, with their incomparable knowledge of the terrain, as well as inflow of sources from Pakistan. The Karzai government may control major cities, with the majority of official political power, but the Taliban is greatly feared throughout the country, has a great deal of resources, as well as investments in the profitable opium market.
The Taliban may be a tyrannical and evil political faction, but brutal political factions exist throughout the world, and the Taliban has demonstrated their advantages, and ability to exploit the United State’s greatest assets. The United States ought to focus its resources in international counter-intelligence, and making al Qaeda the priority. The Obama administration may want to invest in training the Afghan army to battle the Taliban, sever its ties into Pakistan, and refocus itself less on a threatening political faction, and more on the international terrorist network of al Qaeda. Granted the Taliban is known for its harboring of these terrorist agents, but we must go after the terrorist network instead of the government willing to protect it. Even if we somehow manage to defeat the Taliban, as Iraq has demonstrated, al Qaeda will find an unattended state to reboot, such as Somalia or Yemen.

[Jared Sorin]

Anti-Terrorism Efforts Must Be Expanded Beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan To Other Failing and Failed States If We Are To Achieve Sustained Success

President Obama’s recently announced plans with respect to the battle against terrorism call for greater focus and appropriately include an increased, albeit highly costly, military force in Afghanistan, with dramatically greater development assistance for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He hopes to finally and fully defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban militants ousted from power in Afghanistan but never completely driven out of the two nations as the US was diverted from its efforts in Afghanistan by its subsequent invasion of Iraq. The Obama plan, however, is too narrowly focused. Even as al Qaeda reportedly plans new terror attacks from its safe havens in Pakistan, mandating a more fulsome and immediate approach by the US in that region, we also must consider and mitigate the near- and long-term grave threats to international peace and security posed by the existence of other failing or failed states throughout the world. Each one, after all, represents a potential replacement for Afghanistan and Pakistan or an additional safe haven for highly flexible and mobile non-state actors such as al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Accordingly, anti-terrorism efforts of the US and others must be expanded beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan to other failing and failed states if we are to achieve sustained success.
Assuming our redoubled, newly focused efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan are successful and sustainable, a highly questionable assumption in light of the convergence of difficult topography, demographics, tribal culture, and the financial resources of the Taliban from the drug trade, there remain a large number of failing and failed states throughout the world. Such states represent a unique challenge to the maintenance of international peace and security. Many believe that there currently is far greater threat derived from failing and failed states than by conquering ones. Failed states are more prone to humanitarian disasters, endemic civil wars, immense flows of refugees and internally displaced people, and international trade in drugs and weapons. Moreover, they also increase regional and global instability and the threat of global terrorism from havens often more easily established in failed states. Analysis of peacekeeping operations around the world reveals the fragility and difficulty of maintaining the peace, all the more so within or among failed states. It behooves us, therefore, to work diligently to prevent state failures and to help failed states re-emerge as democratic ones capable of peaceful coexistence, economic development, and poverty reduction.
Complex problems usually require complex, multi-pronged solutions. Although President Obama has embraced a seemingly broad solution that combines military force with development assistance, he limits the current effort to only those states that seem to pose the most immediate problem. In doing so, he ignores the reality that we also must take an expansive view that looks well beyond merely the national borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan and recognizes that long-term success requires that we address the dangers associated with other failing and failed states. There is, for example, evidence of an emerging “arc of terror” taking shape in the north African states of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, as terrorists relocate from Iraq due to US success there. Similarly, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen already are safe havens for terrorists. Accordingly, even if we successfully “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the states in this emerging arc of terror are, and other failed states of the world could be, ready or potential replacements. Our seemingly singular focus on the immediate problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan is shortsighted and must, therefore, be conjoined with an equal and long-term commitment to promote peace and democracy in failing and failed states. Our experience in Iraq should, however, remind us that peace and democracy are best achieved not by the use or threat of force but by political and economic liberalism fostering power sharing and economic opportunities, enhanced trade, and diplomatic efforts incorporating increased contacts and engagement, peacekeeping, and foreign aid. An exclusive focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan and a concomitant failure to address the risks associated with failed states elsewhere all but assures that we will confront al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that find safe haven among the numerous failing and failed states of the world over and over again. The need to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan should not serve as license to avoid or ignore those states that similarly pose palpable risk.

[Danielle Raullli]

Certainly the U.S. cannot afford to turn our backs on Darfur, Somalia, and other failed states that provide safe-havens for terrorists. In addition, I think we are being short-sighted by narrowly focusing our resources and attention on Pakistan and Afghanistan, because the new form of terrorism cannot be framed as a single state or a single group of people. It has no center and no single ideology; rather, it permeates various social networks. As an example, it is believed that Al-Qaeda has terrorist networks in over 40 countries including Bangladesh, Algeria, and the Philippines-nations that are not in proximity of each other but maintain ties to terrorism. This demonstrates that the modern terrorism we are trying to combat today is truly a global terrorism, and focusing on a single state is clearly not the right strategy to effectively deal with this issue.

In order to begin fighting the terrorism threat, we have to first realize that the issue must be framed on a multi-lateral level. Modern terrorism is deeply rooted in societies, and a military operation intended to knock out a terrorist cell is not a sufficient method to eliminate the global terrorist threat. It requires international action and awareness. For example, nations should aim to increase and improve border security in order to impede the movement of terrorists. This increase of security and awareness should also extend to hubs of transportation, major marketplaces and financial exchanges. The international community also needs to take steps to cut off the financial means to which these terrorist organizations are kept alive. This could mean reevaluating and restructuring how the west distributes foreign aid to third-world states to ensure the aid is not getting into the wrong hands. There needs to be increased transparency, especially in failed states, that can shed more light on possible areas where terrorism is a significant risk or has already taken root. To say the least, the international community cannot ignore situations in Darfur and Somalia or leave the situations to their own means, which ultimately will only breed terrorism from the fallen governments, uneducated population and rampant poverty. Thus, the U.S. and the rest of the globe need to focus more on intelligence in this nations and less on military stratagem.

Lastly, the war against terror must not be seen as solely an American endeavor. It requires global cooperation, so that terrorists are not simply working against the U.S. but an entire international community. If framed only as an American military pursuit, and we channel our resources on just two nations, it will be increasingly easy for terrorists to slip under the radar in other nations. Sure, we can drive terrorist cells out of Afghanistan. However, the best analogy for terrorism is similar to that of a life-threatening disease in that with the destruction of one terrorist cell in one nation, other terrorist cells take ground in several different nations. By then we are trapt in a cat-and-mouse game, chasing fleeing terrorists rather than preventing the network from expanding. During this game terrorists have ample time to prepare and execute multi-front attacks. In times of escalating danger, I think that is a risk we simply cannot afford.

[Dorian Bakogiannis]

Ambassador Walker laments the tremendous expenditure that has accompanied American reconstruction strategies in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and it is certainly true that these programs have been costly without consistently delivering measurable results. The resurgence of terrorist activity in both Iraq and Afghanistan, well after victory had been declared in those regions, is testament to how limited the success of those missions has been. One is left to wonder, as Ambassador Walker does, whether U.S. funds might be more effectively dispensed according to amoral pragmatism, buying off local tribes and militias, rather than by the tenets of an overarching ideology or doctrine.
But the alternative to narrowly focused might and money that Ambassador Walker implicitly suggests hardly seems feasible, and could easily prove more costly to America’s image and to her treasury than President Obama’s projected Afghanistan policy. It may be true that the military squeeze in Afghanistan and Iraq has sent terrorists fleeing to North Africa, India and elsewhere; but it is equally true, and Ambassador Walker rightly contends, that poverty is the primary driver of terrorism in the Middle East. The critical issue that the U.S. faces in the Middle East is not as much the ideology of Islamic Radicalism as it is the platform of poverty and deficiency on which this ideology stands. Surgical special ops strikes in Somalia, a Tomahawk exploding in Yemen, a blockade of the Gulf of Aden: these clearly are not the tools with which a global power combats poverty.
The United States must pursue anti-terrorism policies that are designed to curtail terrorist funding, mobility and leadership, while simultaneously alleviating the conditions of poverty. This strategy must be executed not simply through military means, but with the cooperation of other governmental and non-governmental organizations. Significantly, this process must occur on a country-by-country basis: as the deterioration of conditions in Afghanistan indicates, the shift of American focus to new theatres, such as Iraq, only hinders the reconstruction efforts of initial programs. Ambassador Walker is correct in suggesting that the United States must not become too mired in any single conflict, but fails to fully consider one of the lessons of the Iraq-Afghanistan dichotomy in criticizing President Obama’s new plan for a surge in Afghanistan. Anti-poverty and reconstruction campaigns – campaigns that require a tangible and focused U.S. presence – are the most effective weapons against terrorism that America possesses.

[Francis Matt]

Ambassador Walker questions whether the United States should be focusing all of its attention in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre in its battle against al Qaeda. Ambassador Walker is correct in suggesting that there are many other fronts on which the U.S. needs to confront a growing al Qaeda presence; however, the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre is currently the most pressing. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been establishing strongholds in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which has had a severe destabilizing on the country. By reaching a peace deal in February, the Pakistani government effectively legitimized a Taliban stronghold in the Swat valley. Pakistan has nuclear capability, thus it is essential for the U.S. to ensure Pakistan’s strength as a state and combat any al Qaeda presence in the vicinity. Obama’s decision to escalate U.S. involvement financially and militarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a prudent move and shows that his administration is addressing al Qaeda’s presence in this volatile region with the urgency that the situation requires. The stakes in the Afghanistan war are also high in terms of the credibility of the United States in the broader war on terror. This is not to suggest that it is not important for the U.S. to confront al Qaeda on other fronts; however, the war on terror has become so large and complex that it is necessary to prioritize. Currently, the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre is and should be the Obama administration’s top priority in the war on terror.

Prioritizing the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre is a sensible move for the Obama Administration; however, it appears as though the U.S. is simply escalating the conflict without making the necessary adjustments in strategy to meet the unique conditions of the region. More troops and money will not compensate for a flawed strategy. The Obama administration should complement its redoubled effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan with a comprehensive strategy that is suited to the challenges of Afghanistan’s terrain and culture.

Al Qaeda’s continual spread into failing states indicates that the overall war on terror cannot be won quickly or through military force alone. The United States cannot conceivably confront al Qaeda militarily in every failed state in which it has established a presence. The countries that Ambassador Walker cites as having a growing al Qaeda presence have several characteristics in common. Each of the countries listed have problems of persistent poverty and crumbling state authority. These characteristics have implications for how the United States cannot address terrorism in these areas indirectly while its much of its resources are tied up in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. If poverty and crumbling state authority are the conditions favorable to al Qaeda gaining traction, the U.S. should seek to combat al Qaeda indirectly by reversing these conditions. The U.S. should undermine al Qaeda’s presence in these countries by helping strengthen state institutions and promoting economic development. The U.S. must also seek to distinguish between governments that harbor al Qaeda and governments that simply are unable to do anything about al Qaeda’s presence within their borders. The United States should provide incentives to the latter to fight al Qaeda’s presence themselves and provide these governments with advice and assistance in counter-terrorism operations.

[Emily Davaney-Graham]

Ambassador Walker rightly states that terrorism is fueled by poverty and money. In fact, most problems of instability can be attributed to these factors. Therefore, it must be of grave concern that the United States has been wholly unsuccessful at rooting out terrorism or fighting the circumstances that breed said terrorism. Given this reality, Ambassador Walker suggests that the United States not only engage in military endeavors but humanitarian efforts as well. This suggestion is valid because it has the potential to stem the expansion of terrorist organizations, like al-Qaeda, at best and at worst improves the lives of those impacted. While the question of validity is easily answered the more important question of feasibility must also be addressed.

Does the United States have the economic capability to provide military and humanitarian aid? According to a CRS report that was commissioned for Congress in 2004, the United States already provides foreign aid to 150 countries with Israel and Egypt receiving the greatest funds. Overall amongst large donors, the United States provides the most amount of foreign aid in dollars, but the least amount based on percentage of GDP. Given the small percentage of GDP spent on foreign aid and the large amount spent on defense and the military, it is apparent that the United States can afford to spend more in order to alleviate poverty in developing nations.

Given that the United States is economically capable and has a vested interest in ameliorating terrorism, it should expand its foreign aid budget. As Ambassador Walker suggests, aid should be increased in developing nations such as Yemen, Somalia, and northern Africa. Increased aid can come from direct loans and grants to these nations or through indirect mechanisms like the World Bank. In addition, the United States should provide favorable trade agreements, administrative support, and human support. In reality terrorists organizations will never be fully eliminated, however, through foreign aid and military policies the United States can limit their ability to take hold.

[Abdelwahab Abdelghany]

Ambassador Walker’s concern of al-Qaeda spreading, more than it already has, is a very serious threat that the United States must deal with now. There are two ways that al-Qaeda may react to the increase of US military presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan: either increase their man power in these two nations or flock out to other parts of the world where they have a safe haven like Yemen. Al-Qaeda being able to increase its recruitment when it is under attack is not a surprise nor is it anything new. When the United States first entered Iraq, al-Qaeda’s presence was very limited but that didn’t last too long. Because the Iraq invasion was seen by many Muslims around the world as a Western occupation, it became very easy for al-Qaeda to recruit.

In 2003, a New York Times article titled “Anger on Iraq Seen as New Qaeda Recruiting Tool” cited Carl Bauer, the chief of the German state department, noting that “we know the activity is increasing and the willingness to participate and to listen to radical messages is on the rise.” Al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama Bin Laden attracted a greater audience as result of the US invasion of Iraq by defining the movement as Jihad. The United States’ top priority should be to ensure that its efforts don’t become a selling point for al-Qaeda’s recruitment. Securing the borders as to deny al-Qaeda members entrance into Pakistan and Afghanistan does not mean fighting won’t intensify. If ordinary Pakistanis and Afghanis view the US as a threat, they may feel provoked to fight as well as ally with fighters from other regions. The US has taken the right steps by offering economic incentives to people in hopes of buying out al-Qaeda but that alone will not stop its spread or the imminent threat the US faces.

It is crucial for the US to be able to have Muslims and Muslim nations around the world believe in as well as enlist in the goals and missions of the US. The United States must be willing to communicate and work with all Muslim nations including those connected to al-Qaeda such as Iran; this will increase the United States’ soft power, which is important to its success. There is no doubt that this is a difficult and complex task but the alternative is to keep fighting a war that has no end in sight. The most useful resource that the United States has is its alliances with countries like Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia and it should continue to use them. That being said, attempting to have greater alliances or control in places like Yemen is tough and simply unreliable because, as Ambassador Walker mentioned, it’s close to being a failed State. Yemen’s problem will be much easier to handle when people in places like Egypt believe in what the US is trying to accomplish because that will have a spillover in other parts of region. President Obama’s tactic of reaching out to Muslims and the Muslim world is a great strategy and indicates that his administration understands that its fight goes beyond the borders of two nations. That being said, actions speak louder than words and so in order to have Muslims truly side with the US, our policies must illustrate the change we seek. One way for the US to illustrate this change is by distaining itself from oppressive domestic policies in these regions as well as be more willing to criticize them. In short, the US needs to continue to tackle the al-Qaeda threat by fighting it fundamentally in the eyes of the world as well as continue its missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan to stabilize the region.

[Chloe Major]

In a New York Times article on July 8th 2007, Stephen Kotkin explained that when it comes to terrorism and national and international security, “a cesspool of misery next to a world of growing prosperity is both terrible for those in the cesspool and dangerous to those who live next to it “. You note that for terror to prosper, poverty and money are the means. This could not be more correct. Terrorism comes from the innate problems of having income discrepancies so vast that all other options seem hopeless. Enhanced al-Qaeda presence in failed states is proof of this fact.
The spread of terrorism is a national and international security issue for the untied states. As a world superpower, we hold an increased responsibility both for our own safety and that of the world community. You raise the question whether we can afford to focus our resources solely on Pakistan and Afghanistan while al-Qaeda infiltrates other failed states. With $3.2 billion perhaps we could outspend or out-corrupt the Taliban; but maybe the more important question is how we should spend out money.
Terrorism occurs when a lack of resources makes terror an appealing option. With $3.2 billion dollars, it seems that we should be working to eliminate such failed states, income discrepancies and poverty. By eradicating the root of terrorism, we would essentially be “nipping the problem in the bud”. The short answer to your question is that no, we cannot and should not turn our backs on countries like Darfur or Somalia, or any other failed state where terror my breed. However, I think that the root of this problem lies in the number and increasing prevalence of failed states to begin with. With such vast resources ($3.2 billion dollars is not small price tag), I think we could better utilize our “help” in a way that protect us and surrounding nations from the sources of terrorism.

[Michael Busenhart]

When looking at the current situation that is taking place in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I think that it was the right move for President Obama to send more troops into Afghanistan. It seems that when we entered Iraq we lost our focus on Afghanistan and a lot of the progress that we originally had made was gone. Whether it was true or not, I remember hearing about the successes we were having in Afghanistan and that the Taliban had been driven out of the region. When we entered Iraq it seems that we turned our back on Afghanistan and as a result the Taliban has been able to move back in. Under these circumstances I can see why poor locals might, in a way, welcome the Taliban because the United States did not do a great job stabilizing Afghanistan after we entered. With the increase of troops, hopefully we can improve on the areas where we have fallen short in the past and win over the local population. Also the $3.2 billion a month needs to go to more than just the military. The post mentions that poverty and money are all you need for terrorism, so the US needs to find a way to stop this. The best way is to educate the poor lower class that is likely to fall for the bribery and ideals that the Taliban are able to inflict on them. In addition I feel that the US first needs to be successful in Afghanistan before it can move onto other countries. We entered Afghanistan because Al Qaeda was for the most part centered there and they directly attacked us. Yemen, Somalia and other Northern African countries are yet to attack us on our soil. At the same time they should not be forgotten so that Al Qaeda can get a stronghold and turn these countries into another mess that is hard to clean up like Afghanistan. NATO, the UN and other strong political organizations should work to bring aid, education and money to these countries that are being infiltrated by Al Qaeda before it becomes to late and we have to enter with military forces again.
Michael Busenhart

[Sarah Moore]

On his second day in office, President Obama signed an executive order to close Guantanamo Bay within the year, a symbolic, but significant shift in strategy for how the United States will continue its War on Terror operations. Several months later, the Bush Administration's policies regarding the War on Terror were further dissolved, as President Obama extended America's hand out to her former opponents, in an attempt to usher in a new era of diplomacy. In a clear demonstration of this transition to soft power, the Obama Administration illuminated its new image by re-branding previous War on Terror efforts as 'Overseas Contingency Operations'. The American public and citizens of foreign nations took little notice of this unsubstantial name change. But for the Obama Administration, this change in policy and the re-branding of a war with no hope for victory marked a significant turning point in American foreign policy: As Fareed Zakaria described it last week- “For America to continue to lead the world, we will have to first join it.”

Still, many continue to be skeptical that President Obama will bring about substantial changes in the way America relates with the rest of the world. To some extent, even President Obama agrees, stressing that we cannot be so naive to think that the election of "Barack Hussein Obama" will eradicate the threat al-Qaeda and religious extremism pose to the United States. Furthermore, the goals of the Obama Administration remain the same as those of past administrations: to make America safer, to combat terrorism and eliminate the threat al-Qaeda poses to the international community. So, the question remains—has anything really changed? America does seem to have reexamined both her place in the world and the War on Terror, with the understanding that we cannot combat terrorism unilaterally. Perhaps most importantly, America has rejoined the world, on the basis of both mutual respect and an interest to insure that al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations cannot operate. Still, it's one thing to foster change, its another thing to communicate it well: And this is where the election of President Obama-- and his well-renowned communication skills-- have defined a new era for the United States.

Recently, the President spoke in France on the continuing threat al-Qaeda poses to both Europe and the United States. But it is worth noting that al-Qaeda poses a much greater threat to the Arab world-- to countries like Saudi Arabia-- threatening to destabilize regimes in the name of Islam. Ousting al-Qaeda and the Taliban through out-spending and out-corrupting these organizations will almost certainly push them into weaker states such as Yemen. Our best strategy then, is to work alongside strong European and Arab states on counterterrorism operations, while striving to empower the governments of fragile nations to respond against terrorism. We must use this $3.2 billion a month to build institutional capacity in places such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, recognizing that it is in all of our best interest to do so. When once-fragile nations can defend their own borders from terrorism, then we will have succeeded in the War on Terror.

[Christina Culver]

Few argue – particularly in the wake of the disaster that is the Iraq War – that fighting terrorism in Afghanistan is not a daunting task. Some support anti-terrorist action in Afghanistan and others oppose it, often questioning the true motives behind involvement in the Middle East. “A New Al Qaeda Strategy” takes a middle ground, arguing that anti-terrorist action is necessary, but not in Afghanistan given Al Qaeda’s growth in North Africa. The blog makes two main points. First, that complexities in Afghanistan will likely prevent the U.S. from strangling the Taliban, and second, that more focus should be placed on states such as Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen that are vulnerable to terrorism. Both points, however, err in their judgment of the situation.

Ambassador Walker states the vitality of the crisis in Afghanistan best when he writes: “If you want to fuel terrorism, what you need is poverty and money. And the Taliban has both.” It seems clear from this that the U.S. should indeed be concerned about terrorism in the region. Additionally, the blog mentions that there is a “clear and focused goal,” but that the U.S. needs to develop a more effective strategy. Too few foreign policy concerns have such an outlined goal. This, in addition to the creativity that accompanies the new presidential administration, gives hope to creating a new strategy and accomplishing this goal. Troops are already on the ground, giving the U.S. a leg-up and setting the stage to stifle terrorism at its source. Success in Afghanistan given that there is a focused goal, the stage for new strategy development, and troop availability is more likely than “Strategy” indicates.

Over the past eight years, it has become apparent that the United States’ strength does not lie in its ability to conduct multiple wars simultaneously. Engaging terrorists in Darfur, Somalia, and Yemen would only further stretch U.S. troops, making it nearly impossible to successfully fight the Taliban in any of these regions. The U.S. should instead focus on the areas in which troops already exist as opposed to becoming involved elsewhere. This however, does not, as Walker implies, require the U.S. to neglect states at risk. Sharing responsibility for terrorism prevention would allow all at-risk regions to be monitored. The United Nations, for example, passed Resolution 60/288 in 2006 and 62/272 in 2008 mandating UN involvement in the fight against terrorism. The organization already has troops on the ground in all Darfur, Somalia, and Yemen and is far better equipped to handle issues at hand than the U.S. is currently. The United States should not intervene in this process, but instead focus on Afghanistan where U.S. resources have been placed and assist the UN through other means when necessary.

[Joe Hudson]

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center awoke the United States and the world to the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. With support from Congress, the Bush Administration initiated military campaigns against Al-Qaeda and the terrorists’ allies in Afghanistan and Iraq in late 2001 and early 2002, respectively. The campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda was closely associated with a campaign to fight Islamic extremism. Bush called the military actions in the Middle-East, a “war on terror” where Iraq, Iran, and Syria were recognized as perpetrators of a political ideology amicable to Al-Qaeda’s cause. To the Bush administration, the Middle-East was a region hostile to Western interests. Bush’s policies therefore, emphasized military action opposed to diplomacy. The lines were clearly drawn. “You are either with us or against us.” (Bush, November 2001).
Like the preceding administration, President Obama fully recognizes the threat Islamic terrorism poses to the United States and its allies. Yet, in a clear political break from the Bush administration, Obama is seeking partnership with the Muslim world. Terms once employed to demarcate enemies from allies, like “axis of evil” or a “war on terror,” are no longer used. Instead of isolating the countries within the Middle-East as harbors of terror, Obama is rightfully seeking to amend old relationships in an effort to cultivate new solutions.
At The Hague on March 27, 2009, Obama announced a new strategy to fight Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In attendance were 73 nations and 11 international organizations. America’s new, refocused strategy, as envisioned my Obama, places an emphasis on fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan together. The United State’s intelligence agencies warn “that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the U.S. homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan.” (Obama, March 2009). To solve this problem, Obama announced that he has ordered the deployment of 17,000 additional American troops to the border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the coming months, Obama will consider deploying an additional 10,000 troops, a move that in combination with the troops currently being deployed would effectively double the U.S. military presence in the area.
Yet, as noted by Ambassador Walker, Al-Qaeda is currently developing a presence in Algeria, India, Libya, Pakistan, Mauritania, Morocco, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen. Al-Qaeda’s growing “arc of terror” and influence is the result of the American led political and military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda’s diaspora will further complicate and threaten Western security in the future.
The fleeing of terrorists to Muslim, impoverished countries complicates the terrorist threat, but in no matter necessarily greatens the viability of Al-Qaeda. A surge in Afghanistan will likely encourage the development of Al-Qaeda and its “arc of terror.” Yet, if Obama’s diplomatic strategy is successful, the Middle-East will hopefully be intolerant to the expansion of Al-Qaeda within the region.
The troop surge in Iraq has been successful. It seems that a troop surge in Afghanistan will lead to a similar positive end. By establishing viable, strong governments in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, coupled with a drastically new diplomatic approach to old allies like Iran, the Middle-East and the United States could together triumph over Al-Qaeda and terrorism.

[Grant Blosser]

As America expands its presence in the Middle East, we must recognize that our approach is treating the symptoms, but not the cause, of terrorism. Afghanistan and Iraq have shown American policy-makers that micro-victories do not equal macro-victories. Rather than pursuing unilateral progress in select states, the U.S. must seek an overarching, cooperative policy in the Middle East.
Ambassador Walker asserts that “victory in Iraq has led to an enhanced al-Qaeda presence in failed states.” Keeping in mind this spillover effect, there can be no lasting progress against Islamic extremists without addressing every failed state. Stateless groups like al Qaeda feed on the despair of impoverished and seemingly hopeless peoples. Furthermore, leaders of extremist groups brew anti-American sentiment by arguing that Western “meddling” has only exacerbated the problems of Muslims. Such an argument is a pillar of Bin Laden’s support for jihad against the West. Given the spillover effect and the nature of terrorist groups, America faces an all-or-nothing prospect: save every failed state or extremists will simply migrate to a place where conditions are ripe for breeding terrorists.
Surely America, and our allies for that matter, possesses neither the resources nor the human-capital to rescue every Middle Eastern political-economy. One needs to look only at our struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan (or our own economy for that matter) to recognize that such a task is impossible. Rather than continuing to force the Middle East into reform, we must incent failed states towards political and economic gain.
America has, for too long, used the stick without the carrot. We could, for example, promise economic trade, investment, and aid to countries that improve human rights, promote economic opportunity and equality, and exhibit political reform. Not only would incentive-based diplomacy nullify al Qaeda’s “Western meddling” argument, but the potential increase in per capita wealth could ease poverty (a precondition of terrorism and extremism). Such measures would only work with substantial cooperation from our allies and other global players in the Middle East: only when a swath of nations and organizations offered economic gain would nations see substantial benefits.
America’s current strategy has served only to sweep the problem from one place to another. A healthy dose of incentive-based diplomacy would battle the root problem. Rather than asking whether America can afford to neglect Darfur, Somalia, and Yemen, we must ask if those countries can afford to neglect potential economic and political gain.

[David Lichtstein]

The issue of controlling al-Qaeda is one that has troubled the American government since the tragic September 11th attacks, and even beforehand. In overcoming U.S. attempts to destroy the organization, al-Qaeda has proven to be demonstrably strong and interwoven into the cultural fabric of many Middle Eastern and North African counties. As President Obama’s administration begins to implement its plan for achieving success in Afghanistan, and perhaps eventually, Pakistan, critics have begun to identify several other international issues that perhaps should be concerned high priority. It is clear that President Obama is serious about diminishing the influence of al-Qaeda, and it is of his administration’s belief that this can be best accomplished by forcefully applying pressure in Afghanistan, the country whose support and nurturing of al-Qaeda and the Taliban is widely recognized as a major factor in the planning of the September 11th attacks. President Obama’s primary aim appears to be what it should be: ensuring peace for the American people. Though many Americans can sympathize with the tortured citizenry of Darfur or Somalia, it is the primary responsibility of our government to protect against another devastating terrorist attack on the United States.
The argument could be made that it is equally important for the future safety of America to spread our resources among the smaller, insecure countries that are susceptible to a political takeover by terrorists. Ideally, America would be able to protect its own interests in Afghanistan while international organizations such as the United Nations would work to rebuild and secure areas such as Darfur, Somalia, and Yemen, among others. With al-Qaeda as such a viable threat of terror both to America and other countries in the world, the U.S. cannot afford to rely on the work of outside militaries and organizations. Under this principle, President Obama’s administration sees it necessary to immediately allocate considerable resources to destroy what has been a centralized base for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. It is the hope of our government that forcing al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan will leave the terrorist group, formally one of the most organized and structured, without the necessary organization to carry out its attacks.

[Raphael Morali]

To begin this comment, I will quote Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa’ida’s number two, who said in his « state of the union » address, delivered in January 2007 :

« As for the people of fait hand jihad, the people of steadfastness and ribat…they are confronting America’s crusade in every corner of the Islamic world…in Chechnya, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, the Arabian Peninsula, Algeria, and everywhere the Crusaders and Zionists have desecrated the lands of Islam with their feet ».

I rather tend to think that to understand accurately why this « war against terrorism » is much more extended geographically than Iraq and Afghanistan, we have to understand the ideology of an organization such as Al-Qaeda. It is worth noticing that al-Qa’ida had no significant presence in Iraq prior to March 2003, which is the beginning of the war ; but would soon thereafter.
An important concept to explain that idea is the word ribat. According to the Islamic tradition, the ribat is a kind of guard duty as a frontier outpost. This concept provides a justification for warfare, an explanation for its victories, and an apologia for the ethical dimension of Islam’s actions. Thus, every land that has once been under Islamic hegemony such as Spain, has to be cleaned up from the unbelievers. Hence, the World Trade Center attack is defensive in nature. The presence of Westerns and Americans on « Muslim lands » such as Afghanistan and Iraq is a violation of the “Muslim sovereignty”. It is considered as a great humiliation for Muslims all over the world. True Muslims have then to participate to a worldwide djihad (defensive war) against the Crusaders and Zionists. According to Sayyid Qutb, the whole Muslim world has to be protected from the hand of the western world and it is through the war against the “unbelievers” that the ancient glory of Islam and the caliphate are going to be restored.
Abdullah Azzam, was a Palestinian theologian who trained at al-Azhar and was Bin Laden’s mentor. According to him, in his book Defense of the Muslim Lands Islamic lands are impinged by adversaries. Then, there is an individual obligation in which every Muslim, without exception, must respond, if he or she is physically able, to join the djihad which is a mandatory, defensive action. Unsurprisingly, Azzam declares Iraq and Afghanistan as lands which have been usurped, but he also adds a number of other places, including Palestine, Aden, Sudan, Spain, Bulgaria, Indonesia, the Caucasus, and others.
Zawahiri calls for the Arab Maghreb to be “cleansed” of the French and Spanich, and for the restoration of true Islamic government in al-Andalus.

“Our battle is one and it extends from here in ard al-ribat to the Tigris and Euphrates. An al-Qaeda member said.

As a conclusion, I would say that all what is written above tend to argue that the attention and the resources of the American policy do not have to be focused on a few states such as Iraq, Pakistan or Afghanistan. They have to be enlarged to a broader spectrum. It is in the hope of the fundamentalists to recover an imagined geography, and with it, a supposed way of life. It is a will to make eschatological dreams a present reality for the true believer. Nonetheless, Iraq and Afghanistan have to remain the focus points of the attention and the resources of the American policy. What is worth noticing is that on March 19, 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, al-Qaeda did not operate in Iraq. Today, it does. Baghdad was the seat of the Abbasid Caliphate. And even if Saddam was a dictator, he was at least putatively Muslim. Thus, he built mosques. So when US forces entered Iraq on March 20, 2003, and after the collapse of Saddam’s government, al-Qaeda invoked the doctrine of ribat that I was talking about before. The same argument applies for Afghanistan.

Only one month after the ceasefire in Iraq in March 199, the then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney observed :

“there is no question that if we wanted to commit US forces, we could go in and clean up the Iraqi Army or take Baghdad or intervene and defend the Kurds or the Shiites against the onslaught of the Iraqi Army. But that’s no what we went over there to do. That would be a significant extension, a whole new set of military objectives for us to try to pursue. It would without doubt cost a lot of American lives, and it raises the very real specter of getting us involved in a quagmire trying to figure out who the hell is going to govern Iraq.”
The interview is in US News and World Report, April 15, 1991, p. 31

So, I would argue for a new US policy toward the Middle East and the Islamic world, a one that is more nuanced and subtle. This does not argue against the US pursuing its interests in the region, nor even against offering clear support to Israel. It does not argue against all military action in the region. What is important is the manner in which policies are pursued. Here is the difference. US policy in the Middle East has to take adequate account of al-Qaeda’s radical doctrines.

[Sharfi Farhana]

The United States is currently facing a financial crisis at the home front as increasing numbers of Americans face foreclosures and glooming poverty. In the wake of this, the United States should be focusing its economic resources in resurrecting and improving the lives of its citizens rather than that of at risk states.
As memories of 9/11 are still horribly fresh in our memories, it is understandable why the United States would want to remain battling Al Qaeda on the Afghanistan and Pakistani front. However, constructing entire nation states in order to battle rising terrorism is too substantial an investment while facing a financial crisis at home. The most effective way of dealing with this is to increase security at home; hardening our borders, increasing security, and investing in strengthening the military. Although this would go against Mr. Obama’s “anti nuclear weapons” campaign, creating American jobs and supplying financial support for taxpayers should be our number one priority.
As fellow members of NATO focus primarily on successful exit strategies, the United States should follow suit. Investing billions of tax dollars into Pakistan for support against Al Qaeda is a waste in that a substantial portion of the population views the fight against insurgency as an American cause and not a Pakistani one.
At risk states such as Darfur, Somalia, and Yemen can not be taken on personally by the United States as an extension of our war on terror. Nation building practices of this nature must be left to the United Nations. Mr. Obama ran a campaign promoting peace and change. Currently, international peace is a luxury, and ambitious plans for creating overnight change in places like Afghanistan is not only idealistic but grossly overpriced. The United States can no longer go into resolving these conflicts alone; we must first and foremost have enough support from our allies and the rest of the developed world.

[Ted McBride]

The Obama administration’s plan to focus its effort and resources on removing al-Qaeda from its safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan seems to be a way for the US to restructure and clarify its efforts into a more tenable and solvable issue. By providing a specific, although still quite difficult, goal of pushing al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration has reduced the lofty goal set forth by the Bush administration to develop successful democratic governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well maintaining the government of Pakistan. Obama has stopped using the phrase “War on Terror” and has refrained from using such rhetoric as “preemption” or “unilateralism” in an effort to incorporate other countries and separate current strategies from those of the past. It seems that this is the administrations way of providing small step solutions so as to not overextend the military and anger any war-weary US citizens.
While focusing solely on Afghanistan and Pakistan would seem to merely move the issue to another location such as Yemen or Somalia, the US has already committed to these two countries by investing significant effort and resources over the last decade. Also, these two countries are in significantly more important locations and situations than many of the other countries al-Qaeda is fleeing to. Afghanistan has a democratic government in place and its strategic location next to Iran makes this a considerable point. Pakistan has routinely pledged its support to the US, however its inability to control the FATA region and pervasive corruption is a threat to international security. These issues, in conjunction with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, provide significant reasons for the US to devote considerable resources.
It appears the US is trying to prioritize the issues within the Middle East so that there can be tangible, long-term results. Also, by focusing on removing al-Qaeda instead of establishing democracy, the US has made it easier for it to potentially withdrawal from the Middle East. Establishing democracy within the Middle East would take a commitment lasting decades, but removing al-Qaeda from Pakistan and Afghanistan by focusing all its resources would be much quicker.

[Bill Getman]

I think that President Obama’s recent shift in Afghanistan is exactly what is needed in the battle for Afghani and Pakistani security. This agreement, however, does not mean that I believe this Afghanistan surge will provide an overall success of the War on Terror. Personally, I believe that declared “wars” on general nouns (the War on Drugs, Poverty, Terror) are, in fact unwinnable. However, given Afghanistan’s traditional tendency to harbor terrorist cells, any measure of success in Afghanistan must be positive. Furthermore, the Al Qaeda of today bears little resemblance to its structure of pre-9/11 which, while more decentralized, has depleted leadership, resources, and state willing to harbor them.
As such, Afghanistan is a battle that the United States cannot afford to lose. President Obama’s current plan resolves many of the gaping operational flaws of previous administrations and, coupled with recent increases in military and economic aid to Pakistan ($3 billion and $7.5 billion respectively), is likely to stabilize the entire region. While weak and failed states will continue to harbor terrorist cells, positive examples of success in Afghanistan and Pakistan will go a long way towards deterring other states from doing so.

[J Kevin Oc]

In discussing the future of what our friends at the Pentagon are calling “the Long War,” Ambassador Walker is prudent--and in good company--when he points out some of the pitfalls that could come with expanding America’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (specifically the Waziristan region of Pakistan). Likewise, he is right to note the increasing threat of terrorist cells emerging in a range of new host countries that spans the globe, from Morocco to Yemen to Thailand. So when he asks what should be done with regards to counter-terrorism strategy as it regards to both the Khyber Pass countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and the new host countries, one cannot discount the issues he has raised.

As to whether or not we can afford to focus all our attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, I think the clear answer is no. To focus too narrowly on these countries would be akin to spraying pesticides on one corn-row of a large farm and then expecting the entire farm to be pest –controlled…it is not a realistic solution to a far-reaching problem. If experience teaches anything, it is that both terrorists and pests will show up if they can find an environment that hosts them. Accordingly, if our goal is to reduce the aggregate threat to Americans and their interests, we should focus on broadly reducing the Islamic world’s host potential for Al-Qaeda-affiliated extremism.

Certainly, a comprehensive effort to eradicate Al-Qaeda should include a continued presence in Afghanistan and continued efforts in Pakistan. Pakistan is a nuclear power and we cannot afford to let the central government fall. But rather than focusing our attention on completely routing Al-Qaeda out of these places (perhaps an impossible task), it might be more productive to focus on building up the economic and political strength of parties friendly with the United States. To the greatest extent possible, we should let the examples of our allies make the case for moderation and an end to hostilities. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, we do not stand to succeed if we have to compete with Al-Qaeda for every warlord’s loyalty or chase those fanatics from one wretched cave after another. It seems more feasible and no less productive, given previous results, to simply work at ensuring a better standard of living for those who (relatively) agree with us, aggressively protect that higher standard of living and communicate that to the rest of the Islamic world. To be sure, we should keep track of who and where our enemies are and what they are doing. And there is no excuse for not trying our best to cultivate human intelligence sources. But this persistent game of hide-and-go-seek is one that, given the landscape, we don’t have great odds of winning. We cannot just compete for ground coverage; we need to compete for public opinion.

As far as potential hosts and new hosts go (Yemen, Somalia, Darfur, etc.), we cannot afford to turn our backs on them, but neither can we afford to intervene in each country either. With respect to these countries, the solution must include both bridge-building, and where necessary, bridge-burning. Perception matters and we should do our best to enhance America’s image internationally. We should pressure the friendlier leaders on the Arabian Peninsula (i.e. the public and private leadership in Riyadh, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi) to in turn apply pressure against those funding the extremist and insurgency efforts in Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere. We should try and provide humanitarian aid in threatened states where we can, and, moreover, we should try to coordinate such efforts with reputable Islamic charities.

We need to look after our friends in Jordan and Turkey (and other places) and try to ensure that they stand as stunning counterexamples to the squalor and despair that almost universally characterizes the miserable lot of those under extremist control. This might not be through direct aid, but possibly through helping open markets or sharing commercial technologies. Again, though, we cannot buy everyone materially; we must compete philosophically. We need to show those on the fence and even swayable folks who are on the other side of the fence that America need not be viewed as a foe of Islamic virtue. To this end, we should make an effort to get high-profile American Muslims in front of Arab audiences and also raise the profile of Muslim moderate thought leaders(like the signatories of the “A Common Word” letter : http://www.acommonword.com/index.php?lang=en&page=signatories).

Teddy Roosevelt had it right when he said “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” We could use a little more speaking softly before we swing another big stick at an agile and hard-to-find enemy. After all, the sticks we are swinging are pretty expensive. Accordingly, we should continue but not necessarily redouble our efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and wage a far-reaching diplomatic (and intelligence) campaign elsewhere, so that we can minimize the places where military action is absolutely necessary.

[Kasey Kaspar Hildonen]

Successes in Iraq have pushed terrorists into states with poorly protected borders like Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Thailand, and particularly in North Africa in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. It is hard to measure success in Iraq when these groups are now simply terrorizing other peoples. Now President Obama intends to enact a more aggressive plan of action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the topography and tribal culture present many challenges. At $3.2 billion a month, it is necessary to consider three factors that will help determine if Obama’s plan is the best way to deal with theses terrorist organizations.

The first factor is an economic analysis of the situation through a cost/benefit model. At the cost of $3.2 billion a month for the U.S. to conduct its plans in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the returning benefit of ending terrorism in the regions is unlikely. For the same cost, the U.S. could help establish plans in many more states that have suffered attacks since Iraq was invaded in the areas of border patrol, intelligence units, and antiterrorism teams, providing a much greater benefit to a greater number of people. By this analysis, the U.S. should invest in alternative programs.

The second factor is based in threat assessment theory. If the threat of terrorists hiding in Pakistan and Afghanistan is higher than that in the countries mentioned previously, then Obama’s plan is justified. While terrorists attacks and car bombings continue to occur in North Africa and Yemen, if U.S. intelligence indicates higher members of these cells are in Pakistan and Afghanistan, then that is where we must focus our plan. The strength of terrorist cells is the hierarchical structure of both power and knowledge. Removing the underdogs one by one will not topple the cell; higher members must be apprehended. By this theory, if it is true that higher members in these cells remain in Pakistan and Afghanistan then those states must be the object of antiterrorism plans if any success of possible.

However, factor two must be assessed with consideration of factor three, the predicted success rate. The topography and tribal culture in Pakistan and Afghanistan pose serious concerns for the potential for success in any mission conducted there with the technology and capabilities we possess at this time. If the predicted rate of success is low in an antiterrorism plan in Pakistan and Afghanistan at this time, then funds should be used elsewhere.

Taking these three factors into account congruently provides a better picture of the situation in President Obama. On one hand, lies Pakistan and Afghanistan, which both provide logistical hurtles, but supposedly host the leaders of these organizations. On the other hand, there are many neighboring states that are suffering at the hands of terrorists we pushed into their territories in our last attempted mission. Obama’s proposed mission in Pakistan and Afghanistan is both costly and does not, by any means, promise success. We risk making the same mistake as we did in Iraq, where we simply run the terrorists from one state to another – allowing the problem to spread. The better plan at this time is to continue to monitor Pakistan and Afghanistan, but use the money from Obama’s plan to help establish programs in other states. By strengthening the border patrol, intelligence units, and antiterrorism teams in states like Yemen, we will trap these terrorist leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan with no communication with their followers, limited followers in other states, and nowhere to go. Then, when we have the capabilities, we will track them down. But what Obama is promoting now is a wild goose chase, and far too reminiscent of the recent administration for comfort.

[Phill Hoying]

Ambassador Walker brings up several good points regarding the war in Iraq and Afghanistan... and now Pakistan as a part of America's War on Terror. With the ingredients for terrorism in the failed states of Darfur, Somalia, Yemen and others beyond the current scope of American snipers, he poses the question “can we afford to focus all our attention and resources on Pakistan and Afghanistan while al-Qaeda turns its attention to the more accommodating environments of failed states?” Simply put – yes.

Now there is that pesky question – why? Unfortunately, that answer is not so simple. It involves the most powerful, well-armed military in the world (with the latest in technology) trying to fight a small, relatively disorganized group of fundamentalists whose culture is at odds with the West. It involves spending billions of dollars a month in Afghanistan and Pakistan – places with widespread economic problems. And, it especially involves politics in the U.S.

The major problems the U.S. faced on the ground in Iraq were the shift to counter-terrorism warfare, and the lack of proper equipment used to protect vehicles and personnel from IEDs – the simplest, most improvised weapon you can make. However, on the whole, the U.S. has fixed these problems and is ready to solve any new on-the-ground problems. As the U.S. moves more troops into Afghanistan and perhaps Pakistan (as far as I'm aware the U.S. has only carried out unmanned attacks in Pakistan), Ambassador Walker rightly points out the terrain and culture has changed. In addition, there is really no way to ensure terrorists do not go back to where you were (Iraq) or someplace new (failed states).

But despite having “unlimited” resources (at least comparatively), the U.S. can not afford the cost of fighting a war (or even sufficient aid) on every front as Ambassador Walker proposes, highlighting one of the reasons terrorism is a tactic of the underdog – it costs significantly more to contain terrorism, than it does to carry it out.

Right now, the U.S. is involved in the mess we made in Afghanistan – the stronghold of Al Qaeda. We need to fix it if we have any hope of winning the “War on Terror.” Pakistan, pragmatically speaking is a logical, second front to the war. It is a westward-leaning state, a haven for the Taliban, and in danger of becoming, though not quite yet, a failed state – three excellent reasons to support its fight against terrorism. The failed states Ambassador Walker notes are going to be a harder fight to win because there is no significant internal power fighting the spread of terrorism. And while I am always one for making pragmatic decisions, trying to “out-corrupt and out-buy the Taliban” – resorting to the same tactics of their enemies – is probably not morally sound for the U.S. and its allies.

However, there is no reason the international community cannot find a way to help develop these impoverished areas, even in the countries the U.S. is attacking. Addressing the root cause of terrorism by meeting peoples living needs is the surest way to quell support for terrorism and will help ensure terrorists cannot regain control in an area after the U.S. military has left.

[Shyama Nair]

Global cooperation has always been a tricky subject requiring nations to balance between their own national interests and the good of the global population at large. Ambassador Walker is right to point out that unfortunately, the balance often shifts in the direction of self interest which also tends to come at the expense of another nation. History has shown however that it is possible for nations to work together to achieve common goals. As such, President Obama’s appeal for increased global cooperation though not impossible, may be overly idealistic. To truly reap the rewards of global cooperation, Obama will have to understand its dynamics. Nations are able to come together most effectively when national interests mostly in accordance with global ones, though such a scenario is not common.

Despite President Obama’s plea, the utter lack of global cooperation was evident by the end of the recent UN climate talks in Bonn. For instance, large economies such as India and china refused to be talked into new global climate deals requiring them to reduce green house emissions. Likewise, industrialized countries are only willing to take on ambitious reduction measures if the emerging economies are prepared to do the same, leaving things at a standstill.
There are however reasons to remain hopeful. President Obama has in fact followed his declaration that the United States would take on a leadership role with several positive changes. For instance, this past week, the US government pledged to regulate its carbon dioxide emissions, having decided that it and five other greenhouse gases were in fact detrimental to health. Furthermore, the G20 summit in London appears to have produced some positive outcomes with nations having agreed on making some critical changes to help boost the global economy. This includes, promoting global trade by rejecting protectionism and trebling the IMF’s resources. The summit in London also borught about cooperation with regards to the nuclear proliferation issue where in a breakthrough agreement, both the US and Russia have “agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty”.
While most of these changes, including nuclear disarmament will require time to take effect, it is more important that the steps for change are being taken. Global coopearation is a challenging endeavour but it is crucial that we remain optimistic. In order for us to overcome challenges as a global population, it is imperative that nations begin to see past selfish interests that will only leave us in a rather Hobbesian state of nature, and start working towards common goals.