305 - Peacekeeping: the Sorcerer's Apprentice

On May 29, 1948, the UN Security Council called for a cease-fire in the Arab-Israel war of 1948 and set up the foundation for the first UN peacekeeping mission by calling for military observers to assist the UN Mediator and the Truce Commission in overseeing the cease-fire.  The result became the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Resolution 50 incorporated about a page of text and was limited to 12 paragraphs, which were each one sentence long.

On May 21, 2004, the Security Council issued its resolution number 1545 establishing the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), a peacekeeping operation.  That resolution has three pages of single spaced text in the preamblular paragraphs alone and five pages of 23 operational paragraphs. 
Whereas Resolution 50 simply called for a ceasefire and limits on introducing fighting personnel into the conflict, Resolution 1545 authorized the UN peacekeeping operation as well, but then it went on to set out its structure, size, and mandate.  Its mandate included monitoring the ceasefire, investigating violations, promoting confidence building measures, providing security at pre-disarmament assembly sites, collecting weapons, dismantling militias, quartering the Burundi Armed forces, monitoring illegal flow of arms, creating security for humanitarian efforts, protecting civilians and UN personnel.  Then it adds the responsibility to advise the government of Burundi on refugees, institutional reforms, electoral activities, reform of the judiciary, and promotion of human rights.  Like the brooms of the Sorcerer’s apprentice, the number of paragraphs in Security Council resolutions just keep on growing.
By the time we get to 2006, the Security Council is issuing a resolution, number 8928 calling on Iran to halt uranium enrichment and providing for sanctions.  That resolution is 10 pages long of single spaced text and goes into every detail of the impending sanctions.

In 2008 the Security Council passed 63 resolutions and in 2007, 55.  While this is a decrease from the 100 plus resolutions passed each year in the early 1990s, it still raises the question of man hours devoted to extremely complicated and comprehensive resolutions that seek not only to keep the peace, but also to restructure the states involved in conflict.  It also calls into question the ability of the members of the Security Council to absorb and decide on the details of peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and nation building that dominate the recent Security Council approaches to peacekeeping.  The Secretary General and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) are calling the new resolutions “multi-dimensional.”  

With over 100,000 military and civilian personnel at headquarters and deployed in 16 missions abroad and a DPKO budget off about $7 billion, the peacekeeping functions of the UN dwarf its other responsibilities. The budget for the rest of the Secretariat was $1.9 billion in 2006. Keep in mind that in 1991 there was no Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Now there is a large and growing bureaucracy with vested interest in the perpetuation of ever more complex missions to guard against the failures of the past.  

The question we have to ask now is who is running whom? The member states no longer control the process.  Their staffs are dwarfed by the DPKO.  Even the largest mission in New York, the US mission, would be lost without the full resources of the US government in Washington to keep track of and make decisions on the proposals for peacekeeping provided to the Security Council by the Secretary General based on lengthy reports and recommendations of the DPKO. 

The second question that needs to be asked is “Is all of this necessary.”  We seemed to stumble along with a more limited number of missions and much more narrow objectives in the first 40 years of the UN’s existence. Do we really want the UN in the business of nation building?  In whose image? And under whose direction? The world did not fall apart when it ignored most local conflicts before the 1990s.  And if there was a problem in the area of peacekeeping, that problem appeared to be generated more by headquarters mistrust and dismissal of its commanders and representatives on the ground. Now DPKO is trying to determine every detail of a mission and take away the flexibility of the people running the show in the field who probably are in a position to know and understand a fast moving situation better than a bureaucrat in New York.  Brian Urqhart, long time Undersecretary with responsibility for peacekeeping before the advent of the DPKO, wrote: “Care should be taken in attempting to generalize and improve upon what has been part of the recipe for success [of United Nations peacekeeping], namely improvisation.”   (Robert A. Rubinstein, “Peacekeeping under Fire” Paradigm Publishers, Boulder CO, 2008, Chapter 2, page 22)

Comments

[Jared Sorin]

A Fool’s Errand: Multi-Faceted PKOs Undertaken by the UN Overreach Institutional Authority and Exceed Capability

Without express or clear authority from the UN Charter or other guidelines, but with ostensibly good intentions and desire to ensure international peace and security, from the time of the Arab-Israel War of 1948 to date, the UN has undertaken numerous peacekeeping missions. Since the 1990s, it has been increasingly proactive, feeling empowered and emboldened to undertake more fulsome and expansive operations. UN missions have, as a result, grown far more complex, evolving from merely observing or overseeing a ceasefire in an attempt to keep the peace to overbroad, multi-faceted peacekeeping operations (PKOs) encompassing intricate, multi-dimensional mandates, necessitating long-term efforts to maintain peace and security by reforming states, completing humanitarian missions, and building or strengthening failed or weak states. Despite these lofty goals, however, the UN operates in an international system comprised of independent, sovereign states and an institutional framework in which it is nearly devoid of any substantive authority to accomplish or enforce the responsibilities it or member states assume in these considerable PKOs. When such system, reliant on the collective action of independent states, is combined with the notable absence of an effective, enforceable intergovernmental or global system of governance with memorialized core values and shared principles, the UN seems to be undertaking fools’ errands. Not only does it lack institutional authority with its overreaching mandates, the UN practically ensures its own failure when it engages in operations in scope and number so far beyond its capabilities. The UN is resource constrained, lacking in both funds and manpower to successfully complete many of its missions, as evidenced by a record surprisingly lacking a high percentage of material PKO successes.

The UN exceeds its institutional authority when it engages in nation building and reformation, intruding into arguably wholly internal matters of sovereign states. First, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) insists on controlling every aspect down to the smallest fact, often crippling the flexibility and eliminating the improvisation which have been significant factors in successful PKOs. Moreover, the DPKO takes control away from the nation-state, which, with the greatest stake in the matter, is most likely to have, along with the peacekeepers on the ground, the most comprehensive understanding of the situation and what needs to be done to accomplish the operation. DPKO’s assertion of control is contrary to the May 3, 1994 statement of the President of the Security Council, calling for case-by-case solutions tailor-made for the prevailing conditions in which peacekeepers are to be empowered to respond to rapidly-changing circumstances. Second, while right-minded men and women of the world might view maintenance of international peace and security an appropriate pursuit of the UN consistent with its Charter, there remains no express grant of authority or guidelines from the world community for the wide-ranging activity of many of the PKOs undertaken since the 1990s. In addition, there is a notable absence of a global consensus, let alone agreement among the members of the Security Council or the “permanent five,” with respect to core values and principles that must underlie every sovereign state, including matters of civil, as opposed to religious, law, collective or private property rights, free-market capitalism in comparison to social capitalism, and governance systems. Accordingly, unless and until the international community adopts such values and principles, the UN’s role in nation building and reformation is highly suspect, likely to lead to results unacceptable to many. In addition to this philosophical concern regarding lack of authority for such wide-ranging roles, the UN lacks the ability to undertake successfully these elaborate PKOs.

The UN, with finite, limited, and insufficient resources, simply is incapable of accomplishing the numerous goals and objectives of its myriad resolutions. It also is encumbered by a structure, including a requirement for Security Council unanimity and the related role of the “permanent five” and their veto power, that may have been deemed appropriate in the immediate post-WWII era, but which seems anachronistic in an increasingly globalized world, with shifting balances of power, new emerging superpowers, and changing geo-political circumstances. The existing structure of the UN basically ensures that, although it may create responsibilities through its growing number of resolutions, the institution lacks the wherewithal to enforce such resolutions and accomplish its multiple, perhaps unachievable, goals and objectives. Moreover, the DPKO is a bureaucracy created by the UN only eighteen years ago which has grown to be of a size and scope such that it no longer is controllable by the member states, or even fully accountable to them. The Security Council is wholly unable to consider adequately, understand fully, and decide appropriately the vast number and range of peacekeeping, reconstruction, and nation-building issues that predominate the current approach to peacekeeping. International peace and security are critical goals, but the UN needs to pick its projects wisely and carefully, consistent with both its institutional authority and its capabilities, or risk loss of credibility and legitimacy. If the international community really wants a more pro-active, highly involved community, it is time to commit to globally shared values and principles, if such can be obtained, international institutional structures capable of being transparent and accountable to the members, and a level and quality of resources allocated to the international body sufficient to meet its assigned tasks and satisfy complex global needs.

[Chloe Major]

The two questions posed, “who is running whom” and “is all of this necessary”, are relevant given the current times. I believe that the increased complexity of both peacekeeping missions and the concurrent mandates is a given based on the changing demands of peacekeeping as an ideal. The world no longer looks as it did before the cold war (or during the days when a mandate could be explained in several sentences), and peacemaking and peacekeeping cannot be expected to look the same either.
While the world did not “fall apart” with a more limited number of missions pre 1990, the visibility of genocide, conflict, and unrest has increased. It has become much harder for the United Nations to sit back and watch inaction or avoid humanitarian intervention when the conflict has become so “in your face”. News media, on the ground reporting, and a general awareness of the globalized world has forced the world to relook at how we handle peacekeeping. Is it the right thing to do? Is the United Nations in the business of nation building? I think that is a question that only the continued presence and action of the UN will be able to answer, but it is harder to overlook the notion of taking a responsible position as a global body in the current climate.
As for the specificity of current mandates and the loss of on the ground flexibility, it is true that extreme details have the potential to limit the “see and react” instinct of those on the ground, one of the most valuable resources. However, given the pressure and scrutiny the UN has faced, especially in light of the global ethos and the increased visibility of global conflict, it makes sense that the UN “covers all it’s bases”. To demand exacting precision is an attempt to avoid failure. It is a preemptive move, and on the part of the UN, a wise one. To fail in a mission discredits the UN as a whole; while the ultimate purpose, goals, or necessity of the UN may still be in flux, its presence and existence are valid in the globalized world. Protection of its prestige and legitimacy should not be overlooked.

[Sarah Moore]

While more recent peacekeeping Security Council resolutions may not perfectly resolve any and every conflict, this does not suggest that the U.N. should return to peacekeeping practices of the 1990’s. If we examine only one case, let it be one where the U.N. proclaims success: UNTAC’s mission to Cambodia. UNTAC was the first of its kind: an elaborate, resource rich mission with a heavy mandate that allowed for limited flexibility on the ground. However, UNTAC’s mission was bound by the realities of 1992, shackled by the U.N.’s limited resources and time constraints. Despite its electoral and repatriation success, the U.N. was unable to provide for lasting stability, evident after only a few years when a coup overthrew the elected government. The ambiguousness of UNTAC’s mandate created frequent and overwhelming difficulties on the ground– the UN was responsible for ending hostilities between four warring political factions, caring for refugees and internally displaced persons, running Cambodia’s first national elections and completely rebuilding Cambodia’s war-torn infrastructure, in addition to providing support to every sector of Cambodian society.

Attributed to the Security Council’s post-Cold War enthusiasm, UNTAC’s mandate may have been brief in comparison to those written today, but it’s lack of definition gave it a heavy and impossible burden of responsibility. The difficulties UNTAC encountered were oftentimes exacerbated by the lack of instruction and guidance on how to deal with escalating situations on the ground. On the other hand, the successes UNTAC enjoyed—particularly electoral and repatriation successes— resulted from extensive instructions clearly defined in the mandate that left little room for improvisation. Thus, it seems logical that future missions would reflect U.N. experience of past peacekeeping operations, leading to longer and more detailed mandates, which attempted to clear up any confusion on the ground in advance.

However, in an attempt to learn from peace-keeping’s past, it seems that the Security Council has gone too far, creating sharply defined and idealistic peacekeeping missions that limit the operation’s adaptability in the uncertainty of conflict. Recent peacekeeping missions have failed because they are too constrained by their mandate, while those of the 1990’s failed in part because of an ill-defined mandate. Regardless, the problem may not be in the operations themselves, but rather an inherent flaw in the goals of U.N. peacekeeping, aimed at resolving conflict immediately, as opposed to addressing the problems that caused the conflict to arise in the first place. Assessing peacekeeping in Africa further illustrates this point, revealing that of the twenty-five U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa, the majority of them have taken place in just six countries and conflict, more often than not, reignites within a decade.

[Hilary Weiss]

I would like to address the second question, “Is all of this necessary.” The international role of the UN Security Council, which authorizes peacekeeping missions, provides an incomparable authority to other forms of intervention. In addition, the UN’s peacekeeping missions demonstrate its commitment to the international community by addressing issues of global concern. However, this does not mean that UN peacekeeping alone can do the best job. Through using outside enforcements like the European Union, NATO, the African Union, the UN can help dispense the burden and take more effective action. Although the UN’s role in nation building has not always proven to be successful one must also take into consideration that its success lies in the cooperation and efforts of other major powers who are aiding the UN as well as the people and government of the state in crisis.

You state, “The world did not fall apart when it ignored most local conflicts before the 1990s. And if there was a problem in the area of peacekeeping, that problem appeared to be generated more by headquarters mistrust.” Much has changed since the 1990s in regards to technology; information is being spread globally at a rapid speed which allows individuals to be informed about what is going on around the world and the injustices that are taking place. For the UN, or for any international community, to sit idly by and do nothing it would be an outrage. Countries have signed various agreements pertaining to land, resources and rights such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights agreeing to acknowledge certain inalienable rights. If these laws are broken it is the responsibility of the UN and other international bodies to intervene. Not only is it the international community’s responsibility, but people would demand that something be done given that there is access and knowledge to what is going on around the world. Although one may argue that much of international intervention is spurred by self motivation and interests, I would argue that guilt, shame and one’s image play a powerful role in intervention as well. If the international community does not intervene where it is necessary that they should, the global community will lose respect for the UN and their ability to preserve and foster peace.

[Kasey Kaspar Hildonen]

Peacekeeping missions today are a balancing act between member state consent and DPKO power. In this article, the question is raised: who is running whom? While it is quite true that the DPKO dwarfs many member states’ staffs, it is important to remember that the DPKO exists because the member states consent to its authority on matters of peacekeeping. In arguing that: “the member states no longer control the process” (Walker) we get caught up in the procedures of peacekeeping, and neglect the final goal. States are concerned with the outcome of peacekeeping missions and with protecting their own rights as sovereign nations, which leads them to consent to the arguably tedious process of UN resolutions and the expertise of the DPKO.

The evolution of the UN resolution process represents the world’s recognition of the importance of clearly defined parameters in peacekeeping missions. In this post, it is suggested that the transition from a one-page document in 1948 to eight in 2004 to ten in 2006 is unnecessary. However, by examining the essence of a resolution for a peacekeeping mission, it becomes clear that specificity in the document establishes expectations of the entire mission, greatly improving its likeliness of success. A resolution establishes the rules of any peacekeeping operation; like a contract, it holds all parties involved in the conflict accountable, as well as the UN itself. The DPKO’s new “multidimensional” resolutions, which outline not only the UN’s plans to keep peace, but also to restructure states involved in conflict, establish a concrete plan by which the UN will be held accountable, and also guarantees to the states involved that the UN will not enter into their territory, become involved in conflict-management, and then pull out. In actuality, multidimensional resolutions protect nations from any abuse of power on the part of the UN.

[David Lichtstein]

The United Nations is somewhat at a crossroads in the current state of the world. In theory, this should be a time in which the UN is most prominent and influential, as peace, human rights, and other conflicts have come to the forefront in recent years. The theoretical application of the UN, however, vastly differs from the realistic role it plays in international affairs. Firstly, as each year has brought new conflicts, the goals of the UN have expanded, thus decentralizing the true power of the organization. It is merely common sense that a coalition of world leaders such as the UN will be most effective when all members are cooperating on solving a single task. This has become nearly impossible in recent years. While one sect of the UN might be writing a resolution on Darfur, another might be attempting to solve issues in the Middle East. In the end, all members become fragmented and the capabilities of the UN become limited.
That being said, it is very difficult to determine which conflicts the UN should pursue, and which it should ignore. The UN is truly the only organization of its kind, and holds a responsibility for protecting the well-being of the citizens of all member countries. A solution may be for the UN to identify and pursue very succinct and crucial goals in each of its missions. Surely the leaders of the UN can find a way to abridge a ten-page resolution on Iran by identifying key points of pursuit. This will help to depressurize the environment, and allow all conflicts to be pursued and, hopefully, solved. It must be accepted, however, that under this strategy not all issues will be completely addressed. Some conflicts are deeper than others and require more time and effort. This tactic, however, leaves open the possibility for a follow-up resolution in the future. In the time being, the UN can focus on the most imminent issues and address them accordingly.
Lastly, the UN is hampered by the ongoing question of who is truly in power. Though the goal is always to give each member country an equal say, this proves to be truly impossible. As with any similar style coalition organization, the most powerful members will, in the end, have the most say. The United States and other permanent members of the UN Security Council have considerable influence over the other nations. There really is little that can be done to prevent this. The hope, however, is that the contrast between these five countries will help to create a compromise solution that, hopefully, is beneficial to everyone. This will not always be the case, but the UN is really limited in what it can do to remedy this dilemma.

[Abdelwahab Abdelghany]

As Ambassador Walker clearly illustrated, The United Nations peacekeeping missions have become extremely complex as well as extremely expensive over the years. In order to begin to understand why resolution 1545 looks nothing like resolution 50, we need to recognize as well as acknowledge the influences and forces at play today that were not in 1948. The United Nations mission as whole appears to have changed since it’s founding in 1945, it went from being an international organization that seeks to be a platform for a dialogue as well as stop wars from occurring between nations to given itself the role and the responsibility to protect people from both foreign and domestic governments. Because of this new role and responsibility that it has given itself, it became open to criticism for not doing enough to end all international conflicts as well as domestic issues that individual nations face. Genocide, such as the one that occurred in Rwanda and currently occurring in Darfur is no longer just viewed as internal matter but rather a problem that the UN has a responsibility to end. Another type of issue that the UN now must address that it didn’t need to in the past is unjust rulers like in Zimbabwe. Because of the UN’s new responsibilities, it can no longer be neutral in all conflicts which of course in return caused a decrease in its legitimacy. Because of the United Nations expended role, it has become very vulnerable and in need of any information and assistance that member states can provide. This notion of vulnerability goes back to Ambassador Walker’s first question about "who is running whom."

Ambassador Walker’s question gets down to the reality of the UN. The UN would not be able to survive without the United States resources because the US has the largest military, the biggest economy, and of course the most political power. As a result of the of the United States influence, the UN by default, is forced to act in the interest of the United States in order to insure its own survival. Throughout his blog, Ambassador Walker illustrates how UN resolutions now require more than ever a tremendous amount of work which requires a significant amount of man power. With regards to Ambassador Walker’s second question, “Is all of this necessary,” I do think that all the efforts that the UN now makes to cover it basis on each mission is required because of what it wants to achieve. However, I don’t think that the UN is being realistic with its goal because it can’t solve all of the world’s problems. The reason the UN has been able to survive for the first 40 years without needing to put in so much time in resolutions is because it limited its missions and goals but now every member of the UN wants the UN to get involved on issues that concerns them.

Globalization is also a big factor that caused the UN to take on so many more missions. This is part of the reason why the UN has also needed to work out every little detail of a mission before putting it into action. Globalization made the world a very small place but that is even more of a reason why the UN needs to limit itself rather than expand its role. More problems will continue to arise and the UN’s limited resources will continue to be called upon which will cause it to become even more vulnerable than it already is.

[Christina Culver]

The size, scale, and sheer number of UN peacekeeping missions have expanded since the organization’s founding. “Peacekeeping: The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” focuses largely on the increased complexity and number of missions without examining the driving forces of change. Operational modifications within the UN, particularly the DPKO, stem from years of learning experiences, organization growth, and world-wide developments. Each peacekeeping mission provides peacemakers with an increased understanding of how to better conduct future UN missions. These skills result in more direct and detailed mandates. This partially accounts for the complexity “Sorcerer’s Apprentice” discusses. In addition to an increased knowledge base, UN membership growth rose from the original 51 members to 192. Each added country brings their views and ideas to the UN which contributes to mandate intricacy. In order to gain member support for a mission, members must largely agree to the mandate. This makes simple resolutions difficult to achieve. Most notably, however, increased interconnectedness world-wide necessitates more complex missions. The same forces bringing countries together through trade create tensions between and within states; ultimately requiring additional peacekeeping missions.

The increased responsibility of the DPKO seems inevitable after considering the impact of past missions on current operations, UN growth, and conflicts accelerated by globalization. Though the DPKO does admittedly monopolize much the UN’s budget, it also provides a necessary avenue through which a multitude of states – 118 in March 2008 – contribute to peacekeeping throughout the world. The DPKO relies on UN members for funding, forces, and equipment. It does not exclude member states from controlling the process, but rather attempts to centralize and organize operation development. Though the peacekeeping process certainly remains imperfect, it plays a necessary role in conflict resolution. “Sorcerer’s Apprentice” argues that the UN managed to adequately “stumble along” with simpler missions. We should not, however, settle for stumbling along. If, in an effort to perfect the effectiveness of peacekeeping, the process becomes increasingly complex then so be it. Effectively adapting to changing circumstances is more important than maintaining simplicity.

[Emily Davaney-Graham]

The United Nations is becoming increasingly bureaucratic and ineffective. Through an examination of the timeline of peacekeeping missions it becomes clear that member states are losing control over the missions. The expansion of United Nations’ mandates both in length and in number indicates that the organization is expanding its reach beyond its original scope. The ultimate result is that member nations are marginalized in the decision making process. Although it is important to realize that member nations’ roles are being limited, the more important question is that of efficacy of the system.

The mandates of the 1990s are defined by their large number and overreaching mandates. Certainly the motive of trying to provide aid to as many locations as possible is noble. The issue, therefore, is whether the missions are successful in fulfilling their mandates. The answer is clearly no. The mandates of the 1990s resulted in the United Nations trying to do too much and in too many places. The result is an overall failure of these missions, most notably in Somalia and Bosnia. The United Nations would be better served to return to its policies before the 1990s and mainly address peacekeeping missions that involve more than one state. The return to the pre-1990s strategy would allow the Security Council to better examine the issues and determine the most effective course of action. This would likely prevent the United Nations from further failures and humiliation. Also, more importantly, it would allow the United Nations to better fulfill its mandates and help those member states and people most in need. As a result, the United Nations will likely be more effective and respected.

[Riordan]

Lawyers hate one thing above all else: risk. They are hired to mitigate client risk. In firms they use billable hours to mitigate risk of not getting paid large sums (creating a perverse incentive system). And when it comes to contracts, that which they don't "control" is that which is left open. Ambiguity is unpredictable, and therefore risky, and therefore the lawyer responsible for drawing up the contract is responsible when that ambiguity comes back in an unforeseen or uncontrolled fashion.

Consequently, to tell a friend about a new project requires the signing of a five-page non-disclosure agreement, which is considered unenforceable in several states, but is still common practice. It means several-hundred page contracts, which opens with two hundred pages of definitions. It means we get these thirty page UN resolutions and thousand-page US bills.

We have this problem of overdefinition in Congress, and consequently there's a contingent that's shocked (absolutely shocked) that members of Congress don't read the bills put before them (http://www.downsizedc.org/page/read_the_laws). That doesn't make a lick of difference in terms of Congress' function (that's what Congressional Aides are for), but it does at the UN, where military operations are authorized and run by what are nominally bloated contracts.

Because of the statutory origin of these DPKO operations we get on-the-ground operations with their hands tied, not because it makes sense for the actual military parameters, but because of a massive set of definitions drafted by risk-mitigating lawyers.

Even though in the 1990's there was a total free-for-all with mission authorization, but with the free-for-all of the mission operationalization because there weren't definitions. There was failure because of ambiguity.

So regulations came into play. Rules make things easier. They stop us from getting to disasters. They limit us from bad, but also from good. So how do we overcome it? What's the way out? More robust operational protocols & rapid communication. By limiting the authorizing resolutions, but having on the books a set of best practices, coupled with a rapid communication system that allows the chain of command to function rapidly, we get the ability to make decisions on the fly but with the freedom and best information possible. It allows for creativity, but it also allows us to avoid situations where we have to "follow the rules" when the rules should not apply. It will let us put into practice our practical wisdom (http://www.ted.com/talks/barry_schwartz_on_our_loss_of_wisdom.html) rather than our preordained processes.

[Ted McBride]

The DPKO seems to be necessary with the growing problems of the world and the often indifferent member states. More centralized authority often seems to lead to a more direct operation. However, the increase in power also makes one wonder, especially in this post-modern world, how do they determine what is a correct response and how to rebuild a nation? Are we to model everything off of the American or British constitutions and infrastructures? Before the DPKO, a more effective, localized outlook on nation building and peacekeeping seemed to exist. However, I dont know if that could have continued with today's problems.

[Phill Hoying]

Ambassador Walker brings out a very interesting point – has the UN created its own multiplying problem by becoming increasingly detailed in each peacekeeping mission proposal? Probably. With more operations requested, an increased need for accurate information and research in remote parts of the globe that require specialized research teams, and with more emphasis on detailed plans before putting troops on the ground, how do you prevent the DPKO from continuing to grow? Do you ignore requests for peacekeeping operations? Do you put troops in without knowing what might happen? Obviously, those two alternatives are unacceptable. Or are they?
I would argue that if an organization is going to intervene, it should know all the information it can. To do otherwise would be improvident. However, the United Nations is not large enough, nor equipped for global peacekeeping operations in the way that regional treaty organizations could. If the UN could defer requests to a regional organization that knows its area well, it would allow international response to act more swiftly and adeptly to the individual needs of each operation. As Ambassador Walker pointed out in class, the UN's inability to act and adapt quickly is one of the consequences of its current design.
The UN was originally designed to prevent major blocks of countries from going to war but most of its current operations are designed to prevent smaller groups of peoples (sometimes national, sometimes subnational) from fighting. It needs to find a way to let regional problems be solved through a regional response.

[Michael Busenhart]

For one thing, on reading this piece and through many of our discussions in class, it appears to me that the UN has at times bitten off more than it can chew and that could be a result of the complexity of the mandates and resolutions that are being put in place. At the onset of UN intervention in 1948 the goals were clear and concise. They focused on the goal of either creating or keeping the peace between states where there was conflict. The UN was small and was being run by the most powerful countries in the world that had many of the same interests, preventing any more war. Today the UN has blown up in size and has both an enormous budget and arsenal of manpower to be deployed if a resolution is put in place.
At the same time though this expansion in size has lead to many inefficiencies within the UN. More members means more interests and these interests might not necessarily all coincide so as a result an inefficient bureaucratic system is developed that all has to come to some general conclusion. This then leads to resolutions and mandates that become very long and complex because each member state might want a certain goal for the mission. In addition the members of each state have to do extensive work to lobby to other states to see their side and stance on the issue and hope to persuade them to see their way. Today the UN still does a lot of good by trying to preserve peace and create ceasefires, but at the same time it has turned into a force that does not necessarily have any right to become involved with every conflict that arises in the world.

Michael Busenhart

[Raphael Morali]

« Is there someone else ? » Lincoln P. Bloomfield writes in his article « Peacekeeping and Peacemaking » in the Foreign Affairs Revue. This is the first answer I would give to the second question that is asked in this article. Are the peacekeeping missions necessary to avoid the world to fall apart ? I would say yes. Professor Walker, you write : « the world did not fall apart when it ignored most local conflicts before the 1990s. » My view is that this is partly true. The United Nations Organization was created after World War II to make international diplomacy the key word in the resolution of conflicts, even if they are tiny conflicts. Because we know that the two world wars have begun with tiny and regional conflicts : the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia for World War I and the invasion of Poland by Nazi troops for World War II. We know that in Africa, local conflicts are the matrix for a general crisis. We have seen the last weeks, that a very local and tiny conflict between Israel and Gaza ( the geographic area is as big as Rhode Island) can create anger, frustration, and trouble all over the world.
To end on this point, I would quote Bloomfield : « In the ten years since the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force, no better alternative to U.N peacekeeping operations has been devised for avoiding escalation… for today, U.N. peacekeeping seems the most likely method of dealing with potential crisis. » So, I rather tend to think that yes, all of this is necessary because we do not have better options, because without those operations, without the international cooperation, it would be much worst.

Nonetheless, the way those operations are decided and managed could be better. The feeling that appears on the issue of peacekeeping operations is “who is running whom? The member states no longer control the process.”
The resolutions are voted on the principle of compromise. The troops sent are usually from more than ten nationalities. There is this feeling of confusion. But, was not it one of the purposes of the United Nations Organization when it was created, that the national interests should be overstepped ? The feeling of confusion expresses, I think, the fact that the U.N is more and more becoming an autonomous organization more and more independent from the national interests of the country members. So, there is, I think a good aspect in that idea.
Meanwhile, the issue that matters here is, I think, “where are we going ?” On what conditions, is a peacekeeping mission justified or not ?
To answer those questions, there is a need of consensus, a sense of community amongst the nations member, and a tacit agreement among great powers.
In conclusion, there is still a lot of work.

[ted mcbride]

To continue my previous comment, the expansion of the DPKO is a good thing. However, it must be done right. For the DPKO to be effective, it must be the original source of authority behind localized missions that trust the decision making of those in the volatie area. Rwanda is a good example of in-area commanders being undermined or placed in awful circumstances due to the decisions of faraway bureaucracies. Immediate response and improvisation seems to be key in maintaining stability in troubled regions such as Rwanda. Placing complex bureaucratic loops for countries or commanders to jump through does provide a safeguard but it also inhibits the effectiveness of the local forces.

[Bill Getman]

Rather asking if the UN should be in the business of nation building, the more pressing question is if the UN can afford not to be in the business of nation building? The consequence of letting failed states is both clear and stark with examples such as Somalia’s pirate problem and Darfur in the Sudan. Failed states will continue to harbor transnational criminal organizations, terrorists, and remain hubs of drug, arms, and human trafficking until they are either coerced or forced to stop.

Furthermore, is there another vehicle as multilateral or as well-equipped for peacekeeping than the UN? For all its faults in inter-operability, training, and planning, it remains the only organization in the world currently equipped to provide mostly unbiased resources in the hopes of ceasing and solving a conflict anywhere in the world. However, it is overly complicated to plan every aspect of a given peacekeeping or nation building operation for two simple reasons: Firstly, every situation is different locally. Specifically, operations undertaken in the Golan Heights in Israel cannot follow the same specific guidelines as an operation in Haiti. Secondly, commanders in the field cannot yield pre-determined planning to personnel in New York City for one critical reason; a plan of action never survives first contact with opposition. That is, conditions in the field can transform far more quickly than managers behind a desk can deal with them. As such, while the overall objective must not suffer, a far more simply elegant style of planning is commonly referred to as ‘commander’s intent’. Specifically, this style of planning allows a planner to set an ultimate objective, but leaves the unfolding operational details to the commander in the field.

If the Secretary General acts in the best interest of the UN, should the member states concern themselves with day to day control of the process? Much like UNEF II, the Security Council should cede daily operational management to the Secretary General’s office and the sizable resources that in controls, but maintain ultimate control of an operation, another level of commander’s intent. After all, the member states also have the interests of their own nations to concern themselves with and, at its very foundation, the Secretary General acts not in the best interest of a specific nation, but in the best interest of the UN.

[Dorian Bakogiannis]

On the topic of UN improvisation, it surprises me that the UN peacekeeping mission has proved to be more rigid in its modern engagements than in those of the past. I say that I am surprised because I would have expected modern technologies – of communication, intelligence, deployment, etc. – to facilitate a more fluid type of peacekeeping, designed to react nimbly to changing circumstances on the ground without compromising fundamental principles. Instead, it seems new standards of accountability demand that Security Council resolutions be thorough to the point that they approach obsolescence not long into their implementation. Certainly, resolutions may be updated and revised constantly, but as Amb. Walker indicates, this process is a drain on the resources of member states and on the general efficiency of the UNSC.

In assessing the current rigidity of UNSC resolutions, it helps to juxtapose new power structures with their predecessors. In past situations (say, the Arab-Israeli wars), the inefficiency or indecision of the UNSC was often the product of U.S.-Soviet one-upmanship. As a result, for better or for worse, this arm of the UN was sometimes bypassed. The prelude to the 1967 Six Day War, during which the Secretary General attempted unilaterally to remove the peacekeepers of UNEF, is a prime example of the Secretariat circumventing the UNSC in an effort to avoid the deadlock of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy. In this particular instance, the actions of the Secretary General may have prevented UN member states from becoming further embroiled in a local conflict. The question on is left with is whether the UN is more functional when it is governed despotically by the Secretariat, or when its democratic process demands ever-growing complexity to address the concerns of all member states.

[Grant Blosser]

Over the past 60 years, UN peacekeeping resolutions have morphed from concise mandates to much more complex and detailed plans. The transition from succinct to convoluted is, given the nature and structure of the UN, predictable: UN officials, wanting to avoid both practical and political shortfalls, have attempted to “resolve out” any possible failures. So why have “improvements” upon prior missions resulted in more detailed and tangled mandates as opposed to increased mission flexibility? The current bureaucratic quagmire emerged, in large part, because the UN cedes too much decision-making power to the politician. Take, for example, Article 39 of the UN Charter: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace… (and) decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The relationship between politician and peacekeeper inherently skews towards the politician. Another way to frame the relationship between the Security Council and the acting forces is to imagine if Congress both declared war and scripted a battle plan. I argue that the Security Council’s charge to “decide what measures shall be taken” should be left to those on the ground.

Although more flexible mandates would likely result in more successful PKO’s, there is little likelihood of significant change. The current architecture for mandates “tends to reflect the political play in the Security Council” (Jett, 39). Members of the Council, acting in the interest of their respective nations, are uncomfortable giving the needed power and flexibility to peacekeeping forces (which are often compromised of soldiers and commanders from various member nations). Some view the political challenges as the UN’s death card. For example, Touval writes that the UN, “is incapable of pursuing coherent, flexible, and dynamic negotiations…no amount of upgrading, expansion, or revamping of UN powers can correct those flaws” (from Jett, 53). However, I reject Touval’s total dismissal of the UN’s ability. Rather, the UN can and must move forward towards a more flexible and simple peacekeeping process. As Ambassador Walker highlights, there will always be mistrust between DPKO bureaucrats and ground forces: however, I argue that an inflated budget of $7 billion and a voluminous number of mandate are simply not worth “resolving out” politically charged trust issues.

[Joe Hudson]

The growth of the United Nations as a peacekeeping organization is directly related to the expansion of liberalism as a world political ideology. A history of European colonizers and vying superpowers has evolved since the end of World War II into a world of free, autonomous, sovereign states. As the political and economic landscape has changed since the ratification of the United Nations Charter, so has our concept of peacekeeping. A direct result of the evolution of peacekeeping is the growth of the bureaucracy attached to the Secretary General. The bureaucratic strength of the Secretary Generals office is effectively minimizing the member States political agency on peacekeeping issues. The ever growing resolutions and stipulations are minimizing the capacity of the member States. The Secretary General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is central to the structural conflict. In the interest of reestablishing the original balance of power and intention of the charter, the United Nations as an institution needs to rebalance its internal structure.
The UN Security Councils call for a cease-fire in the Arab-Israel was of 1948 reflected the organizations founding pursuit: peaceful conflict resolution between warring States. As a concept however, the definition of peacekeeping has become more complicated. Peacekeeping is now “multi-dimensional.” Once a reactionary body that mediated conflict, the United Nations now recognizes potential hostilities and often preemptively tries to find solutions. For example, Resolution 8928 was a decree issued by the Security Council ordering Iran to immediately stop its nuclear activity, specifically its uranium enrichment program. Although this action is legitimate as stated by Article 2, Chapter 7 of the UN charter, it demonstrated the preemptive nature the UN was adopting. Yet, the broadening of peacekeeping as a definition is problematic to the structure of the organization.
As resolutions continue to be issued, member states continually rely more on the Secretary General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for information and direction. This reliance negatively affects the United Nations ability to effectively act. States that do not have the capacity to inform themselves on an issue rely on the Secretary General and his staff for information. This reliance comes at a cost. Now empowered, the Secretary General and DPKO stipulate requirements within resolutions. Unable to fully comprehend all situations and all resolution, States rely on Secretary General and DPKO to draft appropriate legislation. This legislation however, ultimately limits the United Nations effectiveness in the field of action.
To reestablish the United Nations effectiveness and power, the definition of peacekeeping should be narrowed. In a world where conflict is reported instantly, this may be a hard task. Yet, for the actions of the United Nations to agree with the founding charter, this task is necessary.

[Sharfi Farhana]

The UN was created in the aftermath of a series of World Wars that ravaged the globe. At the time, it seemed necessary to attribute authority to those nations that held the most military capabilities so as to prevent nations from justifying the use of atomic warfare. The charred remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki illustrated the magnitude of nuclear warfare and it is the existence of the United Nations that has prevented similar international atrocities. Therefore, although it is frustrating and sometimes archaic, the initial design and distribution of power among members in the United Nations remains today.
Although the resources of the United Nations have been dominated by peacekeeping operations, which at times seem overly costly, ineffective, and cumbersome; these operations play a key role in retaining international stability. The disputes have moved from the territories of the global powerhouses to regions that have suffered as a result of actions by these world leaders. Therefore, as the United Nations is an institution that strives toward world peace, it is the responsibility of those equipped with superior military armament to play a role in constructing peaceful and sustainable governing systems; essentially the act of nation building.
The globalized economy also plays an important factor in this. In an era of outsourcing and what David Harvey calls flexible accumulation, no local government or community in any part of the world is without connections or investments. This makes third world conflicts pertinent to the stability of the economies in the first world. Genocide and political instability in Rwanda that prevents the export of goods and services affects businesses in the United States. Illustration by the media of people suffering as a result of famine in Angola incites concern in the United Kingdom and thereby has an influence in political campaigns. The borders around the globe have been imaginary to begin with, but with the creation of the United Nations in the face of globalization, these borders have melted altogether. As Bloomfield states, “The price can be heavy in political, moral and human terms, but it is less than the price of uncontrolled violence, unpoliced disorder, unlimited war. On balance, it seems not too great to pay.” (Foreign Affairs “Peacekeeping and Peacemaking” 682) This is why an international institution such as this is vital.
In light of the financial burden that is the result of such necessary peacekeeping endeavors, specific details and rigid planning structures are necessary. I agree with Rubinstein that improvisation is essential to any peacekeeping operation; however, the previous failures of costly operations make it necessary to create mandates in line with Colin Powell’s ideologies. Due to the demands of present international strife, even the wealthiest nations cannot justify providing firm political and financial support without initiatives that have some level of transparency.

[J. Kevin O'Connor]

The Framers of the American Constitution realized that variance in public problems necessitates different approaches to solving them. On this account, I suspect few would disagree with them. Accordingly, they imbued their plan of governance with the principle of federalism, that is, the notion that power should be balanced between the different levels of governments, ranging from the most local to the most immediate.

While the United Nations is not a government, it is a global problem-solving confederation, and as such, it would do well to take a cue from America’s Founding Fathers. As the organization itself proves, there is considerable value to political structures that coordinate complex decision-making taking a top-down approach. Still, recognizing the advantages offered by centralized planning should not preclude one from also acknowledging the value of localized decision-making. And yet, the UN’S DPKO has repeatedly failed to look beyond the centralized planning taking place in its New York office for useful solutions.

Put simply, the DPKO would do well to refocus on its original purpose of improving and stabilizing relationships between hostile states. While the restructuring of states might be critical to the sustainability of these peacemaking efforts, that fact does not entail that the DPKO leadership is equipped with the appropriate expertise, political authority or organizational structure to see these types of nation-building/rebuilding challenges through. Restructuring and in-country political changes deserve attention, but if Iraq is any indication, such change tends to be more effective when a bottom-up approach is taken. It is not enough to rely upon the expertise of those on the ground, they must have adequate leeway to act in accordance with their knowledge and real-time perception of changing ground conditions. Make no mistake, though. There is a place for high-level, centralized decision-making, but in general that approach is most effective when one is dealing with conflicts between high-level centralized decision-makers (such heads of state, senior military leaders, and diplomats representing organized administrative apparatuses).

[Connor Hines]

Ambassador Walker raises a crucial concern in this blog, “Peacekeeping: the Sorcerer’s apprentice.” The contrast of resolution 50, designated for the Arab-Israeli war, and that of resolution 1545 for operations in Burundi, perfectly demonstrate how vastly the role of the UN has developed over time. Over the past 50 years, the UN has transformed their involvement from basic tasks of establishing order and security, to completely reconstructing nation states. Therefore the principal question is, where is the line to be drawn between securing a people and overhauling their political system?
While the resources of the Department of Peacekeeping have skyrocketed from its complete absence of 1991, is it smart, acceptable, or even feasible for the UN to be in “the business of nation building?” It is clear that the United States and the United Nations’ involvement in foreign affairs are different, but one cannot help but examine the current situation in Iraq. The United States military began with the task of removing an evil dictator, and that mission rapidly snowballed into establishing a democracy in the Middle East. Though the United States faces the hostility generated by its “big stick” diplomacy, the UN is also considered by many to be a tool of Western powers. Therefore, the UN may likely face overwhelming resistance with presumptuous objectives such as those illustrated in Resolution 1545. The idea behind wanting to tackle every aspect of a conflict is important, however it is likely that smaller nation states will not always respond positively to being manhandled by an organization run by the world’s superpowers. The DPKO must use and extend its resources in order to secure, protect and collaborate, however it must not overstep its position, such as making decisions based on the assumption that it knows what is best for a people. The UN must return to its role as guardians, and keepers of peace, as oppose to the world’s architect of democracy.

[Julian Brody]

Since its inception, the United Nations expanded their role in the international community and spread their presence to nearly every conflict region in the world. With this evolved responsibility comes added challenges and greater risks, thus constantly begging the question, when will the United Nation go too far? The growing case load of the DPKO answers this question. While peacekeeping operations exist as a crucial function of the United Nations, they do not entitle the United Nations to engage in nation building.
Some may argue that nation building is the end game of peace keeping. If all states operated with a just, moral, and functioning government, internal conflicts such as those in Sudan and Rwanda will cease. In addition, international security will increase because states like Iran will no longer threaten the international community with an unstable regime. These descriptions, however, are all relative. If the United Nations engages in nation building, as Ambassador Walker asks, in whose image will they follow, and in whose direction? At what point do we begin nation building, and to what standard? Disagreements exist even among the permanent members of the UNSC, where China, the United States, and Russia all practice different political philosophies within their own governments. Agreement on a standard of government, whether democratic or socialist, religious or secular, is therefore unfeasible. Furthermore, though the definition of state sovereignty may have changed due to the United Nations ability to intervene on domestic issues that threaten world peace such as genocide in Rwanda, it does not license the United Nations to dictate the governments of states. States alone have the right to choose their own forms of government, not the United Nations.
Even if the United Nations possessed the right to engage in nation building, the responsibility of such a task limits the abilities of the United Nations. First, the United Nations lacks the capabilities to successfully achieve nation building operations. Conflicts that necessitate nation building, such as Burundi, are dynamic; the facts on the ground change from day to day. The DPKO is too bureaucratic to keep up with the speed of conflicts; they simply cannot assess the situation, determine the greatest course of action, and mobilize the necessary resources to effectively achieve their goal in the time frame of evolving conflicts. Nation building should therefore take place through those on the ground who can make day to day decisions rather than week to week resolutions. Furthermore, accepting all nation building tasks will overwhelm the workload and finances of the United Nations. The United Nations, therefore, cannot afford to engage in nation building.
Though the United Nations should not dictate nation building, it should not neglect such a crucial step in peace keeping. Clearly, stable governments do not breed conflict. The United Nations therefore, should assist-not dictate or lead-in the nation building process. The responsibility of nation building must rest with the citizens within the state. When their resources prevent citizens from successfully establishing a functioning government, the United Nations must use alternative resources in order to avoid the burden of the process. The Millennium Challenge Corporation, for example, loans money to struggling countries. They then involve both civil society and political leaders to determine the allocation of the funds and establish a timeline to ensure that they efficiently use the money. The strategy of the MCC enables members of struggling states-those most capable of nation building-to independently make decisions on the interest of the countries. By following a similar practice, the United Nations can assist struggling nations without becoming overwhelmed by the entire nation building process.
The United Nations should also allow regional organizations to bear the burden of nation building. Regional organizations possess more expertise and experience in conflicts within member states. They should, therefore, both monitor and play a more active role in nation building than the United Nations. The United Nations should assist regional organizations such as the African Union, however, who elected corrupt leaders such as Mugabe, to make them more effective. Investment in these regional organizations will benefit the United Nations in the long run by preventing the United Nations from bearing the brunt of nation building.

[Lachlan Markay]

American skepticism regarding the United Nations is not entirely
unfounded. The body's ineffectiveness can be called into question not
because it is a waste of resources or because it operates contrary to
American interests, but rather because it is ill-suited to deal with
today's major global military threats. The changing nature of nuclear
weapons since the end of the Second World War illustrates the
inability of the United Nations to address major shifts in the global
balance of power.

At its inception the UN was designed to keep the peace in a world of
large and powerful nation states who could wage full scale ground wars
against each other. Not coincidentally, the five permanent members of
the Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Russia (USSR), and China, were the only nations at the time that were
in possession of or close to developing nuclear weapons . Nukes
instantly give countries in possession of them a preponderance of
military power, and the UN was formed to deal with the preponderance
on the part of superpowers and major nation states.

Since then, four other nations have acquired nuclear weapons: Israel,
Pakistan, India, and North Korea. The maintenance of a nuclear arsenal
by those four countries constitutes a greater threat to world peace
than the possession of nukes by the five security council members, as
all four have historically had more unstable relations with their
neighbors or with the global community generally. Though the arms race
between the US and the Soviet Union was a grave threat to world peace
(even the world's continued existence), the bilateral nature of that
arms race provided a deterrent effect sufficient to prevent the use of
nuclear weapons. Israel, on the other hand, could be spurred to use
its nuclear arsenal to counter a perceived threat against its very
existence from hostile Arab nations. Pakistan and India have
longstanding tensions, and the nuclear elephant in the room is
omnipresent. North Korea has been hostile to the United States and the
west in rhetoric, and could constitute a grave threat to world peace
with a more developed and advanced nuclear arsenal.

If the UN has had difficulty in dealing with smaller and more unstable
nuclear powers, it has no tools at its disposal to deal with the
ever-increasing threat of nuclear terrorism. The carrots and sticks
employed by the UN to prevent international (and occasionally
internal) conflict are not designed to deal with transnational
non-state actors. If the UN is to take this problem head on, it must
revise its conflict prevention and resolution strategies to address
the growing relevance of terrorist groups and NSA's. The changing
nature of nuclear weapons demonstrates the vastly different
geopolitical landscape from that at the UN's founding, and demands
that the UN adjust its presumptions regarding international actors
accordingly.

[Danielle Raulli]

This post poses daunting questions: Are basic peace-keeping endeavors by the U.N. enough to keep the peace in modern times? Or, should the U.N. expand it's role to include nation-building under peace-keeping operations? Essentially these two questions lead to another important question of whether the U.N. should or has become a type of global governance organization. While indeed the U.N. has greatly expanded its role in peace-keeping to include peace-making, it has also expanded its powers into areas that have been previously controlled by the member states.

There is the argument that in an increasingly complex world of international relationships, it is imperative that a more complex organization be equipped with a variety of ways to keep the peace that don't merely involve something seemingly simple such as dispatching troops, sending in observers and creating a buffer zone between hostile parties. Perhaps the physical aspects of peace-keeping are not enough that it is inevitable to include policy-making under the U.N. power. However, there is also the argument that a bureaucratic staff of people unfamiliar with the events happening in a particular region or that region itself, is too "political" of an endeavor for the sole purpose of the U.N., which is to maintain the peace. Vast networks of communication and miscommunication can often complicate the process of peace-keeping and exacerbate matters. In conclusion, I support the idea that more "hybrid" operations of U.N. personnel and regional peace-keeping organizations, NGO's, etc. take control of peace-keeping. We need to eliminate bureaucracies within the U.N. itself and allow member states and host states more control over situations which they are entwined in and thereby more knowledgeable of. I don't believe it is the U.N.'s responsibility to practice nation building and I believe that the governing should be kept to the national governments.