The Terror Track of Negotiations

On October 31, 2008, the State Department announced that the Government of Libya had deposited $1.5 billion through a humanitarian fund into a US controlled account, which will go to compensate American claimants who have terrorism-related claims against Libya. A number of other steps were also taken to settle all terrorism claims against the Libyan government that were before our courts.  The principle claimants for these funds are the families of the victims of Pan Am 103 and the 1986 LaBelle Disco attack in Berlin.  At the same time, the Libyans are to receive $300 million for the victims of the US airstrikes on Libya after the LaBelle Disco attack. That money will come from donations and not from US government or taxpayer funds. Payment of the claims now opens the way for appointment of an Ambassador to our Embassy in Libya.

The resolution of the problem with Libya came about through secret negotiations with the Libyan authorities in 1999 and 2000, initiated by then Assistant Secretary Indyk and continued under my direction when I took over from Martin at State.  We began these negotiations when Libya was still designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism,” and, in fact, had been complicit in both the LaBelle operation and the Pan Am 103 act.  With the election of 2000, and subsequent change of administration, the portfolio was sidelined for a period by the Bush administration.  When I briefed Secretary Powell, shortly after President Bush took office, Powell was surprised that these negotiations had taken place,  and even more surprised that they had been kept secret. 

The Bush administration picked up the negotiations once again After the 9/11 attack and in August 2003 Libya finally agreed to pay about $2.7 million in compensation to the victims of the PA 103 bombing and to deliver a letter to the UN Security Council accepting responsibility for the attack.  Then in December 2003, Libya announced that is was giving up its weapons of mass destruction program as a result of secret negotiations between US and UK intelligence agencies. 
From the very beginning of Martin’s and my negotiations we had structured the talks with the Libyans on a stair step model so that when they did something we required, we would reciprocate with something they wanted.  The issues were related in the first instance to terrorism, but also included weapons of mass destruction led by the CIA and Libyan behavior in Africa, which was directed by then Assistant Secretary for Africa, Susan Rice.  It was a complicated negotiation from the outset, but ultimately extremely successful. 

It was always politically sensitive, particularly in the beginning when any leak would have caused a political firestorm from the families of victims and from Congress.  Secretary Albright and President Clinton took a real risk in authorizing us to proceed.

There are several important points about these negotiations.  First, there would not have been a successful resolution had we not agreed, in the first instance, to negotiate, face to face with the representatives of a State Sponsor of Terrorism, one that had cost multiple American lives.  Second, our success owed considerable debt to several foreign countries, starting with the United Kingdom, but also including the Saudis who hosted our initial talks, and the Egyptians and Palestinians who put pressure on Qaddafi.  Third, this was a victory of intelligence and diplomacy.  While Qaddafi may have been sobered by the US attack on Libya, which was allegedly designed to assassinate him, there was no indication from 1986 to 1999, that military action would change Qaddafi’s policy.  Fourth, this negotiation would never have succeeded had the Bush Administration not been willing to pursue a course that Clinton had started and charted.  President Bush could have made the Clinton negotiations public and caused considerable political damage for the Democrats.  He did not do so, which indicates the great advantage we have when our diplomacy is backed by bipartisan cooperation. 

With this bipartisan success, as well as the progress in the negotiations with the North Koreans, the question has to be asked why some politicians continue to oppose negotiations with our enemies.  If we can negotiate with Qaddafi, and Kim Jun Il why not Nasrallah of Hezbollah, or Haniyya of Hamas?  What is the difference? Is it the $1.5 billion dollars Qaddafi paid? Is it that Israel stands in our way?  And how could it be Israel when they have just concluded a deal with Hezbollah on release of prisoners and have been in negotiations with Hamas over the return of Gilad Shalit? It is a mystery to me how we can make these distinctions.  Isn’t it time for us to scrap the general policy of no negotiations with terrorists or their sponsors, and replace it with a judgment in each case as to the likelihood of a successful resolution, which is in the US interest? 

Comments

[Jared Leslie]

The Terror Track of Negotiations -
2nd Blog Comment
By: Jared Leslie

The recent presidential election, which saw Barack Obama win, will be the change that all Americans and the United States as a whole have been waiting for. President Obama has promised change and for once the nations of this world are looking to America as a beacon of hope. The Clinton and Bush administrations took a great risk in opening up dialogue with Libya and North Korea. Both of these nations are known for supporting and promoting terrorist activity. The success of these talks however have shown that the risks were justified and that international conflict can be resolved if an effort is put forth. The negotiations with Qaddafi and Kim Jun Il were successful and I believe that if the United States were to enter into negotiations with Nasrallah and Haniyya, of Hezbollah and Hamas respectively, they would produce positive results. The backlash from rural America would be very negative, as Hezbollah and Hamas are both seen as terrorist organization. This however should not be a reason for not entering into negotiations with Hezbollah and Hamas. The difference between the two negotiations is that Libya and North Korea are legitimate countries, while Hezbollah and Hamas are seen by many around the world as terrorist organizations and direct threats to Israel. The money given by Libya to the victims of the two terrorist incidents must not be a factor in the decision to engage Hamas and Hezbollah in a dialogue. Israel is in negotiations with Hamas and I believe that although many see Hamas as a terrorist organization, they play a key role in the security of Israel and to our interests abroad. The security of Israel and to our interests abroad is the main reason why America should enter into negotiations with Hezbollah and Hamas. By securing positive results from these negotiations the safety of Israeli and Americans will be greatly increase. Recognizing the potential benefits and being able to convince Americans is the responsibility of the newly elected president. It is time for America and its leaders to come back to the table and solve this persisting problem. The policy of not negotiating with terrorists must be scraped as it is in the interest of the U.S. to help secure the Middle East.

[Steven B.]

I wholeheartedly agree with Ambassador Walker’s main point: it almost never hurts to talk. Many terrorist groups and ‘rogue’ regimes are not completely fundamentalist and are willing to negotiate in return for concrete benefits (present-day examples include the successful negotiations with former ‘terrorists’ in Nepal and Iraq). For too many years, Americans have bought into the rhetoric that the world is black and white: there are good guys (the US and its allies) and bad guys (terrorists and rogue regimes), period. While this mindset may have had limited utility during the Cold War, today we live in a world defined by a new paradigm: grayness. As former CIA official and co-founder of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and National Counterterrorism Center John Brannan says, “if you look at the world in black and white, you miss a lot of the subtleties out there. 'Either with us or against'--the world is not divided into good and evil a lot of time.” While there are a few terrorist groups that are so ‘bad’ and have such a different vision for the future of the world (such as Al-Qaeda), most terrorist groups and rogue regimes are not this way. These groups and states are frequently shades of gray; some are worse than others, but rarely is there no room for dialogue and no hope of mutually beneficial negotiations.

As the successful negotiations with Libya demonstrated, many of these groups and states are not irreconcilable and the US has many opportunities for mutually beneficial negations with them. While negotiations will not always be successful and should not always be pursued, a greater emphasis on dialogue with these groups and states offers the US many benefits. Initiating dialogue with Hamas, Syria, Iran, North Korea and factions within the Taliban offer very real hopes of easing tensions and splitting potential enemies from one another, both of which would further US goals. Moreover, these groups and states are too powerful to ignore—if the US hopes to solve pressing regional problems that have global implications, it cannot disregard these groups and states. In some of these cases, dialogue should be initiated through back channels so as to not give groups legitimacy (such as in the cases of Hamas). In other cases, negotiations should be done publically in order to bring positive publicity to the US (such as with Syria and Iran).

The US must accept that the world we now live in is mostly gray. Initiating dialogue with some so-called ‘terrorist’ groups and ‘rogue states’ does not mean giving into their demands. Rather, dialogue does not cost the US anything other than a little bit of its time and offers potentially very high returns.

[Sarah Moore]

The success of the recent negotiations with Qaddafi and the North Koreans have ignited questions about whether our policy of not negotiating with terrorists should be replaced by a policy better suited to American interests. The blurred distinction between which terrorists we decide to negotiate with ultimately depends on what is best for U.S interests. However, it seems that a pattern has developed in our recent decisions to negotiate with certain terrorists.

Examining American judgments to negotiate with Qaddafi and the North Koreans may illustrate more than their willingness to submit to U.S. interests. It demonstrates our decision to negotiate with two states, which have legitimate power within their own country. However, despite the recent electoral victories of Hamas and Hezbollah, it is also well known that both of these terrorist organizations have significant rivals within their respective states. Even more so, because Hamas and Hezbollah are sponsored by an outside state, Iran, if the United States hopes to progress relations with Hamas and Hezbollah it seems necessary that the U.S. first negotiate with Iran.

However, although the public may be unaware of any secret negotiations taking place, we can assume that at this time, negotiations with Iran will not be as successful as our negotiations with North Korea and Libya. For one thing, Iran has an interest not to negotiate with the U.S. and to continue its nuclear program. Yet, negotiations with Hezbollah and Hamas may not provide much success, as long as Iran continues to sponsor terrorist tactics.

Ultimately, this leaves the United States in quite a predicament: negotiate with Hezbollah and Hamas, which may, even in the best of circumstances, provide only superficial success or enter into negotiations with Iran. Neither of these options appears to be in America’s best interest, as they both look to provide little progress in terms of the War on Terror and better relations with the United States. In this light, the United States continues to uphold its stance that it does not negotiate with terrorists.

[Maura Donovan]

The negotiations with Libya were a success because of the correct timing and combination of several factors. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations took a great risk in the decision to engage Qaddafi, an admitted enemy of the United States. While the compensation for Pan Am 103 and LaBelle Disco families was a momentous first step, followed by our own compensation for the victims of our air strikes, these concessions were quickly followed with a declaration of the end of the weapons of mass destruction program, only four months later. It is this second part of the talks which makes the risk worth it. The end of Libya’s WMD program is a large gain in the global war on terror, and the Bush Administration had put combating terrorism on the top of its agenda.
Secondly, these talks were possible because the United States gained assistance from multiple allies in order to work with the Libyans. These intermediary countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, allowed both the U.S. and Libya to reserve its pride and not look desperate for a deal. This tactic has been extremely effective in the progress with North Korea and could be even more fruitful with the new Obama administration. However, the factors which were right for the negotiations with Libya are not necessarily in place for other “enemies”. Pan Am 103 and LaBelle Disco both took place at least ten years before the talks began, and at this point American wounds had begun to heal. The violence and fear in the Middle East, however, continues almost daily. Therefore, Israel is a major obstacle in talks with Hezbollah and Hamas because they are continually experiencing attacks from these opponents. These organizations need to make their sincerity clear before anything else can go forward.
We must balance our attempts at normalizing relations while also respecting the concerns of our allies. It will also be difficult to create a multilateral talk with Hezbollah or Hamas because they are not actual state actors, like Qaddafi. However, it seems that the trend of negotiating with our enemies, as we have starting in Libya and North Korea, is the beginning of a hopeful trend. It is up to the new administration to tread lightly between the lines of absolutely no talks and open and public ones. We should continue to utilize behind the scenes channels and test the waters on a constant basis with intelligence and support from our allies. Then, once the actor or state is deemed rational and the talks potentially successful, it will be worth the international risk.

[Emily Smith]

Negotiation is one of the many strategic tools employed by the United State in order to achieve strategic security objectives abroad. There are numerous instances in which negotiations have proved successful and numerous instances when it would have foolish for the US to negotiate with terrorists. The trouble comes when discerning what instances merit negotiations and what instances will only worsen by talking to the enemy.
The US currently operates under the blanket statement policy, “The US will not negotiate with terrorists”. However, there is nearly no situation where a universal statement such as this can apply. I believe there are certain situations where it is ok for the US to negotiate with terrorists and others where it would be unreasonable and dangerous. One of the clearest distinctions made between types of terrorist organizations is that between national separatists and religious terrorists. National terrorist are attempting to create their own state or establish an area of operation while religious terrorists have global non-negotiable objectives. Thus, the US should never negotiate with religious terrorists such as Al-Qaeda. The nature of their objectives is absolute and unchanging and thus negotiations will not produce compromise or progress. On the other hand terrorist groups with a political goal often have more concrete objectives and inherently possess the need to recruit public favor or deliver social services. The realistic nature of their operations makes them a more viable partner in negotiations than religiously motivated terrorists who see themselves as answering only to God.
In looking at past negotiations it seems that the US has never completely adhered to their doctrine of no negotiation with terrorists. The terrorists we have negotiated with have usually had a strong connection to a state political system and the leaders (on some level) have had to cater to the demands of their national populations as well as their international allies. For example, the US has negotiated with Libya and North Korea and even with Hezbollah and Hamas.
One of the most pressing concerns for the future of both peace in the Middle East and with the war on terror will be whether or not the US under a new president will choose to negotiate more openly with either Hezbollah of Hamas. Currently, the US defines both as terrorist organizations and the general public tends to view them as closer to religious terrorist than a national terrorists. While both Hamas and Hezbollah have a religious dynamics, they are inherently political organizations and the US could benefit from recognizing them as such. They have large global objectives but also have strong moderate wings and both need to deliver goods and services to the populous. The mere fact that both organizations eventually have to answer to a population could make them a pragmatically thinking partner in negotiations.
Due to the exceptionally polarized nature of the conflict between Israel and the rest of the Middle East, the US could risk the alliance with Israel if we negotiate openly with Hezbollah or Hamas. However, I believe it is pressing that the US open negotiations and connections to only the moderate groups in Hezbollah and Hamas. In order to diffuse possible situations with Israel, the UN or other multi-national bodies should aid in future peace talks involving Israel in order to give the US more leeway to negotiate with Islamic countries.
Conclusively, the policy of not negotiating with terrorists is a valuable one when looking at religiously motivated groups. However, when looking at politically motivated groups the US should be open to negotiations. States, leaders, and groups whose legitimacy comes from their ability to rule in a pragmatic and useful way are more likely to make valuable negotiation partners. In the example of the Middle East, the US should begin to negotiate with Hamas and Hezbollah. This will establish direct allies and ties between the US and Islamic countries in the Middle East. These ties will in turn aid in changing negative perception in the Middle East towards the US and overall increase national security.

[Olivier Perrachon]

I believe that the case provided with Libya is a great example of what can come out of a successful negotiation. It's a win-win situation for both countries. By having diplomatic relations, the United Stats and Libya can foster economic ties. Libya is known to having massive oil reserves; this can be quite beneficial for the Americans. Libya could also benefit enormously from tourism. Libya is home to amazing Roman Ruins such as Leptis Magna and Sabratha. Thanks to negotiations, Americans can enjoy these priceless works of art.

Why can't negotiations such as these take place with Hezbollah or Hamas? Like many, I believe they should. Israel is not the problem. They want to negotiate with Hamas and Hezbollah. In fact, they have exchanged prisoners for Israeli soldiers and given sovereignty of Gaza to the Palestinians effectively evicting Israelis from their homes. The Americans are the ones who are stalling for peace. The attitude that we do not negotiate with terrorist is not only arrogant but quite contradictory. We have been negotiating with the PLO, whose members have been involved with terrorism activities. Every time the Secretary of State flies to the Middle East, I can't stop thinking about the amount of tax dollars her trip is costing as there is never any progress made from her meetings except a few photo ops.

I think the United States' unwillingness to negotiate directly between Israel and Hamas or Israel and Hezbollah has more to do with politics domestically. Powerful lobbies such as AIPAC have given contributions to election campaigns and have proven to effectively influence foreign policy for the good of the State of Israel. Hezbollah and Hamas are not just terrorists.
They both have been elected democratically to their respectable parliaments.They have been effective with their communities; supplying schools, jobs, community centers, and even hospitals. They seem to embrace democracy. So why are we not negotiating with them? Only positive development could come out of a trial effort. We could help Lebanon fully reconcile as a nation and create a state for Palestine.

[Emma Woods]

It is indeed imperative that the U.S. rethink its policy toward negotiating with terrorists and their sponsors, and it appears that President-elect Obama has already laid the way for his new administration to pursue this possibility. In his concluding speeches following key victories in the primaries, Obama reiterated his belief that “it is not weakness, but wisdom to talk not just to our friends, but to our enemies.” (Lavin, Carl. 2008. “Defining Weakness, Defining Strength.” http://blogs.forbes.com). He was widely criticized for this comment by his opponents in the campaign and in the Conservative media, who tried to use this stance to bolster claims of Obama’s naïveté regarding foreign policy, and even to support the outrageous assertions that Obama is somehow “pro-terrorist.” But, on the contrary, this willingness to find new solutions to old stalemates can better serve the U.S.’s interests than a blanket resistance to negotiations, and is a progressive step toward redefining our image abroad.
The Libya example highlights several compelling reasons for supporting and furthering President-elect Obama’s willingness to negotiate with terrorists or their sponsors. Generally, it shows that a patient, give-and-take approach toward diplomacy can provide a best-case solution. The outcome in this case served the U.S.’s interests in terms of compensation for the victims of Libyan terrorism, as well as the agreement to nuclear disarmament. At the same time, a once-dangerous state sponsor of terrorism was given the means and motivation through which to distance itself from its past violence and be reconciled with the international community. Talking to our enemies is not a foolish or naïve endeavor, as many on the Right have recently asked us to believe; it is one that reflects a sophisticated understanding of international diplomacy, especially as it concerns understanding the nature of groups or states that engage in terrorism. While it is true that groups like al Qaeda have inflexible goals that are irreconcilable with ours, it limits our options for success when we assume this as a rule. As in the negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah or Hamas, there is something to be gained from talks between even the most entrenched of enemies. It does not mean that all conflicts are resolved or that deeply held principles are sacrificed for the good of agreement, but it does mean that an otherwise stagnant situation can yield positive results when the door is opened to negotiation. This door also has the potential to then open wider to encompass greater, more profound agreement and a hope for peace. We should certainly take this cue from Israel in our dealings with Hezbollah and Hamas, or else miss out on opportunities to both serve our interests and seek an end to the violence.
Finally, this case can offer a key piece of advise to the Obama administration. Even as Americans call out for a massive overhaul in Washington, the new administration must see the value of bipartisan cooperation highlighted in this example, and follow President Bush’s lead in carefully evaluating the previous President’s programs rather than throwing them out in an effort to change gears quickly and completely.

[Bianca Dragan]

It's nothing personal. It's just business. Sort of.

Where peace seems to be the highest calling of the people in the Middle East region, it is odd that a direct line is not used to connect the parties involved, such as Israel, Hamas, U.S. and West Bank, for example. There is hope that the Obama administration will renew American diplomacy, will change the world opinion on the United States that has fallen significantly since the Iraq war, and will strengthen a global forum where issues can be discussed and compromises are acceptable. We can expect a process of reconciliation, through non-violence, multilateral diplomacy to achieve tangible benefits, economic and security benefits, for both the U.S. and the Middle East. Clearly, the U.S. and Libya taboos on discussing terrorism, nuclear weapons and accountability have been chinked. The U.S. has tried rehabilitating terrorists in the past: Menachem Begin, Yasser Arafat, Nelson Mandela; ANC or PLO. Cornered, they do not serve anybody when their only resort to legitimacy is through conflict. Egypt understood the importance of negotiating with Israel, hence becoming the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Similarly, the U.S. and Israel need to understand that they cannot negotiate with only half of the Palestinian people. Hamas is in charge of approximately 1.4 million Palestinians living in Gaza. Second, even if Israel and the Arab world reach a compromise, no agreement in the Middle East can be implemented without Hamas. When overseen, Hamas sabotages peace negotiations through violence, which makes the parties involved weary of their new compromise. Hamas should not be allowed to acquire legitimacy through violence, but its political legitimacy as an elected body should be constrained in a peace process. For one to have peace it needs an agreement with the enemy, not with an ally; otherwise the peace process would not involve trading on intractable issues between hard-headed leaders, but merely an exchange of gifts. Hamas does not need to be first a friend for the U.S. to start talking to Haniyya. Although quite personal, it's very much business.

[Victoria Simmons]

Negotiating with terrorists is not an easy or straightforward task, as numerous questions are raised such as, whether it is a good idea to meet with state sponsors of terrorism, whether it will cause opposition with other organizations, and whether meeting with them will end up strengthening the regime. At this point in time, the tactic of completely denying terrorist negotiations should be abandoned. It is clear that negotiations do work in certain circumstances, which is seen through the outcome of the talks with Libya and North Korea. Aggression and sanctions are not the best and only ways to approach the issue, and the terrorist groups are not responding favorably to military action, so it seems even more necessary to look to other measures. Additionally, it cannot be expected that through all their history the terrorist groups will be convinced that their goal is wrong and completely concede to the United States. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to come out of the negotiations with everything we want because it is not a debate and the other side cannot be convinced with arguments, but as Ambassador Walker states “…we had structured the talks with the Libyans on a stair step model so that when they did something we required, we would reciprocate with something they wanted.” This is the best approach because negotiations have to be a give and take operation and the goal is to gain as much and lose as little as possible by trying to get the terrorist organization in a new frame of mind. Even though not all negotiations will be successful and it is not tactical to participate in a talk that you cannot walk out of, there are times that discussions are beneficial, so it seems foolish for politicians to strictly follow the policy of opposing negotiations.
In addition, it is important to have a president and administration that is willing to participate in structured discussions, and in light of President-elect Obama, there should be more opportunities for successful negotiations. I believe that the United States should take advantage of the world’s approval of Obama. As stated in the blog, success came from the help of other countries, and due to the world’s positive response to the United States’ recent election, more foreign countries should be supportive and willing to help the U.S. with negotiations. Furthermore, even though leaders of terrorists groups, such as Nasrallah, do not want people to have high hopes for the new president, there is an opportunity for the upcoming administration to prove they are willing to negotiate and create a more peaceful political environment. On another note, Iran’s nuclear development program is a serious issue on Obama’s agenda. This cannot be set aside and it is necessary for the future Obama administration to decide how to deal with the issue. They could use military threat, increase sanctions, or compromise with Iran in order to encourage them to suspend their nuclear program. I believe that in this situation sanctions and military action should not be the main focus. Instead, I believe this is a time when negotiating is a viable way to approach the problem if the United States can encourage the international community to help in the process. Overall, I agree with the comment that it is time “to scrap the general policy of no negotiations with terrorists or their sponsors, and replace it with judgment”. It is true that compromises will not be reached with extremist groups such as al Qaeda or when Israel negatively interferes, but as seen through the Libya example, there are cases where negotiations are successful, and from now on I believe the government should be more open to discussion and not heavily rely on sanctions and aggression.

[Cameron Gaylord]

Cameron Gaylord
The fact that we have clearly shown progress and success when we negotiate with these rogue states, confirms the effectiveness of diplomacy and delegitimizes the neo-conservative strategy of refusing to talk with state sponsors of terrorism. Specifically, the case with Libya is quite significant. First off, as Ambassador Walker states correctly, “there would not have been a successful resolution had we not agreed, in the first instance, to negotiate, face to face with the representatives of a State Sponsor of Terrorism…” This represents a necessary facet of our foreign policy because it symbolizes our readiness to reach solutions through peaceful means. Furthermore, it declared to Libya and to other State Sponsors of Terrorism for that matter, that we are willing to bring exiled states back into the global community. While bringing Libya back into the fold was not a one way street, in that they were required to comply with many US and UK demands (the stair-step model), it was still representative of the US’s readiness to forgive (if the perpetrators are ready to repent).
The reality that peace was reached without armed conflict in both the Libyan and North Korean instances should send a message to US policy makers that negotiations should be a necessary weapon of choice. As Ambassador Walker points out, the use of force has shown not to be an effective tool of manipulating an enemy state. While I believe that the use of force should not be ruled out as a tactic, these two instances of negotiation display the effectiveness of a “peace first” strategy. At the same time however, peace first is made even more legitimate when there is a real threat of military intervention and that the other party knows it would be too costly to reject the conditions for peace (as the US demonstrated in Libya after the La Belle operation). Ultimately though, the US should reach for a handshake before reaching for the launch command.
While every case and every terrorist is different, the US should continue to negotiate. The challenges faced by the diversity of terrorists can be overcome through negotiations and the possibility of force. While it was significant that Libya paid 1.5 billion dollars, the Libyans did not have to deconstruct their weapons of mass destruction, nor did the North Koreans for that matter. It was only through negotiations and the discussions of mutually beneficial agreements were these milestones achieved; and not through direct military intervention which has the capacity to destroy and anger more than they do to instill fear and enact dramatic change. Overall, if a country feels as if it has been backed into a corner, it will be more skeptical about changing its tendencies. A “peace-first” approach effectively provides that escape route. And in my opinion, no matter whom we are dealing with, the ultimate concerns for anyone are security and the removal of the threat of being whipped out. That is what negotiations have shown and that’s what needs to continue.

[Nicole Edry]

The success of the Libyan negotiations only serves to highlight the foolishness of continuing to follow our current policy of non-negotiations with terrorists. Currently, there are several state-sponsored terrorist groups, like Hamas and Hezbollah, that could be persuaded to change their ways and rehabilitate into a respectable organization. It is both hypocritical and harmful to only selectively negotiate with certain terrorist figures. How is Kin Jun Il or Qaddafi that different from other leaders? If we follow this policy, are we going to have to start grading terrorists by total number of genocide victims, amount of civilians killed, etc.?

Not only would opening up talks with other terrorist organizations help the U.S. in terms of the war on terror, it would also improve our general standing within the international community. By using bipartisan talks through a variety of different countries, we would get more allies, solidify relationships with current allies, and show the world that the U.S. doesn’t just use pre-emptive strikes instead of diplomacy. It also would prove that our leader is open-minded, and willing to work with others instead of single-mindedly continuing to be the “watchdog of the world.”

These negotiations with Hamas, Hezbollah and other leaders would also lessen the incredible amount of pressure we’re currently under. We’ve committed an enormous amount of money and resources to fighting this war, and any avenue that could facilitate a peaceful resolution while simultaneously transferring some of our burden to another country is something worth pursuing.

[Ashbel Wall]

The recent resolutions with Libya demonstrate the importance of negotiations when attempting to reestablish rogue states as functioning parts of the global community. Following the attack on Pan Am 103 and the 1986 attack on the Labelle Disco in Berlin, the United Sates and its allies attempted to freeze Libya out with isolationist strategies and military posturing. The Libyan government did not fold under the pressure and as a result the United States was stuck in a diplomatic stalemate. Toward the end of the Clinton Administration the United States shifted it approach and began a dialogue with the Libyan government. As a result, the United States was able to reach a resolution in only six years of negotiations (1999-2000, 2003-2008), a comparably short period of time. In doing so the United States and its allies succeeded in persuading the Libyans shut down their Weapons of Mass Destruction program the families of victims of Libyan terrorist actions received economic reparations. However, the most important results of the discussions with Libya cannot be measured in dollar values. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Bush’s administration’s decision to continue talks with Libya was the precedent it set domestically. The negotiations with Libya began under Bill Clinton, a Democrat, but were continued by his successor, George W. Bush, a Republican. As such the negotiations are not a product of just one party. For too long politicians who have stated that they are willing to talk with rogue states have been labeled ‘Soft on Terror’. Hopefully both sides of the aisle will see the success negotiations with non-aligned nations and continue to use this as an effective tool in dealing with them.

This is not to say that negotiations are always going to be effective or the right approach. There is certainly a time and a place for the implementation of hard power but it’s refreshing to see the United States government attempt to communicate with rogue states, instead of trying to cut them off from the rest of the world, or bludgeon them into submission. By being flexible and dealing with each situation on a case by case basis, as opposed to a rigid non-negotiation stance, the United States adds incredibly effective and important tool to use when dealing with fringe states and organizations.

[Phill Hoying]

Here’s a very quick thought experiment: Two kids, George and Mahmoud, are in a room alone. They are mad at each other. Mahmoud has made fun of George and his close friends, and has given toys to George’s enemies. George thinks Mahmoud is mean for that and while spying, learns Mahmoud is developing nuclear weapons. He then decides not to talk to Mahmoud anymore and doesn’t try to fight him. Do George’s actions make sense?
I hope most people would say no. George (Bush of the U.S.) is immediately put at a disadvantage if he is unable to communicate with Mahmoud (Ahmadinejad of Iran) because: 1.) the U.S. would no longer be able to persuade Iran to stop creating nuclear weapons or stop supporting terrorism in the Middle East and abroad, which increases the likelihood of attacks on Israel and other strategic areas; 2.) the U.S. would no longer be able to ask why Iran is creating nuclear material or ask what would it take for them to stop; or 3.) with no communication, the potential for war goes up and I believe the U.S. is not strong enough to wage another war on top of the strained troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems then, that it is in the best interest of the U.S. to continue open communication with Iran.
While my example deals solely with Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, I believe Amb. Walker’s argument (that the U.S. should talk to enemies when it is in the best interest of America) holds true across the board. Whether it is with Hamas, Hezbollah, or the devil himself, there are going to be times when it makes sense to negotiate.
The biggest hurdle I see against talking to those who have been labeled terrorists, is potential backlash from public opinion. The phrase – “the U.S. does not negotiate with terrorists” – has been ingrained in the public mind and I doubt people will easily accept a complete reversal. However, public opinion is malleable and would probably only require a few statements of “spun material” here and there, to soften the blow. (It’s kind of ironic isn’t it, that words can mean so much to some and have so little meaning to others?)

[Alex Caruso]

Is it time for the U.S. to change its policy on negotiating with terrorists? While Ambassador Walker highlights a good example of a successful negotiation it is important to consider what would happen if a negotiation that went wrong. Negotiating with terrorists is different from negotiating with nations, there is no guarantee the groups will cooperate and furthermore it is not clear if they can be held accountable. A failed negotiation with terrorists could have serious consequences. A lot can be gained and lost in negotiating with terrorists. I think it is time the U.S. changes its policy on negotiating with terrorists group under the condition that the U.S. negotiates cautiously.

One way to make sure negotiations with terrorists go well is to look at past examples of successful negotiations. Ambassador Walker highlights several factors which he feels were vital to the success of the negotiations with Libya. He writes that the efforts in Libya were multi lateral, bipartisan, and well organized. It is imperative that the U.S. has international support when negotiating and that the U.S. is organized and internally cohesive. These techniques need not be taken lightly; they have worked in the past and need to be embraced in future diplomatic ventures with terrorists.

From what Barack Obama has mentioned in his campaign, it sounds as if once he takes office he will be much more open to negotiating with terrorist groups. If the President elect does change this policy he must act with extreme caution. In some cases terrorist groups will embrace the opportunity and work with the United States. In others, groups might do the opposite and take advantage of the United States to gain power. The U.S. must not force negotiations, act carelessly, or negotiate with too many terrorists too quickly. It must select which groups it wants to target and carry out the negotiations with precision using the techniques I laid about before. If done well negotiating with terrorists could be very beneficial to the U.S. but, if not the results could be devastating.

[Cali Garson]

The United States’ stand on negotiating with terrorists, that is not negotiating, has been a strict policy that has been followed stringently. One reason for this policy may be fear of increased terror attacks. This may happen for a multitude of reasons. First, a terrorist group would want to negotiate with the United States during a hostage situation in order to receive ransom from the United States. Another issue that comes about when completely flipping the negotiating policy is that terrorists might threaten attacks just to speak with U.S. Officials so they can spread their name and cause without the heavy planning of an attack.
While the United States has a strict policy for many reasons, these recent negotiations with states that sponsor terrorism have yielded positive results through diplomatic efforts. Politicians are the main reason that more negotiations with states that sponsor terrorism have not taken place. Some politicians may be wary of agreeing to negotiations with terrorist groups due to possible constituent backlash, especially if constituents heavily support Israel.
Noting the problems with open political support, private diplomatic efforts seem to be the best direction if the United States would like to begin negotiating with terrorist groups. In order to stray away from the issues with negotiations discussed earlier, negotiations can only take place a significant time after the attacks rather than an immediate response.