UN Peacekeeping - cheap at twice the price?

United Nations peacekeeping has been heavily criticized in books, articles, speeches and in our own Congress.  Criticisms have focused on the UN bureaucracy, the long lead time for establishing a peacekeeping mission, the failure of peacekeeping missions to completely fulfill their mandate, and, particularly, the handful of missions that went very badly wrong.  UN peacekeeping has become defined by Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sudan and not the other 58 peacekeeping missions that have been established by the Security Council since 1948.   

One of the harshest critics was John Bolton who served as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 2005 and 2006.  Interestingly, the Security Council approved over 100 resolutions in this period,  according to the record, Bolton voted for all of them. Since 1991, the United States has voted for over 1100 Security Council Resolutions.  And, in fact, the United States voted for all resolutions that were passed relating to Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan.  One would assume that it the United Nations peacekeeping operations are so flawed, the United States, which helps negotiate the enabling resolutions, would balk from time to time and issue a veto. 

There is no doubt that peacekeeping, as the UN practices it could be more efficient and more effective, but there easier or cheaper alternatives if we want international authorization and approval.  Without that approval, it becomes extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible to attract troop contributors. Some countries are precluded by domestic legislation from participating in a peacekeeping mission that is not sanctioned by the UN.

There are other optiions.  Regional organizations like NATO and the African Union have engaged in peacekeeping with mixed results.  The United States has composed ad hoc coalitions of the willing, with limited UN cover.  And the United States created a special purpose peacekeeping operation outside of the UN system in the Sinai with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission to monitor the Israeli Egyptian peace.  It incorporates troop contributions from 11 different countries and is composed of about 3000 military and civilian personnel.   In 1993, the MFO operating budget was $56.1 million and while this cost was divided into thirds by Egypt, Israel and the US, the actual US cost was much higher since the Department of Defense absorbed the cost of the US troops, which amounted to $46.6 million.  While the MFO total cost is not out of line with UN mission costs for equivalent missions, the US contribution is significantly greater than the 25% we pay for UN missions.  In short, the UN is a bargain when it comes to peacekeeping and yet still Congress complains.  

The fact that the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was anxious to cancel our participation in the MFO, suggests that the drain on US resources in terms of lift, logistics and retraining would exceed by a considerable margin the impact of a UN peacekeeping mission on our readiness.  So the question is not whether we should advocate unilateral or regional peacekeeping over UN missions, but which missions to mount through the UN. Or, more appropriately, when to pull the plug on a UN mission that has gone sour or is not fulfilling its mandate. 

In the case of Bosnia, which started with a peacekeeping mission in Croatia to provide security for three UN protected zones, all the proper steps in terms of getting agreement of the combatants were in place and the mission was operational, until the mission was expanded and the original mandate changed.  At that point the Security Council, advised by the military commander in the field, should have taken steps to provide adequate resources to do the job and to renegotiate agreement for the mission by the combatants or it should have pulled the troops home and terminated the mission.  Similarly, there were points in Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan where the game changed from the original concept sold to the Security Council and on which the peacekeeping missions were based.  In each case there should have been a reevaluation and conclusion that unless conditions were again favorable, the missions would have to be aborted. This is easier said than done. 

Public opinion and pride seem to stand in the way of considered military judgment.  The Secretary General does not want to encourage unilateralism or admit that the UN cannot handle the job and the members of the Security Council are reluctant to back away from doing something to relieve an humanitarian crisis, which has captured the attention of CNN.  Everyone seems to have his eye on his own reputation or standing in the public eye more than on the humanitarian tragedy that is unfolding.  The result is that the United Nations is discredited and its future ability to help devalued and people suffer. 

   

Comments

[Ian Stearns]

The United Nations is unquestionably a strong international structure in preventing large scale global war between world superpowers. However, the UN fails to completely achieve the objective of “unit[ing] our strength to maintain international peace and security” (UN Charter Preamble) because it is too large and obtuse to deal with the dynamic problems that plague today’s international system. The UN cannot successfully confront third world problems, such as ethnic cleansing, civil war, and terrorism without significant adaptation and supplementation by a set of unilateral and multilateral operations.

Certainly, in light of failed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sudan, the UN must adapt to successfully deal with humanitarian crises. Although the UN faces basic organizational inefficiencies, such as third world underrepresentation and the inability to adapt to today’s dynamic changes in the power structure, the UN’s major problem lies in its peacekeeping operational abilities. Ambassador Walker is adept in noting that UN peacekeeping missions usually failed when “the game changed from the original concept sold to the Security Council and on which the peacekeeping missions were based.” Therefore, these failures are not a result of poor commitment or a poor resource base, but rather they stem from a disconnect between the Security Council and operational management such as the Military Staff Committee and military personnel. Whether this disconnect is simply miscommunication or a conflict of objectives remains to be seen. In the case of Somalia, when the UN assumed control of the operation from the US in May of 1993, there was no significant change in tactics; the basic strategy remained to “uphold basic law and order while persuading Somalia’s feuding warlords to participate in some form of national reconciliation” (Foley, p. 56). However, organizational difficulties led the UN to abandon the basic goal of peacemaking in favor of a quick-fix deal to patch together a coalition government of warlords. The process alienated most Somali’s and when eighty Pakistani soldiers were killed by a warlord militia, the UN became more aggressive. The operation soon abandoned neutrality, while casualties and torture plagued the operation. The UN operation in Somalia failed because the strategy originally established by the Security Council became muddled in the face of resistance. In the case of Rwanda, commanding officer Romeo Dallaire estimated that 70 percent of his time was wasted on UN administrative battles rather than serving the original mandate of monitoring a ceasefire between Rwanda’s army and the RPF. Therefore, operational difficulties led UN forces to take a laissez-faire approach to the crisis, allowing 800,000 to die in the genocide.

Unilateral and bilateral options external to UN authority should be explored in cases where missions are too vital to US security interests to be subjected to interference in the Security Council. However, UN peacekeeping missions remain the most efficient option for the international system because multilateralism minimizes operational costs and immediately establishes legitimacy for the mission. Before American leaders give up on the UN and target large scale organizational reforms or explore other options for international security, they should attempt small reforms within the current structure. As the cases of Somalia and Rwanda show, small changes in mandate consistency and operational communication could make all the difference in mission effectiveness.

[Cora Katz-Samuels]

We live in a different world today. When the UN charter was signed in 1945, interstate conflict was more widespread. In the early 1990s, however, the character of war shifted. Instead of interstate conflict, we are seeing more civil wars. As a result, the UN has had to primarily deal with peacekeeping initiatives between conflicting parties within state boarders. In the recent past, the UN has failed to resolve these types of struggles in many countries such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan, and Somalia. These civil wars have become more common and violent after the Cold War. Usually involving identity groups, religious extremists, or political-economic revolutionaries, these conflicts are much harder to resolve than disagreements between states. To successfully negotiate in future peacekeeping missions, the UN has to improve the organization of its infrastructure, among other things.

In terms of necessary organizational modifications, the position of Secretary General stands most significant. The role of the chief UN official needs to be redefined and clearly instated. In addition, UN representatives that lead peacekeeping initiatives need to be chosen on experience and skill, rather than the length of time served in the UN. Finally, mandates need to be planned out in advance to ensure efficient missions and sufficient troops need to be ready at all times in the event that they are needed. The UN has the potential to be more effective in its peacekeeping missions. This potential can only be reached, however, if many internal changes are made within the institution. The UN has proven to be successful in other operations, demonstrating that the system can work. We only need adapt the system to match the different nature of war and world-game that we live in today. But as reiterated many times in previous discussions, this is easier said than done.

[Maxwell Brindle]

The origin of the difficulties regarding U.N. peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts is rooted in one of the oldest military maxims: the first combat casualty is always the battle plan. The failures of Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, and the Sudan are all alike in that “in each case there should have been a reevaluation and conclusion that unless conditions were again favorable, the missions would have to be aborted.” This borders on a tautology since every mission is subject to unexpected changes on the ground, hence the existence of the maxim. The question at hand, however, is why were U.N. forces unable or ill-equipped to effectively reevaluate conditions on the ground and make the needed and timely alterations?

As professor Walker suggests, external political pressures force these commanders into making rash decisions.

“Members of the Security Council are reluctant to back away from doing something to relieve an humanitarian crisis, which has captured the attention of CNN. Everyone seems to have his eye on his own reputation or standing in the public eye more than on the humanitarian tragedy that is unfolding.”

With the public on their backs, leaders feel the pressure to ensure a mission’s hasty completion, and in doing so often accelerate the mission towards failure. Politics get in the way of peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts, to the detriment of all involved. But how to remedy this political problem? One answer involves political leaders making pragmatic and unpopular decisions, something that I personally am not willing to put my trust into. A second way would be to depoliticize the U.N. to some degree and separate the human and political elements of any given humanitarian or peacekeeping effort.

The goal of depoliticizing the United Nations in order to ensure that missions remain unfettered by political restraints can be completed by amending the U.N. from a political entity concentrating on diplomacy to an apolitical task force concerned only with the successful completion and enforcement of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. Countries would be encouraged to engage in unilateral talks with one another, and once an agreement is reached between the parties involved, then these parties come before the U.N. with a specific task that needs to be completed. Those who financially support the U.N. the most would have the greatest power in determining what should be done, but they should have no input as to how the mission should be completed. That unenviable task would fall to a U.N. task force acting independently of any nation-states. The task force would require that the U.N. have at least a small contingency of soldiers, but even this could be sidestepped if the U.N. contracted its duties out to the third parties. By its depoliticization, the U.N. inevitably distances itself from the countries that support it. Therefore, the U.S. might let a U.N. task force have total control over a mission, knowing full well that they can honestly wash their hands of any guilt should the mission fail. If nothing else, countries would feel less political pressure to hastily complete missions since they can take credit for any success while simultaneously effectively distancing themselves for any failure.

While there are obvious concerns and significant problems involved, I think the depoliticization of the United Nations is a route worth considering; human lives should never be endangered by the political squabbles of distant countries.

[Welles Borie]

After reading “UN Peacekeeping – cheap at twice the price?” a number of things struck me about the article. For starters, I find this John Bolton character to be quite the hypocrite. He and others like him, including our own Congress, sit around lambasting the UN for its “bureaucracy, the long lead time for establishing a peacetime mission, the failure of peacekeeping missions to completely fulfill their mandate, and, particularly, the handful of missions that went very badly wrong,” and yet he’s the one who, if my information is correct, voted for the Sudan mandate. More striking is that he voted for all 100 resolutions passed during his service as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. This is interesting because how could you possibly spend so much time criticizing the UN for its bureaucracy and failed missions when not once have you used discretion with your vote? If the UN is so flawed then why keep voting for PKOs?

I agree with Ambassador Walker with his point that the UN, while certainly far from perfect, is the best option we have, both in terms of its effectiveness as well as its relative inexpensiveness. The issue, as Amb. Walker states, “is not whether we should advocate unilateral or regional peacekeeping over UN missions, but which missions to mount through the UN. Or, more appropriately, when to pull the plug on a UN mission that has gone sour or is not fulfilling its mandate.” I agree wholeheartedly with this statement. It’s not an issue of choosing an alternative organization, rather, we ought to work towards improving the existing one.

The case of Bosnia, for example, was fine until “the mission was expanded and the original mandate changed.” This could have been resolved by greater oversight on the part of those in charge of the peacekeeping operation with regard to monitoring conditions more closely on the ground and making sure they have secured the resources needed to expand. Another alternative would be to use the UN as a multilateral coordinator between the strongest member states to organize a joint effort, as in the case of Desert Storm in Afghanistan. The article “Why Peacekeeping Fails” states “a mandate can suffer from being unrealistic, unsupported, too vague, or too weak.” The case of Rwanda serves as a prime example of a mission where the mandate was both unrealistic and unsupported by the parties involved. Although I don’t particularly think that the following statement ought to apply to a case such as the Rwandan Genocide, I do understand the merit of making a well-reasoned decision not to embark on a PKO: “Sometimes the United Nations should be willing to stand back from involvement; or leave a situation which seems temporarily beyond recall. It is, perhaps a modicum of modesty and humility which is called for.” Rather than simply saying we need to intervene in every single international crisis that unfolds before our very eyes on CNN, we need to start recognizing the inherent strengths, and more importantly weaknesses, of the UN and take active steps towards improving the organization’s efficiency and capacity for peacekeeping missions. Recognizing the UN’s strengths and weaknesses will go a long way towards more effective planning of peacekeeping operations and maybe then we won’t have another Sudan or Rwanda.

[Sophie Vershbow]

While I agree that the slow pace of a large bureaucracy is problematic for the United Nations, I believe that the real problem stems from ambiguous responsibilities and a lack of power delegation. Since the end of the Cold War the UN Security Council has become increasingly involved in internal conflicts and civil wars. Unfortunately the United Nations' dislike for turning down humanitarian aid requests has turned around to damage their reputation, and put future missions in jeopardy. In overextending themselves the United Nations has in fact lost its white horse image rather than establishing itself as an all powerful humanitarian force.
Since peacekeeping missions have shifted in focus towards racial, ethnic, or tribal conflicts, the UN must accept that often its goal should be to help the individual people, rather than bursting in to establish a new system of government. To attain this new goal, I believe the solution lies in delegating responsibility amongst regional organizations and NGOs.

The question is then: what should the UN deem worthy of its its money, military forces, and media publicity, and what should be delegated to smaller organizations. Regional groups like the African Union, European Union, etc. should work closely with non-governmental organizations to provide specific humanitarian aid such as food, water, medical assistance, emergency housing, etc. While monetary funding would come specifically from the countries in that region and NGO contributors, the UN would still have a place to pitch in financially should they see fit. The UN could then take a more narrow approach towards deciding when to use direct military action and deploy UN peacekeeping forces. These more defined guidelines for qualification would help direct aid requests to more specific organizations with shorter request list, getting them faster responses. Operations in Bosnia and Somalia failed in part because they tried to solve too many problems at once and in doing so, strayed from the original Security Council mandate. Hopefully given the more specific role of dealing with situations of extreme military conflict, events of genocide, and ethnic cleansing, the UN can go into a country with the forces, supplies, and money needed to do the job they signed on for properly.

[Roman Kolosovskiy]

In regards to the cost of the operations, I fully agree that the Congress does not realise, that even though the US contributes most to the UN, other countries still contribute. Therefore if the US were to do the missions on their own, it would cost them much more financially, but also it would cost them their image in the world amongst other countries. This is so because when there is a UN peacekeeping mission, it is supposed to be neutral and not taking any sides. However, if the US were to do it on their own, that could be portrayed as them taking sides.
Regarding the issue of the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions, I believe that the UN was overall not too successful. I acknowledge that there was a large number of successful missions such as Cyprus and Egypt. However, in the modern age of media and it always trying to increase rating numbers, organisations such as the UN will be remembered by their biggest failures such as Rwanda 1994 when genocide occurred. Also apart from that, I truly believe that the Un should be adjusted legally, so that the forces participating in the missions would never be seen as taking sides. This was part of the problem in the case of Rwanda. Therefore I believe that it is not the idea of the UN that is flawed, but the responsibilities which countries don’t want take upon themselves in the world community

[Shyama Nair]

The UN was originally formed in the hopes of creating a more democratic global environment where collective security and cooperation on key global issues would prevail. However, the UN has come under harsh criticisms in recent years. Ambassador Walker is right to point out the failures of the UN in places like Rwanda where UN peacekeeping forces have been accused of merely refereeing a genocide or in Kosovo where the UN’s failure to properly distribute humanitarian aid resulted in the deaths of millions. As with most institutions however, instances of failure often gain much more media attention then instances of success. I think it is important to keep in mind the situations in which the UN has in fact been successful such as in East Timor where UN peacekeepers remained until the country gained independence from Indonesia in 2001. Keeping in mind the successes of this admittedly flawed global institution is in my opinion, critical for reminding us why the existence of the UN is still essential.
This is not to say we should not consider the reasons behind why the UN also fails on so many occasions. Ambassador Walker points out a pertinent example of Bosnia where the changing of the original mandate of a mission caused problems. The inability of UN officials to properly plan out an stick to a mandate however is only the tip of the iceberg of problems in the UN. One of the biggest problems in my opinion is that the UN is not independent and any action in carries out relies on gaining the agreement and consensus of all its members. Ultimately, every nation is still looking out for its own national interests and reaching such unanimity on a decision is highly unlikely. Furthermore, when the biggest, most powerful nations of the world act unilaterally or impose restrictions on the UN itself, the legitimacy of the institution is clearly compromised. For instance, in 2005, the US congress passed a bill to cut funding to the UN if it did not meet certain criteria. An even more prominent example is the United States unilateral action in Iraq without UN authorization.
So why bother with the UN at all? Aside from the situations where the UN has in fact been successful, support from the UN also carries an element of legitimacy to it. Nations still value UN support because the soft power that comes with the global community in your side is valuable. The global criticism against the US about the legitimacy of a war that was not sanctioned by the UN is a clear reflection of the moral status held by the UN in the international climate.
The point here is that although the problems with the UN as an organization are obvious, they aren’t reason enough to write the UN off altogether. In my opinion, its existence is both necessary and valuable and without it, the last decade would have certainly been a more turbulent one.

[Abdelwahab Abdelghany]

The United Nations is very often given less credit than it deserves but for good reason. While some UN peacekeeping missions were successful and those that weren’t still managed to save many lives like in the case of Rwanda, the UN gives a sense that it acts in the best interest of the world which is simply not true. People who were suffering and are still suffering around the world tend to believe that help is on the way but that belief comes from a misinterpretation. The United Nations has over and over proven itself to be a membership of nations who have interests and goals and believe that the best way to achieve them is through this membership. Someone may argue that the member states are not members so that they can only pursue their interests but because they want to live in a more peaceful world. This argument is made by stating that the United Nations has intervened in time of crisis such as in Rwanda even though it wasn’t intervening t protect any interest it had. While the UN may have intervened in places like Rwanda to save lives, it is pretty clear that this intervention was not well planned and not enough resources were put on the ground to actually deal with the problem. According to a NYT article, Report Says U.S. and Others Allowed Rwanda Genocide, the US did not respond appropriately and President Clinton apologized for it. When looking at how this mistake allowed to be made, it’s easy to find statements that were made at the time that imply that the US did not want to intervene in another costly mission in Africa in which it had no “interest.”

The main reason that missions go wrong as they did in Rwanda is because the members of the United Nations are not honest and do not trust one another. As Ambassador Walker mentions in his blog, even though John Bolton was “one of the harshest critics who served as the United States Permanent in 2005 and 2006… the security council approved over 100 resolutions in this period, according to the record, Bolton voted for all of them. “(UN Peacekeeping-cheap at twice the price, Ambassador Walker) This is truly a problem because as long as nations continue to vote for resolutions to please one another because they feel that is the way to gain trust rather than analyze each situation and resolution for themselves, than the idea that countries will challenge each other to come up with the best possible response for a situation will vanish if it hasn’t already. As long as the members of UN continue to do favors, the creditability of that entire organization will sink and a day may come when the UN will have no significance. It’s unrealistic to ask nations to put things like cost, and allies to the side when considering a mission but at the same time, we should be giving attention to recommendations, the conditions are on the ground, and likelihood of success if we truly do want to have a more peaceful world.

[David Schlifka]

While he supports United Nations peacekeeping missions, Ambassador Walker admits that their full implementation sometimes becomes nearly impossible. He identifies the threat of the Secretary General and UN’s diminished pride that accompanies an incomplete operation as the fundamental cause of the continuation of hopeless missions. Media outlets, as the Ambassador mentions, have the power to shape the public’s overall opinion of the organization. Currently commentators and reporters vaguely state that a UN operation is failing. The only message that the public receives from this news is that the UN repeatedly falls short and, in doing so, wastes taxpayer dollars. The result is that the Security General and the UN do not withdraw from a mission soon enough, because they fear having a legacy of a failure associated with their names.

A viable remedy to the public’s dwindling faith in the UN’s ability to render peace in humanitarian crises consists of the mainstream media’s more accurate portrayal of the magnitude and danger of the conflicts and how feasibly the UN can continue to pursue peace in a region. In doing so, the public will hold the UN to more realistic standards in terms of its capabilities for ensuring peace and not immediately want their local Congressmen to vote to cut the United States’ contribution to the organization’s budget. In 1994, the President of the Security Council offered six requirements to determine whether the UN could realistically accomplish a peacekeeping mission. The President’s grounds remain accurate today, especially in considering why the UN has yet to deliver in Sudan. Both the organization itself, as well as the media, must enforce the UN’s thorough assessment of all six conditions to ensure that they exist both before and during an operation. If one becomes absent during the course of a peacekeeping mission, the media must discuss this absence in public broadcasts and cite it as a reason for the UN to withdraw troops from the conflict region. If the media ensures that the public understands the six requirements and only accuses the UN of failure to negatively sway public opinion when it does not accomplish peace in the presence of these conditions, the Secretary General and his or her organization will feel comfortable terminating a mission at an earlier stage and allocating its resources for more promising operations.

[Max Currier]

Ambassador Walker suggests that regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions are preferable to the United Nations. I disagree. First, I believe strongly that the primary challenges in the coming decades will be increasingly products of tribal warfare, failed states, environmental degradation, or lack of food and water, and decreasingly products of state aggression. Over the last decade or so the U.N. is almost invariably the first to call international attention to these issues otherwise ignored by powerful nation-states with different and/or larger interests.

In addressing these challenges, the U.N. has, as Ambassador Walker notes, successfully executed nearly sixty missions. The few that have failed may be faulted not for uncorrectable institutional failures but for insufficient resources. The defining U.N. mission in Somalia failed both because of insufficient resources (emphasizing only military equipment) and the emotional manhunt for Gen. Aideed, simply an ill-conceived expansion of the original mandate. Failure in Somalia effectively ensured that few resources would be committed to future missions, which of course only exacerbated the original problem. So, in Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire received alarmingly few resources despite continually pleading for more. Regarding Darfur, some critics of the U.N. apparently expect the Bush administration’s characterization of “genocide” to spontaneously trigger a U.N. resolution and its implementation, but after past peacekeeping failures the U.N. has received few resources, again exacerbating the original problem indefinitely. Perhaps some of the under-resourced missions would fail, but the sixty successful missions suggest the U.N. is capable when it is empowered.

Indeed, the solution is not less U.N. engagement but more. For example, the 2003 invasion of Iraq may be traced to the distant role of the U.N. in 1991 when the U.S. led an ad hoc coalition against Iraq without negotiating post-conflict stabilization structures pursuant to the U.N. Charter. So, in March 2003 the U.S. military invaded again, despite that U.N. weapons inspectors issued a February 2003 report stating they hadn’t found anything illegal and despite that the U.S. did not seek or obtain U.N.S.C. authorization. If the U.N. had asserted itself more by engaging Iraq in 1991 or by condemning the U.S. invasion in 2003, the U.N. may not have achieved everlasting peace but would have stepped in the right direction. By comparison, ad hoc coalitions have not proven credible or even successful and, in Afghanistan, the fact that NATO—in its first mission outside its jurisdiction—leads the mission reflects that neighboring regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Gulf Cooperation Council are not viable peacekeeping alternatives. In fact, these organizations eerily resemble the alliances that helped spark and fuel the two Great Wars. Hopefully NATO and the AU do not become the new Axis and Allied powers. I might half-jokingly predict that such a war would stalemate because neither would have any resources to fight with.

The overarching lesson I’ve learned over several years studying foreign policy and the U.S. government is that idealistic ideas are often ineffective less because they are unrealistic and more because they are poorly implemented. Most peacekeeping operations, then, should be coordinated by the United Nations and, if the U.N. should falter or require more resources to fulfill an expanded mission, the U.S. should lead the way in providing what the U.N. needs. The solution is not less but more because, ultimately, the U.N. may be the worst peacekeeping option, except for all the others.

[Julian Brody]

Since its inception, United Nations peacekeeping has faced criticism for its cost-inefficiency, response time, political rather than humanitarian interests, and failed missions. While the validity of some of these criticisms exists, especially in the cases of Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, and Sudan, the United Nations nonetheless serves an important role in the international community and is integral to the maintenance of international order.

The international community convened the United Nations to prevent any future world wars. To their credit, a third world war never occurred. Instead, the international community now faces different and complex crises such as terrorism and genocide. Since the founding nations did not predict these international problems, they failed to equip U.N. peacekeeping with the ability to quickly respond to internal crises and terrorist networks. In Rwanda, for example, Hutus massacred hundreds of thousands of Tutsi men, women, and children in one hundred days. It is unrealistic to require the United Nations to order a mandate, organize and arm a peacekeeping force, and conduct a peacekeeping mission in such a short time frame.

Some criticize the political nature of the United Nations for limiting their peacekeeping abilities. In many cases, some argue, states place self-interest over humanitarian responsibilities. Since 1991, however, the UNSC passed over 1100 resolutions. Furthermore, while a collaborative peacekeeping effort may be difficult, it is better than the alternative. As the MFO demonstrates, the United States paid more for a non-U.N. peacekeeping force than for the 25% they pay for U.N. missions. In addition, without the U.N., peacekeeping would become even more political. In a world without the U.N., a state could feasibly declare any internal crisis a humanitarian issue and intervene for national rather than humanitarian interests. The United Nations places checks and balances on the self interests of nations while simultaneously providing the opportunity to confront crises. U.N. peacekeeping, therefore, is cheaper and less politically biased than alternative peacekeeping opportunities.

The failure of peacekeeping does not always rest with the United Nations. The U.N. cannot force two countries into peaceful agreements. Mandates such as MINURSO and UNFICYP succeed because the states involved believe that violence and war does not uphold their best interests. UNIFIL, on the other hand, continues to struggle because neither Lebanon nor Israel believes a peaceful relationship serves their national interests. Furthermore, these states do not adequately invest in peace building efforts. In Northern Ireland, for example, the parties involved invested $650 million in peace initiatives that reached one sixth of the total population before the Good Friday Agreements. No such financial commitment to peace exists in the Middle East. Peace, therefore, must begin with the states at conflict and not U.N. peacekeeping.

The international community holds U.N. peacekeeping to an unrealistic standard. The U.N. cannot confront a crisis in the required time frame. Without the U.N., however, peacekeeping missions would become even more expensive and political. The international community must therefore consider strategies that decrease response time to crises and increase their funding for domestic peace building initiatives.

[Kate Marek]

In the past two decades the United Nations’ reputation as the world’s global watchdog and maintainer of peace has continued to suffer and weaken to the point that many in the United States question it’s presence and overall effectiveness. Despite the numerous successful missions of the UN (ie Cyprus), the institution is haunted by the disasters in Somalia and Rwanda in the early 1990s to more recently, the war in Darfur and the United States’ invasion of Iraq. However, is the overall organization of the UN as an international governing body so unstable and corrupt that we are better off without it?
The UN is nearly sixty-four years old and still revolves around its founding countries from the post-World War II era (US, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom). It is run by the world’s super powers, and nations such as the United States have too much influence and power in an institution that is suppose to represent the interests of the entire world. The UN depends on its member states, but when the United States and other major superpowers are more concerned with their own self-interests rather than what is best globally, it becomes difficult for the UN to maintain authority throughout. For example, the UN took a huge hit when the U.S went through with invading Iraq. Furthermore, the United States continues to veto almost all Security Council decisions that are significant to Israel.
The United States is not to solely to blame for the weakening of the UN. The UN needs more balance, stability, and resources to carry out their missions efficiently and effectively. They also need to approach every conflict as neutral as possible, along with enough troops and aid to carry out each mission. In order to do this, the UN needs its member countries to come together as a collective group to do their job for the greater good and not solely for their own self-interests. In addition, if states continue to ignore and go forth with independent military action, the UN’s international authority and governance will continue to weaken. The UN is an important institution in maintaining global order and has great potential for achieving more success than failures. The United States can play a pivotal role in improving UN peacekeeping, and this is an opportunity to gain the international support and backing it desperately needs.

[Kristen Daniels]

Conflicting ideologies, religions, and national interests may forever prevent the United Nations from ensuring international peace and security. A world without wars and human suffering is an unrealistic ideal nullified by the severity of complicated international problems. National interests, lacking resources, and the Security General’s poor decisions impede appropriate mandates and timely responses. Despite its financial appeal, the U.N. is overstretched by the complexity and financial demands of new and ongoing operations. Scott Strauss’s article in Foreign Affairs, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate” illustrates the self-interests and inefficiencies that prohibit international coalition and allow states to pursue selfish motivations. Hoping to avoid the deeply complex and savage events in Sudan, members of the U.N. have evaded the Genocide Convention’s technical definition of genocide: the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group as such.” Interpretations of a perpetrator’s objective vary, and conflicting notions of genocide will remain so long as political will determines financial support. In response to the U.N.’s inadequate response to the Rwandan genocide, Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated the U.N. force was not “mandated nor equipped” appropriately for the widespread. Despite the U.N.’s previous failures in Rwanda, the Darfur crisis again suggested bureaucratic shortcomings. Debates over intervention and national self-interest allowed for to inefficient decision-making. China nearly vetoed a resolution threatening economic sanctions against Sudan’s oil industry due to it’s commercial and oil concerns in the country. Such divergent political wills are extremely dangerous; without decisive international action, ongoing violence may deteriorate an environment beyond humanitarian or military assistance.

Peacekeeping missions are not appropriate or well equipped for every conflict. Nevertheless, ignoring the Sudan and Rwanda catastrophes is unjust and irresponsible- the U.N. must develop more specific policies requiring international intervention under such critical circumstances. Wall Street Journal Editor Max Boot describes the United Nation’s systematic failures in “Paving the Road to Hell: The Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping.” Boot specifically notes U.N. reports, which reveal: “U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda stood by as Hutu slaughtered some 800,000 Tutsi,” and the U.N. did not protect the declared safe areas in Bosnia. Humanitarian responses must reform; peacekeepers must place a greater emphasis on victim’s rights and recognize their obligation to act rather following their mandate’s rigid guidelines. Boot sheds light on a crucial theme, writing that interventions must address the causes rather than the symptoms of international conflicts. Peacekeeping-missions in environments such as Lebanon face highly complex and deeply rooted social phenomena: religious, ethnic, and clan differences divide the society and present cultural issues that appear beyond international negotiation. Similarly, peacekeepers in Somalia were seen as “outsiders” invading a domestic issue of civil war. By neglecting to gain the civilians’ consent, the peace-enforcement operation could not provide humanitarian relief or political stability. Long-standing social tensions between warring clans overpowered the U.N.’s mission and peaceful resolutions were seemingly impracticable.
Ambassador Walker suggests U.N. peacekeeping missions remain defective primarily due to the organization’s inability to foresee a failing mission. When warring parties are non-compliant or divided by ethical differences, the U.N. must adjust mandates to best-fit domestic climates or exit before exacerbating a situation. Appropriate coercion requires adequate resources and access to intelligence. Most needed, however, are regional efforts and the will of warring parties. Internal and external agents will continue threatening the U.N.’s peaceful principles. Appropriate responses, however, are achieved through state political will and the Security General’s evaluative decisions. Each must carry the weight of responsibility.

[Chris Kasdorf]

The UN has had many successful peacekeeping missions, such as the mission in Cyrpus. Congress has criticized the UN for being bureaucratic and not able to accomplish their job; however, many Americans forget that they are not working with the same resources as the US. Despite the amount of resources the US has, both militarily and financially, UN peacekeeping missions cost a fraction of what it costs the US to intervene. Moreover, the GAO has conducted studies on how successful UN peacekeeping missions are and concluded that UN peacekeeping missions are highly effective and efficient.
The cost for the US to conduct a unilateral “peacekeeping” mission is higher than that of a UN peacekeeping mission because the US pays there military personnel more than UN peacekeeping men. They also have high costs for the technology they equip their soldiers with. In addition, it becomes tougher to receive troop support from other countries because the mission is not UN sanctioned. If the US is able to save money and keep their strategic interests in the world by using the UN, the US should use them and their peacekeeping strategies.
The MFO mission to supervise Israeli Egyptian peace is a good example of the cost of peacekeeping missions that are not performed by the UN. Even though the US split up the cost with Egypt and Israel in thirds, the US paid for all of the US military personnel used, which was $46.6 million. These costs may have been avoided if the UN was able to conduct the peacekeeping mission themselves.
Since the UN’s strategies in peacekeeping have been successful then why do incidents like Rwanda and Somalia still occur? The UN is not flawless and needs to be reformed; however, the US should not take money away from the UN rather investigate what is the cause of unsuccessful UN missions and continue to reform the UN.

[George vM]

As Ambassador Walker points out, one of the more appealing facets of any UN peacekeeping mission, when compared to unilateral action, is the substantially lower cost. A 2005 report from the RAND corporation and a 2006 study by the Government Accountability Office both suggest that UN peacekeeping missions are not only less expensive, sometimes 1/8 the cost of a comparable U.S. only mission, but also more efficient. The argument for savings in terms of explicit, or dollar costs, while appealing, should not be a means of justifying the shortfalls, or implicit costs, associated with the way the UN currently operates. For example, the UN’s inability to establish a timetable for a more significant troop deployment hindered its ability to respond to the genocide in Rwanda. The death of approximately 800,000 Rwandans is, in part, the result of a sluggish, inadequate response by the UN. Has the international community begun to ignore the cost of human life associated with a delayed or inadequate response? Better yet, are there acceptable civilian losses so long as there is a “bargain” or the price is right? Both the United States and The UN face a moral quandary about how the sluggish UN bureaucracy and the stigma associated with more rapid unilateral action impacts the people they stand to protect.

Additionally, there are implicit costs associated with longer, unresolved UN missions. If peacekeeping missions are effective in stabilizing situations, but not facilitating solutions, the UN may eventually spread it self too thin or become cumbersome. By entering more and more peacekeeping missions without permanently resolving existing ones, the UN runs the risk of undermining its credibility as an effective international mediator, while simultaneously increasing the military and financial burden on member nations. Such a scenario could exacerbate the UN’s growing reputation problem that Ambassador Walker mentions in his post. To strengthen its legitimacy, the UN should including peace building and peacemaking components in its missions, which could make UN action more of a catalyst for forward progress instead of an ongoing crutch for peace. Given the efficient, cost effective structure in place, the UN could greatly enhance is reputation and long term effectiveness by responding swiftly and quickly to international incidents while simultaneously emphasizing peace building and conflict resolution.

[Jenn Anderson]

As is outlined in Ambassador Walker’s discussion of the problems currently facing the UN in peacekeeping missions, self-interest and the concern of flawed international reputation have become major problems that cannot be ignored in the peacekeeping equation. The UN is currently left in a situation that does not allow their missions to work to their full capability, specifically because all parties involved are not committed to continue peacekeeping in the future. This seems like a logical and simple requirement, yet it is not met in many of the current UN peacekeeping missions.

In the case of Cyprus for example, the mission can be considered somewhat of a success because both parties have a mutual interest in the situation remaining non-violent. Because Turkey is attempting to join the EU, and the Greeks don’t want to disagree with the EU, there is a commonly shared goal of protecting self-interest that prevents the situation from becoming violent in the future. In opposition to this, the case of the Western Sahara indicates how a failure of states to cooperative with one another, creates a situation in which peacekeeping missions are unable to help either party involved. As in 2005 by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “black clouds continue to hang over talks on the three decade-old problem” in Western Sahara (IRIN, 2005). The inability of Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the Polisario Front to collectively compromise on the regional issues makes for a situation in which peacekeeping is essentially impossible. In order for success, countries not only need to be in a non-violent state to begin with, but further need to be open and willing to work towards future peacekeeping. Because the UN is currently faced with the added difficulty of its members acting in their own self interest, and with their own political and economic agendas, countries in need of help must be willing to compromise or we may face a situation in which the success of peacekeeping missions is no longer is a possibility.

IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2005)
Western sahara: UN renews peacekeeping mandate amid pessimism. Dakar: Retrieved February 3, 2009, from http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=56907/.

[Bryan Erickson]

While individuals and states are quick to criticize the United Nations and every action it takes, it is difficult to pinpoint specific changes that could be made to fix the most ubiquitous problems with this international governing body. Many of the proposed reformations and desired changes would either create new problems or face insurmountable obstacles in their attempt to be ratified, given the current structure and procedural setup of the UN. Despite all of the criticism it faces, the UN has done many positive things in its relatively short time of existence. While there are still small-scale wars and cases of genocide around the world, the UN has been successful in preventing any large scale wars and the use of nuclear weapons. The UN has also served as a productive peacekeeper in many tense situations, such as the hostage situation with US pilots in China, and the conflict in Cyprus between Turks and Greeks.

In light of these positives, it seems that much of the criticism of the UN seems to come from the selfish motives of countries, and the difficulty the UN has had in dealing with intra-state conflicts. One of the major arguments against the current structure of the UN is that it gives too much power to the victors of WWII. Countries such as India, Germany, and Japan argue that they are among the most powerful and influential in the world today, and that this should be reflected in the structure of the UN. However, adding additional countries to the P5 would not be sensible, as giving more countries the veto power would seriously hinder the abilities of the Security Council. Another flaw of the UN has been its ability to deal with intra-nation conflicts. Recently, a lot of the debate surrounding the UN has revolved around its mishandling of the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda.

These recent conflicts, such as Rwanda, have proved particularly tricky for the UN to handle. When the UN was created, it was set-up to deal with countries attacking other countries. As a result, the organization has been most successful when it gets involved in conflicts between states. Courses of action become much trickier when conflicts arise between tribes, races, etc. because these situations tend to be unique and complex, and the parties involved are usually unwilling to make compromises. While there is no clear solution in dealing with these conflicts, one interesting idea is creating new organizations, similar to existing regional organizations, which would compete with the United Nations. The benefit of this would be that the UN would either have to make changes to remain more appealing than these competing organizations or it would become obsolete and would eventually be replaced on the international scene.

[Danielle Raulli]

I agree with Ambassador Walker that the U.N. has been discredited due to public opinion and pride by individual nations or leaders to protect their own reputations. The U.N. is harshly criticized in light of such atrocities as Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan—cases that not only involved a drastic change in the original peacekeeping game plan, but they were also cases that nobody was willing to commit to due to the escalating danger involved with the mission. During those incidents, regional peacekeeping forces were ineffective, and the U.N. ended up establishing peacekeeping mission. However, due to the scale of atrocities committed in those areas and the changes in the missions’ mandates, the U.N. missions were also largely ineffective. Even though the U.N. did establish peacekeeping missions in those countries, they were still harshly criticized. I think this is partly to blame on the individual interests of leaders and also reluctance to get involved. Each case presented the global community with a complex and large-scale atrocity that was unfit and unreasonable for one organization to handle, but because the U.N. was involved, it was also blamed for inefficiency. While yes, there are measures that could have been taken to reassess these situations and perhaps reduce casualties; I think the U.N. deserves at least some credit for resolving to remain committed to a humanitarian crisis when the rest of the world turned a blind eye.

I also agree with Ambassador Walker that the U.N. needs to know when to “pull the plug” on a mission that has gone sour, but I also think that determining whether a mission has filled its mandate is a difficult and perhaps unnecessary task. The purpose of the U.N. peacekeeping missions is essentially to keep the peace, and if that mission has done so on some level, having fulfilled it’s mandate or not, then I don’t believe it should be withdrawn. In a case like Rwanda, I understand how pulling the plug on that situation may have been necessary, but in cases involving the Middle East particularly on the Israeli-Lebanon border, people do not want the U.N. to leave those areas because it has protected and saved lives. In those areas, the mission may not have filled its mandate, but it has lived up to the United Nations charter and their commitment to maintain in a hostile region. All in all, I do not believe we should write off small-scale peacekeeping as ineffective or unworthy of commitment by the U.N.

[Sean McCann]

It is apparent that there is no feasible alternative to the United Nations in forging peacekeeping missions. The failure of the Bush administration to forge a true “Coalition of the Willing” without the approval of the UN stands as testament to the fact that the road to international cooperation runs through the UN, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
That is not to say that the current situation can not be improved upon. Though the UN is the best option for peacekeeping, and the vast majority of peacekeeping missions are successful, it is not too much to ask that the process for the execution of these missions be streamlined, and given over to a military head with the authority to pull the plug on a failed or failing mission, thereby solving both the financial and efficiency issues.

[Andrew Witkowski]

Peacekeeping comes at a cost. Congress may always complain, but peacekeeping through the UN is the most economical way to do so. As an international community we are responsible for doing our best to maintain world peace and as the world’s superpower, largest economy and a permanent member of the Security Council, the US, more so than others, bears the burden of initiating and supporting peacekeeping. Though it is not our responsibility to foot the bill, we are obligated to pay our share. Going alone commits more of our resources—money and troops—while risking public opinion of the US in exchange for more control over the mission. We arguable have just as much control over a UN sponsored mission through our deep pockets and strong leverage in the UN.

The problem that comes with entrusting the UN to handle a peacekeeping mission is whether the bargain really pays off. Sure it’s economically cheaper, but most likely the US would be more efficient handling its own peacekeeping. The UN is not a nation, it is a peacekeeping organization. It doesn’t have an army and is more passive, less hands on and has less responsibility than a single nation would. It is very bureaucratic and has a long lead-time, which is the result of so many members and self-interests that must be accommodated. It does though, have international backing and support. UN peacekeeping allows countries, namely the US, to undertake peacekeeping at a cheap price while diverting the responsibility if something is to go wrong. Though we might get bogged down in a situation and involved in a mission that strays away from its original mandate, we can easily place blame for the failure on the UN.

[Megan Bumb]

Ambassador Walker is certainly correct to point out that the majority of the UN’s peacekeeping missions were successful. This is a remarkable achievement considering the inherent limitations with peacekeeping missions. The underlying condition to have such a mission is that both of the feuding parties must agree that the status quo of the situation is better than pursuing the conflict. Several problems with this condition make it incredibly easy for the mission to change quickly and inevitably fail. First, the parties must always see the intervening force(s) as neutral; if one party’s perception changes, peacekeeping will not be effective. Second, when one side decides that it is not getting what it wants, the mission must often change to a peacemaking objective. Clearly, the conditions for an effective mission are extremely volatile; thus, it is quite an achievement for the majority of the UN’s missions to have been successful. With that said, there is still a major limitation with these missions. Even if the mission is “successful,” the only solution the mission can establish is to keep people from shooting each other; to maintain the status quo. Peacekeeping does not and cannot solve the real problems at hand. For that reason, peacekeeping missions are inherently limited.

The “failures” of the UN (i.e. Somalia, Rwanda, and Sudan) are perfect examples of the limitations of peacekeeping; thus, I believe that a more regional approach, for instance the African Union or NATO, is often a better solution for issues that require more than peacekeeping. While there are certainly limitations with these organizations (especially with the African Union), they do have more resources and capabilities to better tackle complex situations. And when you are trying to find a solution to a tribal problem that goes back hundreds of years, or to a conflict based on an issue rooted deeply into someone’s conception of self, such as religion, you simply need more force than the UN’s Charter will allow. Consequently, I do not believe the above mentioned missions are UN failures. They are situations that required more means than the UN could provide. For this reason, the US should not use these situations as reasoning to stop supporting the UN. Rather, the US should look at the UN as a smart investment. Because, as Ambassador Walker said, the UN is really a “bargain” when it comes to keeping the peace.

[Caroline Maran]

Over the years, US support for UN Peace Keeping Operations has been inconsistent to say the least, supporting the UN's efforts when the mission is successful and blaming the organization and renouncing its support when an attempt fails miserably, tarnishing the countries image. The primary example of a failed mission is Somalia. The mission started out as a humanitarian aid action and quickly escalated in to a failed PKO, resulting in the deployment of US troops into the region. Ultimately the US became a party to the civil war occurring in Somalia and thus a part of the problem, not the solution in the region. The US position in the war became evident when Somali rebel forces shot down a US helicopter. After the helicopter went down the public reaction was that the situation was the UN’s fault and not the US’s (who in actuality placed the troops in Somalia against the wishes of many high UN officials, including US secretary of state Madeline Albright (class notes).
The Somali mission dramatically shifted the nature of PKO’s and the US’s willingness to engage in them. The mission incited fear in the US and the UN in future involvement with humanitarian crisis, such as the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda by the majority Hutu population. Because of the aftermath of Somalia, I agree that the UN peacekeeping missions have been defined and further operations discouraged by failed operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Sudan.
Staunch critics of Peace keeping operations, such as US Ambassador to the UN under the Bush administration John Bolton, believe that peace operations in places stricken by civil conflict go against the UN charter, convinced that internal conflicts do not pose a threat to international peace and security. Because of the financial and moral costs of a failed mission, there has been a budgetary battle between the UN and Congress regarding the monetary expense of PKO’s. As Ambassador Walker states, the UN faces a “daunting” problem because Congress is constantly trying to lower the UN’s budget for missions. Ambassador Walkers believes that Congress needs to understand that the UN operations are a bargain.
This is a powerful statement and its validity is seen in a case study conducted by the GAO, in which a comparison of costs was projected for a humanitarian crisis. The study concluded that a peacekeeping operation (similar to the one in Haiti) would cost the US twice as much as it would the UN due to differences in wages, benefits and supplies of the UN troops verses the US soldiers.
I agree with Ambassador Walker's comments that Congress needs to understand that peacekeeping missions enforced through the UN are a bargain in comparison to the costs of a mission done unilaterally by the US. However, I think that the most important question raised by Ambassador Walker's bog is “ when to pull the plug on a mission that has gone sour or is not fulfilling its mandate”. As we learned in class, often times it is easier to reinstate a resolution regarding buffer zones, UN officers, and Borders than it is to solve the problem at hand. Thus the status quo of the operations can prevent peace agreements from taking place. The Un needs to be aware of missions that are not fulfilling their stated mandates and severe funding. There needs to be a compromise between both congress and the Un for PKO to work successfully. Congress needs to understand that sometimes PKO’s are money well spent.

[Russ Thickstun]

The United Nations is significantly more suited and effective at the job of peacekeeping than any other force in the world. It is difficult to assure others of this, as the American news media tends to have a sensational attitude towards what is newsworthy. A massively failed operation such as Rwanda, or even an event so relatively small as the downing of a Black Hawk helicopter in Somalia is more “newsworthy” than a UN force which has managed to set up and hold a DMZ for years without conflict. The fact that the final of these three examples is an amazing accomplishment tends to be lost on Americans. The first Gulf War placed a vision in people's heads of an American Superpower which can put down any conflict in a matter of days with few to no casualties. When such a precedent is compared to the UN's failures in Somalia and Rwanda it is difficult to convince people that a standstill is considered a success. A much more appropriate comparison would be the intervention in Korea, an operation which many Americans consider a success, which is simply a successful DMZ.
The shortness of the American attention span causes significant problems as patience is a large factor in many peacekeeping missions. Americans have proven to be compassionate and willing to front a certain cost to ensure the peace and welfare of a region. It is simply the expectation that a mission can be fulfilled instantaneously and without casualty that tends to cause problems with American involvement in peacekeeping. Peace cannot be established by carpet bombing a city, charging in and executing a few key persons. That instant gratification mentality has tended to turn even parts of the “liberated” populace that may have been sympathetic to the American cause against it, thus creating more problems. Successful peacekeeping missions are not plans for a complete solution to the problem. A mission's goal is to provide peace while the engaged parties try to come to terms, something that Americans might realize if they could remember Korea.

[Mike]

The greatest asset the UN affords the United States is covering responsibility. If there is a UN mandated and guided mission and it fails, the UN will bear the brunt of the responsibility. On the other hand, missions the US runs, such as Iraqi Freedom have been tremendous liabilities in global reputation. The efficiency and cost arguments are also valid in this respect. Thus, there should be a major campaign to educate the American population about the effectiveness and benefits UN mandated actions give. Currently, the UN is viewed by many Americans as wasteful, corrupt and inefficient. If a good PR campaign were mounted, these views could slowly be reversed.
On a side note, this article implicitly criticizes John Bolton for hypocrisy. While I think criticism of Bolton for is thick-skulled approach to the UN and international affairs is valid, his participation in the UN is does not amount to hypocrisy. Politicians will frequently be harsh critics of an institution or organization and participate in said organization out of political expediency because it advances their cause. For example, the Sunni voting bloc in Iraq boycotted the previous election in 2005 as a protest against certain institutions in Iraq. However, said bloc turned out for the most recent election because they realized the best way to change institutions was not through strict criticism but through the inside out.

[Helen Quigley]

The setup of the UN is the reason why it has so many problems as an institution. The global order of power has changed significantly since the UN was created, but the five victors of WWII are still the only permeant members of the Security Council. These five nations have disproportionate weight, and this leads to tension with other states, which clearly has an effect on peacekeeping missions. Why would non-council member states who do not have a part in the decision making process respond willingly and strongly to calls for aid?

Another problem with the setup of the UN is that it was setup in way that expects countries to act in an ideal manner. The obvious problem there is that states are not going to always act “for the greater good”, but rather, will act in ways which will benefit themselves. Peacekeeping missions basically have two strikes against them from the start, which is why the UN has experienced failures such as Rwanda and Bosnia, or have simply managed to keep the peace without actually accomplishing a peacekeeping mandate, like the situation in Cyprus. As Ambassador Walker noted, one of the major problems with peacekeeping missions is that you have countries that change the rules halfway through the mission. No matter how ‘perfect’ a peacekeeping mission might seem, if situation changes halfway through, it is difficult to be successful, which is a large reason why the UN failed so badly in Rwanda. The UN has too many bosses, and it has no power to check against these large and powerful states. Therefore, states can and will act in ways which benefit them the most. This not only effects peacekeeping missions, but it also has the effect of tainting the image of the UN, because it is just seen as a tool for the major powers in the world. In order for the UN to be successful, it has to be re-organized in a way which accounts for how states actually behave, and not how we would like them to.