Russian Realism

Last Sunday, August 31, the Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev gave a speech worthy of the most ardent realist.  He laid out in clear terms what Russia’s foreign policy approach would be to the world and to the United States.  It had all the overtones and quality of a speech worthy of the USSR in the glory days of the Cold War.  Medvedev, flush with Russia’s perceived success in the Russian version of Sherman’s march to the sea through Georgia, and the strong message that sent to the neighborhood, declared a zone of Russian influence and “privileged interests” on Russia’s borders and wherever Russia had friends, citizens and business interests.  Medvedev rejected the paradigm of a “unipolar” world and American dominance of the world stage. 

Meanwhile, Russian Prime Minister and puppet master Vladimir Putin was inspecting an oil pipeline that is being built to China and the Pacific reminding us all of Russia’s key position in the world oil markets and its willingness to use energy as well as its military for political purposes and influence.  The Medvedev/Putin show of force appeared to be a page taken straight from Hans Morganthau’s realist paradigm.  Certainly, the Russian leaders are not burdened by any “universal moral principles” in their approach to foreign policy and they seem to hold firm to the concept of “interest defined in terms of power.”

Thus, we may well be looking at a new old era of 19th century balance of power as former Secretary of State Kissinger claims, wherein states “in the absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic threat” are free to pursue narrow self-interest.  If the realist paradigm is the framework the Russians are using, then we have to ask why now and what convinced them that a policy shift from international cooperation, the goal of American Presidents since the fall of the Berlin wall, to international competition seemed productive. 

American triumphalism as expressed by authors like Francis Fukuyama and by neoconservative politicians may have played a part in recreating the Russian will to power and a desire to erase the embarrassment of the post communist years.  Russian political and economic stabilization under Putin and energy generated wealth and leverage certainly reinforced the sense in the Kremlin that Russia was not powerless and could take its “rightful place” once again. 

But one answer may also be in the signals that the US administration has been sending as represented by Secretary Condoleezza Rice in her article “American Realism for a New World,” published in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs. She stated that: “in the absence of workable relations with (Russia and China), diplomatic solutions to many international problems would be elusive.  Transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change and instability stemming from poverty and disease – these are dangers to all successful states, including those that might in another time have been violent rivals.”

There is perhaps an unintended message here that the Russians may be misreading – that we need Russia, more than they need us.  If that is the message being received, it would certainly embolden the Russian leadership to challenge us. 

Secretary Rice was applying a realist’s litmus test to our relations with Russia and recognized that Russia’s internal course is not subject to American leverage.  She pointed out the long-term effort of America “to marry power and principle.”  She suggested it was possible to create a paradigm that combined “realism and idealism.”   While arguing for realism with regard to Russia and China, she also held on to the paradigm of Francis Fukuyama and the ultimate triumph of democracy and the need to hold true to our commitment to democratic development, particularly in the Middle East.  She stood firmly against Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations when she said that “culture is not destiny.”  She also sought, without much evidence, to discredit the paradigm that China represents of “authoritarian capitalism” Finally, she seemed to be giving a nod to the Republican nominee John McCain’s new world order of a League of Democracies. 

Perhaps her article led the Russians astray.  More likely it only confused them.  She tried valiantly to deal with the competing philosophical approaches to foreign policy of our time and the fundamental outgrowth of the Bush administration’s missionary commitment to “the importance of human rights and the superiority of democracy as a form of government, both in principle and in practice.”  How indeed can you be at one and the same time a missionary and a realist?  This must be the question that Medvedev and Putin were asking themselves and one that Secretary Rice never successfully addressed. 

Comments

[Mary Adams]

The shift in Russia’s foreign policy approach from international cooperation to international competition is a logical response to the changing economic and political global environment. As Russia grows more stable, successful, and confident, the U.S.’s stumbling economy is raising fear in Americans. American triumphalism no longer seems as loud and strong, a trend that Rice’s article confirms, and which presents the opportunity for the international community to pray on American vulnerability.

Rice’s contradicting belief that idealism and realism can be combined in political paradigm, illustrates confusion in American politics. We hold strong to our idealist goal to spread democracy, yet in a time of economic struggles, the government needs a more realistic approach. Rice’s idea to align global power against a common threat while continuing to spread democratic ideas is a pipe dream. Her argument is an unrealistic suggestion that ultimately hurts international cooperation. Although unintended, Rice demonstrates a lack of confidence, convincing Russia that the time to act is now. As America struggles to identify their place and power in the international community, Russia’s realist agenda can only be considered logical and possible.

[Phoebe Potter]

The recent resurgence of Russian influence, particularly military action in Georgia, sent a strong message to the Western world that Russia can, and will, counter America’s global dominance and the influence of NATO. How the United States decides to respond to this resurgence of power will truly test Secretary Rice’s assertion that the U.S. can be both a missionary and a realist abroad. Realist and missionary goals can work together when the U.S.’s power and influence is unipolar. When the U.S. is not faced with opposition from another world power, it can pursue ideological and realist objectives together because countries dependent on the U.S. for military and economic partnerships must meet U.S. requirements to democratize, address human rights issues, etc. However, when nations such as Russia provide an alternative strategic partnership that does not stress these ideological values, the U.S. suddenly loses its leverage and must abandon some ideological objectives to maintain influence; realism outweighs idealism.

This conflict between idealism and realism has already been tested in our relations with Russia. In her article, Secretary Rice refers to Latin America as a partner in pursuing missionary objectives. However, when the U.S. and Soviet Union were deep in the ideological conflicts of the Cold War, South America became a battleground for maintaining influence. While America continued to emphasize the mission of democratization, many authoritarian dictatorships were promoted and kept in power so that the U.S. could prevent Soviet Union influence in the region – the epitome of conflict between missionary and realist foreign policy objectives.

In hindsight it is easy to critique America’s realist position in Latin America, but at the time the perceived threat of the Soviet Union as a counterbalancing political force was very strong, and politicians at the time may have argued that it was better to maintain influence in the region at the expense of democracy rather than to lose influence to the Soviet Union. When Russia interpreted Rice’s statement regarding the need for international cooperation on ideological fronts, it miscalculated the willingness of the U.S. to be a realist when its power is threatened. I believe that Russia’s tactics in Georgia, if continued, will be met by an equally strong resurgence in American realism, even if that does require putting missionary goals on the foreign policy backburner.

[Steven B]

While President Medvedev’s recent speech outlining Russian foreign policy is certainly noteworthy in its frankness, it is hardly breaking-news. For several years, Russia’s elite has pursued a realist foreign policy aimed at restoring Russia’s “rightful” place in the world order—as a great power to be reckoned with. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was humiliated and forced to watch as its empire disintegrated, in economy fell into ruins, and it was relegated to a second-rate world power. To make matters worse, the U.S., over the course of several successive administrations, rubbed salt into Russia’s wounded pride. The U.S. actively supported the expansion of NATO into former Soviet Bloc countries (despite the first President Bush’s promise not to expand NATO eastward), ignored Russian concerns and pursued a missile defense program (which Russia views as a grave security threat), and failed, in the eyes of Russians, to repay the favors and assistance Moscow gave the U.S. after 9/11.

Consequently, the Russian bear has gradually awakened from his slumber and has increasingly shown the world he is not afraid to flex his muscles. In the past few years, Russian foreign policy has become more and more emboldened. Russia has taken increasing steps to restore its former status, greatly aided in this effort due to high energy prices (ironically largely a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq). Russia has increasing used energy as a source of leverage over Europe and its neighbors, and in the past several years Russia has cut off or threatened to cut off gas or oil supplies to countries including Ukraine and Georgia. Additionally, Russia has been at loggerheads with the West over the recognition of an independent Kosovo, and effectively blocked sanctions against Zimbabwe. Furthermore, Russia, under Putin, has repeatedly called for a multipolar world and railed against a unipolar system, often, not very subtly, saying that the U.S. is an abusive unipolar state. Finally, and most recently, Russia has “put Georgia in its place” by militarily defeating it and recognizing the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Medvedev, therefore, is merely putting into words what Russia has been practicing for the past several years. While this policy is undoubtedly troubling for the West, it was certainly predictable. A newly emboldened and wealthier Russia will require that the U.S. and the West increasingly take Russia’s interests into account. While the West should not abandon its principles for the sake of cooperation, as Secretary Rice points out, the U.S. must adopt a realist foreign policy in dealing with Russia and be under no illusions as to Moscow’s intentions.

[Aminata Diop]

In my opinion, the question is not whether Russia makes a bold statement that stipulates its equality in terms of power with the United States, the question is rather how we got to the point where another superpower taunts the US and believes it’s entitled to be the hegemon. The United States, though relatively enduring an economic crisis is still in terms of absolute power in great standing. Its military power outweighs Russia’s military power and the expansion of democracy and american values has been globalized. Thus the US comes off as a decisive country in international leadership and should be regulating the problems of the world.

However, the US government has a fair amount of issues to deal with within its domestic policy and with the ongoing war in Iraq which gives a tendency to overlook foreign policies and react only when the situation is extreme. This not only hurts the adversary but also the US. When the historian George Kennan compares a democracy to a huge prehistoric monster with a tiny brain who reacts when it’s too late and shatters his own environment, he gives a rather good illustration of what’s happening to the US right now; a decline in economic and military power but moreover, a decline of global support to the American image. A typical realist would contend that there’s been a clash between public opinion and national interests. The moralistic-legalistic necessity to combat terrorism and spread democracy has in the long-term put the US in an uneasy status because they made the mistake of trying to make the desirable possible instead of thinking about what can be done in each circumstance.

Russia under Putin and now Medvedev epitomizes realism with a statesman who puts forth the national interest in terms of power before anything. The opinion of the people only counts after power is acquired and it seems to work for them. The attack in Georgia served as a means to show the world that Russia does not fear the US and even tries to instigate a conflict. The US is forced to stay neutral and consequently comes off as very hypocritical. Georgia is a US Ally yet is not part of the NATO because if it were, the US would automatically declare war against Russia which they clearly cannot do. The Georgian government asks for weapons from the US, yet they get clothing and food thrown from helicopters. Condoleeza Rice’s speech on Russian realism did not help the US when she more or less stated the weakness of her country but instead made Russia “figure them out and undercut them.” Also, favoring a ‘League of Democracies’ instead of questioning the efforts put into promoting democracy exhorts the Realist Russia to see that the US are not only scared of a conflict but are also, unlike them, “in the presence of ideological and strategic threat” and are not going to follow narrow self-interest. In the end it is hard to know if one day we’ll go back to a bipolar world because despite all the eventual capacity of Russia to rise as a great superpower, it still is far from wrecking this ‘unipolar’ world. Even though the US are not showing “narrow” self-interest, their successful expansion of liberal and democratic values (democracy, free trade, etc) and vilifying of communist values have largely marked the world and the way it develops.

[Zoe Bruck]

Russia’s recent invasion of Georgia was a strategic move to establish a new, stronger sphere of influence on the world stage. Putin's actions seem shockingly emboldened to the many in the U.S., as we have become comfortable in our position as the key player in a unipolar world. However, Russia’s challenge to U.S. world dominance should not seem so surprising given the rapid economic rise of its neighbor and ally, China, and the damage that the U.S. has done to its global reputation with the internationally unpopular invasion of Iraq. The balance of world-power seems to be shifting, and Russia is not going to be left out of this exchange of power and influence.
Russia may well have misinterpreted Condoleezza Rice’s statements in “American Realism for a New World,” but their misinterpretation may be closer to the truth than Rice’s original intent. We need a relationship with Russia and China in order to solve many of our international issues, not matter what policies or actions they choose to carry out domestically and abroad. Rice speaks of merging realism and idealism when in reality, that will only amount to condemning Russia’s actions in Georgia with hollow words while continuing to work with them. While Rice maintains that we will hold true to our goals of spreading democracy and freedom she admits that we need a diplomatic relationship with Russia. We can continue to spout ideological rhetoric but our inaction in the case of Georgia shows that America will abandon its ideologies and take on a realist perspective when faced with a serious opponent such as Russia.

[Henry Johnson]

There are several issues to be addressed concerning Russia’s foreign policy paradigm shift. First, I agree that Russia’s paradigm shift mirrors Hans Morganthau’s Realist approach to foreign policy, and this is not surprising. The question is why has Russia shifted its foreign policy from cooperation with America to one of international competition and a drive for power. After September 11, 2001 Russia gave its support to America in addressing the greatest concern of global politics, international security. Since then the international playing field has changed. The world may not be “flat” as Thomas Friedman describes it, but nations are dividing according cultural characteristics. In global news today national security is still a major fear, but a more pressing concern is the race for control of finite energy resources. If Russia feels that control over an oil pipeline to China will offer international superiority than this feeling will lead to differences between the Russia and America. Perhaps Russia expected to gain more from America economically during their time of cooperation post September 11, and decided that they were holding the inferior position for long enough. I do not think the shift to competition comes from the desire to “erase the embarrassment of the post communist years.” From a Realist perspective, the changing face global interactions and divisions among civilizations is a more influential reason to shift foreign policy at this moment in time.
Condoleeza Rice may be wrong to deny Samuel Huntington’s prediction of a clash of civilizations. Aside from cultural and religious differences such as the ones between the Western world and the Middle East, clashes can result from a struggle for power. If both Russian and American foreign policy reflect Realist characteristics then there is bound to be competition for economic and military power. This leads to the second issue that Condoleeza Rice brought up, but did not fully address, of how it is possible to be both a missionary and a realist simultaneously. The Bush administration prides itself on being a democratic missionary. America gains power as it spreads and enforces its democratic ideals and values in foreign nations. The realist goal of international power and influence overshadows the missionary goal of instilling ideals and ethics of freedom. Missionary ethics are secondary to power-hungry goals of realist policies.
As we discussed in class, paradigm shifts and differences between nations tend to change over time. Cooperation can change into competition over control of resources, but this change can also occur because of historical animosities. American – Russian relations have always fluctuated, from allies in World War II to polar enemies in the Cold War and then back to friendly relations. With this type of history, the future of American - Russian relations could follow the pattern and develop into serious competition for global power, especially if Russia accumulates wealth through control of energy. What we see here is a clash of civilizations competing for international power.

[Jessy Gelber]

The growing strength of Russia and China in an increasingly global world present a threat to the interests and power of the United States. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US was the sole superpower, allowing the US to have a more idealist approach to foreign policy. The idealistic approach over the last 8 years, which lead our policies to push the spread of democracy and ultimately the Iraq war, has damaged the American image. With the waning power of US and the rise of non democratic regimes, the interest of the US are no longer easy to achieve nor is our ability to spread our values and morals.

I would agree with Secretary Rice that relations with China and Russia need to be workable to have international solutions, but I also agree that she gives Russia too much credit for their influence on our success for the future. The US needs to first restore our global image before we can offer solutions to international problems. In addition, instead of pushing China and Russia toward democratization and fighting these countries on human rights, the US should work on maintaining mutual needs and encourage capitalism. Creating a closer relationship, by not imposing our values and lifestyle onto other countries, will allow the US to work with the international community on a larger scale. By giving up some of our idealist motives and focusing on the realist approach in the short term we can secure a better place in the global community. By securing the US image the idealist approach could become more effective in the long run.

Last, I would challenge Secretary Rice’s view opinion that China does not represent a paradigm of an authoritarian capitalism. The increasing development of China’s economic structure along with their strong communist motives allows China to fit into a category of an authoritarian capitalism. Although not all capitalistic societies are democratic, there seems to be a general trend that capitalistic societies are also democracies. Pushing countries to be economically freer could lead to democratic values and the rise of the middle class. This brings me to my final question. China and Russia have recently adopted sovereign wealth funds, which have become a major part of their economic system. Will the increase in wealth from these funds inhibit democracy and move our society closer to Marx socialist state of Utopian or will these funds ultimately encourage the rise of democracy through a capitalist nature?

[Catie Gibbons]

A nation's foreign policy is based on national interests and national security. For Russia, national security does not seem to be such a problem right now, so it makes sense that their foreign policy would reflect more on their national interests. And agreeing with Hans Morganthau, Russia sees its “interest defined in terms of power,” and thus they are seeking to expand.

From a Russian perspective, it makes sense. How else would you assert yourself on a world stage that is totally dominated by the United States economically and militarily? The United States has spheres of influence thanks to, and through, its economic prowess, military strength, and even in a socio-cultural sense (in terms of McDonald’s and American films in cinemas around the world, etc.). As a result, Russia might be wanting to test the United States, as well as gain for itself a sphere of influence, much more concrete (on the basis that it is territory gain in the form of pieces of Georgia and around Russia’s borders).

I am not so certain that Russia takes the message that, “We need Russia more than they need us,” but rather that this is just a good time for Russia to regain some of its strength, closer to that of its old empire and the sphere of influence it had then. Referring back to what was said in the first paragraph, without external threats to Russia’s national security, combined with a growing self-confidence, their steps toward broadening their “horizons” (aka territory and sphere of influence) could just be testing international political borders. Russia need not be a missionary and a realist. Being a missionary implies ideologies and future goals. Being a realist, however, deals with the present and short term- and they could be just getting a little rowdy and cocky to rile up American foreign policy and its leaders. The United States has placed itself in a foreign policy ditch from previous entanglements abroad, and Russia could be testing US policy makers for consistency of international action, as well as testing its actual global power. After all, has history not given us a record of the balance of world power from empire to empire? Russia could be beginning their threat to the American Empire and matching it with a Soviet one.

[Chloe Major]

By this point it seems clear that America (headed up by Condoleezza Rice) is under the impression that democracy is the only way to peace. In her paper “American Realism for a New World”, Rice claims that America engages in foreign policy “because we have to, not because we want to”. Your blog post states that Russian leaders hold firm in their belief that interests are defined in terms of power. However, just as Russia seems to behave in a way that puts their own self interests above others, so too does America.
Rice argues that we act as a moral superpower and intervene abroad because we have to. It however, would be far from the truth to say we don’t want to as well. You ask how can one be a missionary and a realist; I am not sure that you can, and America is certainly showing that intermixing the two can be very difficult. Just like Russia, America acts to serve their own self-interests. Rational actors work to maximize their profits; we don’t transmit our moral values because we think they are so great, we do it because having other democracies servers our own interests. Russia was in fact responding to American influence; if America can act in a self-serving way, how can they expect others to simply sit back and watch.

[Marie Piayai]

The United States decline in popularity, respect and power is changing the dynamics of international relations with countries rising out of the woodworks with a competitive edge. I would say there are three factors contributing to America’s declining hegemony: George Bush, our relations in Iraq and our worldwide campaign promoting democracy. All three of these things connect to our ignorance of culture. Condoleezza Rice states “culture is not destiny: and that is true if the United States has its way. The United States thinks that democracy is suitable and should be the way of every nation without taking into consideration certain characteristics such as religion, tradition and history. We ignore the facts of Islam that provide women and men separate roles and we lack the respect of their religion because we think their ways are pointing towards the destruction of the Untied States.

Our actions and ideologies being applied in Iraq have caused many international players to lose respect for our nation. On top of that we have not been very welcoming to foreigners since 9/11 thinking everyone is out to get us. Instead of stabilizing and uniting after the crisis we became uncertain of our own culture and vulnerable to many outside influences. These are the instances in which Russia felt that there was not a strong “ideological or strategic threat”. They are aware of our relations with China and how that affects our decisions internationally. The United States cannot take a strong lead in helping end genocide in Darfur because of China’s business relations with the tyrants of the country. We also can’t enforce strict sanctions on Iran because of China’s business relations with their energy industry. Our economies are related, too related and that affects our decisions, negatively, in a number of ways.

Russia knows how to increase their power without directly crossing the U.S. They hop on the China bandwagon when dealing with issues on energy and the Middle East therefore stalemating issues in the EU and the UN. Fukuyama states that liberal democracies have spread to a majority of countries but in Russia and China’s circumstance they have adapted their own traditional policies with parts of a liberal economy and government. The liberal democracy trend has stopped and we are so wrapped up in our Operation Democracy that countries like Russia and China are zooming past us. We need to get our morals and personality back.

[Allie Lawson]

Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s article, “American Realism for a New World” addresses the current tension over maintaining the United States’ perceived position of moral authority in the international world in the face of China and Russia’s increasing economic power. Secretary Rice believes that the real fear is not that the “big powers” will be stronger than the U.S. economically and militarily, but rather that the government should be most concerned about how these countries use their strength. Above all, China and Russia must use their power “responsibly.” To Secretary Rice this means using power in a way that adheres to American values, particularly democracy. The article states that so long as the big powers use their strength in a way that U.S. condones, “we have no reason to fear.”

Of course we will have no reason to fear if China and Russia act according to U.S. principles, but why should they? Russia’s President has made it clear that moral principles are not the driving force of its foreign policy. Unlike the United States, Russia’s foreign policy is driven solely by realist principles. A nation’s interest equals building and sustaining power. What better way for Russia to exert power in the international world than by using its prime location to the major oil markets? Russia has leverage in the international world, and if democratic values are not the top priority, the United States must be prepared to deal with a country whose foreign policy thwarts the American approach.

This is not an argument that the U.S. needs to abandon its democratic ideals; however, the U.S. must shift its focus from imposing democracy in the Middle East to alleviating urgent humanitarian crises such as the genocide in Darfur. The current situation in Iraq proves that imposing democracy is not the answer. Even in countries where democracy has been successfully adopted the U.S. is remains unsatisfied. The U.S. does not believe that Hamas is a legitimate government because the party does not fit in with the American notion of an acceptable form of democratic government. This tells the international world that the only democracy is the American way, and even discourages democratic participation.

The U.S. is currently facing a potential conflict with Russia. Secretary Rice’s advocacy of the “uniquely American realism” that attempts to address both immediate needs and long term democratic goals seems futile in this circumstance because Russia has made it clear that it is not going to play by the rules of democratic morals. The U.S. government must come to terms with the fact that it is no longer an absolute power, and that international relations will not always occur in a way that adheres to the American approach.

[Stuart L]

Secretary Rice tries to blend realism and idealism by suggesting, quite truthfully, that it is in the best interest of all international powers to address certain universal threats (nuclear proliferation, climate change, poverty, and disease, to cite the ones she mentions). However, a clear question remains: what is the appropriate course of action when the national interest may conflict with the interests of other nations?

Russia, as of late, has made its decision quite clear: when national interest and collective interest conflict, Russia’s national interest wins. Russia's recent actions (particularly in Georgia) are a clear response to the growing strength and size of the European Union and highlight Russia's opposition to former Soviet states strengthening ties with the West.

Russia seems to have discovered an unfortunate reality of modern international relations: without the constant threat of nuclear war experienced during the Cold War, there isn't much the West can do to respond to Russian aggression. Direct war is not really an option, particularly with the knowledge that it could lead to MAD. Sanctions aren't a real option - Russia is a net-exporter. Russia is a net-exporter, but Russia exports oil, a resource the West desperately needs. The Security Council is impotent (Russia holds a veto). NATO, the EU, and the US can posture, but at the end of the day... short of war, what options do we have?

[Danielle Alfano]

After 9/11 the security measures of the US changed. In order to accomplish eventual stability, Condoleezza Rice argues in her article “American Realism for a New World,” we must recognize that “democratic state building is now an urgent component of our national interest.” What Rice contends is that in order to achieve stability in our national security, we must root out the problem of terrorism, that being unstable regimes prone to harboring terrorists. According to Rice, “if America does not set the goal, no one will.” Although such an ambition is admirable and may be beneficial in the long run, was this truly the goal of the Iraq war? Or was it a manufactured goal used to cover the individual goals of the Bush administration? Perhaps the way to be both a missionary and a realist is to choose battles which combine ideological aims with realist goals of military, economic, and material power.
As Rice explains, this problem of attaining democracy in Iraq will be generational. Many countries have fought for goals under the guise of others, sometimes leading to success in the long run. Despite eventual success, America at present seems to have lost support from abroad and even at home. Some claim we have lost much of our soft power due to the war in Iraq. Even though we remain the greatest world power economically and militarily, our loss of soft power has hurt our reputation. In many respects, the Bush administration has been blamed for this, and as we near the 2008 presidential election, many are expecting (and hopeful for) change. Still with change often comes a period of uncertainty. Russia may see this as an opportune time to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy towards the US, in the hopes of challenging America during a more vulnerable period.
Although this Russian stand may prove unproductive, it is not necessarily surprising. Ever since the embarrassment of the end of the Cold War, Russia has continued to think of itself as the great power it once was despite economic decline and its secondary position in international politics. In light of a new world order, much has changed, specifically regarding the foreign policy of the US and that of other powerful nations. As Rice states, the world is plagued with many dangers, and all successive states “including those that might in another time have been violent rivals” are subject to them. Though cooperation is necessary, the US and Russia differ in their values, which has lead to friction despite cooperation in the post-Cold War years. Perhaps Rice’s claim that “Russia is not the Soviet Union… It is neither a permanent enemy nor a strategic threat” offended Russia. Consequently, as Medvedev stated in his August 31st speech, “[Russia] cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions.” Also, Rice asserts that “in the absence of workable relations with [Russia]… Diplomatic solutions to many international problems would be elusive.” Perhaps Russia does not think that Rice is stating that “we need Russia more than they need us.” Instead, maybe Russia now realizes that we need their cooperation to successfully improve world order, a goal we are clearly invested in. Medvedev may believe that such a claim puts Russia in a position of relative power against the US. In other words, this claim combined with the somewhat diminished position of the US may have given Russia a small window of opportunity to take steps towards their ever-present goal—to become the super-power they once were as the Soviet Union.

[Justin Williams]

The world as we know it is shrinking. The struggle in the last ten years has been decidedly focused upon international relations, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. There is no way to be a missionary and a realist; the two do not go hand in hand with each other. One only has to look at American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. If we aim to high with idealistic principles, we must fall back to pessimistic, realist policy in order to maintain our direction. The problem of Russia in recent years seems to fall under the ideological approach. In recent years, OPEC has steadily becoming more arrogant and ideological, raising prices as they see fit. Russia, who has been on the sidelines for years, has now shown itself as a leader in petroleum production and with their recent involvement in Georgia, has established their seat in the world oil supply/demand scheme. There is no way to deny that Russia is becoming a world power; militarily, politically, and economically, and it is clear that America needs to be worried.
Russia is seeking its place in world dominance. They have not had the sort of economic boom that India and China have experienced in recent years, although their wealthy keep getting richer. Medvedev has and continues to advocate for the adoption of the ruble instead of the dollar as the world standard of currency. Russia is also the world’s largest producer of natural gas, yet therein lies the problem; natural gas is not the same as crude oil. It cannot be store in barrels; it must be in pressurized tanks and pipelines, increasing the cost. Regardless, Russia is not the same nation as they were 20 years ago.
The Russia we are seeing today is a nation driven by American exuberance in world politics. Since the advent of the Iraq war, Russia has been growing and establishing themselves as an idealist power with the strength to back their principles. In order to succeed they need to be economically positioned on the world stage to compete with China and the US. In order for the US to combat the expansion of Russia’s hand, we must establish an idealist approach. While our realist approach in the war is necessary when dealing with a nation with an entirely different set of moral and lifestyle traditions, Russia is much more similar to the US in individual lifestyles and interests, therefore we can approach policy with Russia with an idealist set of motives. We need to be less careful and more deliberate with the Russians, than say our relations with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan.
Condoleezza Rice’s approach has confused the Russians, for their motives are for growth and power, not foreign cooperation. They are an underhanded nation that will say one thing and do another, regardless of other nation’s agreements or prior statements. One only needs to look as far as the Georgia conflict in the recent months. Their mission was to suppress the Georgian government’s struggle for independence. One can only look back to the 1980 when Russia invaded Afghanistan. Russia is clearly fed up with being a nation on the sidelines and by adopting an idealist approach they are a very dangerous foe in the eyes of many nations who are “stabilized”.
In my opinion, Russia has been lost for years. They are overreaching their grasp and have not realized this fact as of yet. I fear that the US has to redirect its approach to foreign policy. Our economy is faltering, our military is quickly becoming rivaled by other nations and our nation is continually growing apart. September 11, 2001 helped our nation come together, but the war in Iraq helped our nation spread apart. Now Russia is making the most of the open door and they are easily walking right in.

[Maria Leonardi]

According to Hans Morganthau’s “Six Principles of Political Realism,” man’s interests are defined in terms of power. Therefore the primary motivation of men is power, not ideals or ethics. If Russia’s newest political move in the form of Medvedev’s speech is “worthy of the most ardent realist,” than the motivation should be defined only in terms of power. Although Russia certainly must have the desire to regain the lost power the country once had and to become a balance of power in the world, the motivation may not be in terms of the power of “man over man.” Russia does show power as an interest in attempting to display a control over oil and the “march to the sea” through Georgia, this alone does not demonstrate that they are willing to “use energy as well as…military for political purposes and influence.” Also, the use of this force may not be demonstrating interest defined as power. If this motivation is a demonstration of “Russian will to power and a desire to erase the embarrassment of the post communist years,” than this may be motivated by the struggle to validate ideals as well.

Russia seems to want to counter “American triumphalism” and the democracy that Rice promotes as superior in her article. Francis Fukuyama believes that democracy has won out above all other forms of government and that we are witnessing the “universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” During a time when China’s economic success is threatening Fukuyama’s thesis, Russia is attempting to succeed in providing more doubts about the superiority of democracy. For Russia, it is a chance to prove that the Western world is wrong in its assessment of the power of democracy. Although Russia may be driven by power as an interest, this interest is defined in terms of ideology as well as man over man. There are realist components as well as missionary. Although a country could try and be a realist in its foreign policy, ideologies will effect how leaders make decisions. Just as in the United States the “importance of human rights and the superiority of democracy as a form of government,” will continue to drive our leaders as well as the continued motivation of power as an interest as well. Russia will not be able to be primarily motivated by the power of man over man without being motivated by the desire to prove that democracy is not the superior form of government

Russia’s bid for power as a country that could compete with the United States is being pursued at a time when China is the fastest grown nation in terms of power economically. Rice’s article was calling for cooperation internationally so that “terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change and instability stemming from poverty and disease” may be countered. The article was not promoting competition from any country. The speech made by Medvedev seems to be eluding to the fact that Russia will counter the United States and return the world to a balance of power state instead of a world with one dominant power. This is further evidence that Russia is turning to realist principles in its most recent foreign policy decisions.

[Peter Woodruff]

I find it very unlikely that connections can be drawn between Russia’s recent military involvement in South Ossetia/Georgia and Conoleeza Rice’s Foreign Affairs paper, “Rethinking the National Interest.” The timing of these military movements and the release of Rice’s paper seem much more circumstantial than retaliatory.

Russia’s military invasion of Georgia was more likely a response to Georgia’s attack on what Russia perceived as one of its regions of “privileged interests,” Ossentia. If S. Ossentia, while within Georgia’s borders, is under the control of a Russian-backed government, it is perfectly understandable, within a Realist’s perspective, that Russia was simply taking care of its local interests when it invaded Georgia, not retaliating to some abstract statement of American political-theory produced by Rice.

I do agree that Russia’s leaders do not seem to be weighted down by any “universal moral principles” and are operating on concepts of self-interest, defined by military and economic might. However, I would argue that similarly the United States, throughout its history as a world power, has also operated within narrowly self-interested foreign policies.

As cynical as it sounds, I do not think our current foreign policies, which call for “democratic state building” and the institutionalizing of the America-like freedoms worldwide, are actually founded on “universal moral principles.” It seems to me that our foreign policies have been and will continue to be, at least for the foreseeable future, rooted in theories of international competition, and backed by our economic and military power, not some greater truth or moral grounds. Are we that much "better?"

[Jamon Rahn]

Unfortunately for Condoleza Rice, in the current geo-political structure it is near impossible to maintain both missionary and realist policies simply out of necessity. The U.S. and the Bush Administration have painfully strove to align American values across the world, but the as the man once said “the times they are a-changin'.” As America defends the need for its missionary campaigns, the realist actors of this generation, China and Russia, have quietely placed their chess pieces into order.
Ms. Rice maintains that it is possible to maintain a system of “realism and idealism,” but neglects the fact that there is a disparaging difference between the two. To be realist, to really look at the world at its present form and then deal with it today, does not align with the intentions of a true idealist reformer. When the two are mixed, the realist intentions cancel out the idealist inclinations of any actor.
Ms. Rice states “it is incumbent on the United states to find areas of cooperation and strategic agreement with Russia and China, even when there are significant differences.” This does not allude to any form idealism that she speaks of , instead this is realism at its purest form: ignore the overarching ‘change the world’ goal in order to deal with the task at hand, Russia and China.
Medvev and Putin received this mixed message, in fact they predicted the message. They understand it is impossible for the U.S. to continue on its missionary campaigns around the globe, while maintaining the imminent realist efforts facing the U.S. The question is not have they received the message, the real questions is now how does the U.S. deal with the present situation. Continue on a faux- Idealistic stampede across the globe, or determine how to realistically work with our global neighbors?
As China took center stage this summer with the 2008 Summer Olympics, so did Russian tanks with the invasion of Ossetia. It was a coming out party for the sleeping giants of the East. Its been a few years, but the Russians and the Chinese are back and they are feeling a little mistreated. The U.S. can muddle in its missionary affairs across the Middle- East and the world, but the world dynamic is changing fast, and it is important more than ever for us to keep up. It is not time to dictate how people should think, what their ideals should be, but rather work with the current paradigms to produce realistic and organic change. The fact of matter remains its time to get real, and finally notice the entire ever changing landscape, not just the mirage in the desert.

[Raymond D. Coffey]

It seems to me that Russia wants to reassert its hegemonic dominance in the world and that Russia is bent on reclaiming its hegemonic dominance in the world and that Russia is bent on reclaiming its former empire. Russia's attack on Georgia and more recently Russian military exercises on Venezuelan soil as well as the creation of a Russian pipeline between Russia and China indicate that Russia is bent on ending the US hegemonic stance and reclaiming its hegemony in world affairs. Despite these facts, Russia's desire for empire and hegemony in the world affairs was not based on American triumphalism, Condoleeza's article, and realist principles. Historically, Russia has always had a desire for expansion and a desire to dominate both Central Asia and Eastern Europe. This historical precendent is proven by the Russian expansions under Czar Ivan "The Terrible" to Czar Peter the Great to Czarina Catherine the Great to finally the Soviet Expansions under Joseph Stalin. It also seems that Russian expansion is fueled by not only Russia's desire for dominance but also Russian desires for limited resources. In regards to water trade routes, Russia sought to gain warm water ports and as a result expanded south to the Black Sea. Therefore due to this desire for warm water ports and desires for other resources, Russia seeks to control Chechnya so as not to lose more territory, maintain dominance and Russian military presence in Central Asia, and of course have access to the Black Sea and the Mediterrannean. Another example is Ukraine, which Russia seeks to regain because of Ukraine's agricultural richness; at one point Ukraine was considered "the breadbasket of the Soviet Union." Russia's economic hardship in the 1990s and American triumphalism did not cause Russia's desire to regain its former empire and hegemonic position, but rather exacerbated this desire. Condoleeza's article instead gave Russia a legitimate excuse to supress Chechen rebels and feign Russia's commitment to US principles. As stated before, historically Russia has always sought dominance and power and has especially always taken a paternalistic outlook to cultures in both Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Therefore arguing that Russia's desire for hegemony and power were caused by realist principles, American triumphalism, and Condoleeza's article is fundamentally flawed as history better explains Russia's desire for power and hegemony.

[John Molfetas]

One of the main problems of American foreign policy with regard to Russia and the rest of the world is that the United States attempts to marry, as Secretary Rice noted “principle and power”. The US is attempting to pursue a foreign policy that combines realism and idealism. Foreign policy however, is inherently based on a constantly changing balance of power in an anarchic, unstable system. All players, including the United States, want to increase their own power and to restrict others from increasing theirs. When interests of actors clash, whatever these may be, war and conflict arise as a continuation of foreign policy. In such as world, morals and ideals play only a small part in shaping national interest. They merely act as excuses for aggression or action.
This very cynical and realistic theory can be applied to the case of US-Russian relations-in the aftermath of the Cold War. Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the new Russian state was economically shattered, was guided by an alcoholic president, had a decaying military and had just been humiliatingly defeated by the United States. Everything that Russians stood for had collapsed in a fortnight. It is clear that the Russia of the 1990s was not going to antagonize the US. In fact it assisted the West over the 1991 Invasion of Iraq, it allowed for the re-unification of Germany and relations with the US were cordial. The US seized this unique opportunity, of being the world’s hegemon to expand its influence, to states that formerly were part of the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union. A vacuum had been created with its collapse of the USSR which the United States filled. Off course this was done to promote the US national interest: to increase its presence in Europe, to contain Russia, to control the energy supply routes. The US national interest was masked under liberal democratic rhetoric of freedom, democracy and free markets. The souring of relations between the two states occurred only when the Russians realized that their relative power was returning to them.
The handing over of the presidency to the KGB trained Putin, the expansion of the oil industry and the increase in the oil price, increased the Kremlin revenue and thus increased its relative economic power. An extensive control of the energy resources meant that Russia held more leverage over the world. Europe is practically reliant on Russia for its gas today. Russia used its newly gained power, over Georgia, after it had been provoked and showed the United States and the rest of the world that the energy rich Caucasus is Russia’s playground. In Moscow’s backyard, missile defense shields and the expansion of NATO-eastward are simply unacceptable propositions. What is important for the US to understand is how to tackle the growing power of Russia and how to diffuse the tension in the Russo-American relations.
If the US cannot support its rhetoric with actions, then it should not use the rhetoric. The US noted that it supports Georgia’s sovereignty and is appalled by the way Russia has acted. If this rhetoric is not followed up with decisive action, then it is hollow, and makes it seem as if the United States is feeble and weak. The harsh reality is that the US could not act in the case of Georgia, as it was caught by surprise and it was and continues to be bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore it is in no shape today, to counter the rising power of Russia. In fact, it does need to do so, because the rising Russian power just wants to reclaim what it had lost in the 1990s. The US administration can simply accept that and agree with the Russian government that the Caucasus is Russia’s sphere of influence and that NATO should not expand any more eastward. This concession would improve and mediate US-Russian relations and would allow for cooperation on issues such as North Korea, Iran and nuclear proliferation.

[Lindsay Jones]

The resurgence of Russian nationalistic influence in Georgia raises serious questions regarding the future of American political dominance in global affairs. Furthermore, President Medvedev’s recent rejection of American-led unipolarism combined with his government’s self-interested influence on NATO are certainly cause for great concern, especially considering its reportedly scripted military action in Georgia. It is obvious from Medvedev’s statements that U.S. missionary goals in the cadre of unipolarism will not be directly accepted by the Russian government. With this in mind, how can the U.S. maintain and promote its missionary stance while realistically dealing with the problems in Russia? Signals sent from Secretary Rice may provide answers this question.
Rice’s declaration to “marry power and principle” will certainly be tested by U.S. policy with Russia as the U.S. will be forced to balance ideological principles, like democracy and human rights, with short term realist policies that will be essential to cooperation with Putin and Medvedev. Generally speaking, the U.S. policy of missionary intervention is seemingly ineffective when faced with political opposition, as is the case with Russia, who strongly opposes the one-sided dominance of U.S. politics in the global playing field and thus, rejects the practice of fundamental U.S. principles in their own country. Cooperation with Russia, which will require a realistic approach, outweighs what the U.S. must abandon in fundamental objectives (at least in the short-term), especially in considering the importance of Russia’s role in terms of nuclear proliferation and arms control in the Middle East. Just as Russia is able to leverage their economic and geopolitical power in Eastern Europe and Asia, the U.S. can leverage its superior military and economic strength in order to eventually achieve what Fukuyama calls the “ultimate triumph of democracy,” while concurrently pursuing realist goals with Russia. In this situation, the realist and idealist approaches work hand-in-hand.
While Medvedev and Putin may have been misled by Rice’s unrelenting references to U.S. ideology throughout the article, there should be no confusion surrounding U.S. policy when its power and influence are threatened. Considering the recent establishment of American base missile defenses in the Poles following Russia’s occupation of Georgia, the U.S. is clearly not opposed to practicing realist military policies in these situations.

[Alex Morgan]

The world will likely reach a point when American dominance is a thing of the past. Russia and China are growing economically and militarily every year, seeking to surpass the U.S. as superpowers. Whether Russia’s recent campaign in Georgia was driven more by power concerns than morals is unclear. Perhaps Russia was bound by universal moral principles. After all, South Ossetia seeks independence from Georgia and Georgia has bitterly resisted. Russia may subscribe to the belief that all peoples have rights to self-determination. The United States intervened when ethnic Albanians were being slaughtered at the hands of Serbs, so maybe Russia is trying to play the same role as the United States in world affairs. One cannot deny however that Russia’s movements were in some way designed to benefit Russia’s self-interest. There are many ethnicities throughout the world that seek statuses as independent nations. Russia did not rush to their aid. South Ossetia could be within Russia’s sphere of influence, so Russia intervened possibly in the hopes that South Ossetia might wish to join the Russian Federation.
Russia may have finally tired of the U.S. role as world policeman and decided to flex its military muscles inside territory close to its borders. Although not an imperialist nation in the same sense as the former British Empire, the U.S. has sought to impose its own culture and governmental system throughout the world. Russia once did the same thing and may wish to compete for the hearts and minds of developing nations again.
The U.S. can perform as a missionary and a realist at the same time, but it cannot perform both well. Missionary, or idealistic policies will not sway Russia or China. U.S. politicians will criticize Russia about its recent conduct in Georgia and criticize China about its human rights record, but what will this accomplish? The U.S. has a hard enough time turning Iraq into a democracy. While the U.S. is the number one power in the world right now, Russia and China are no pushovers. The U.S. needs oil and natural gas from Russia and is economically interdependent with China. (cheap goods) So the U.S. will continue to preach democracy and freedom, but will likely not win converts in Russia and China. Realist policies must take precedence and will dominate when it comes to the formation of foreign policy. The U.S. better hope that it can avoid further aggravating tensions with Russia through empty idealistic scorn heaped on Russian actions.

[Shyama Nair]

The task of reconciling the worlds of realism and idealism within the realm of politics sill pervades cotemporary political issues as exemplified by the article, “Russian Realism”. Despite significant progress with regards to international relations and global co-operation in the last decade, it is arguable that each nation has always kept its own national interests in mind. While Russia appears to be now making more outright statements about its interest, it is my belief that the US has also been pushing its own agenda though less blatantly.
One question posed in the article was in relation to the timing of the statement made by the Russian president. “Why now and what convinced them that a policy shift from international cooperation…to international competition seemed productive.” In my opinion however, this statement by the Russian president comes as no surprise. In the last couple of years, the US has been further and further encroaching upon ex soviet territory by including an increasing number of eastern European nations into NATO. Moreover, the United States’ plan for implementing a missile defence system in Europe, including placing a base just 115 miles from Russia in Poland, certainly fails to elicit a positive reaction from Moscow. While Rice defended this move at that time by stating that “missile defence, of course, is aimed at no one”, one can only imagine the reaction to Russia placing defence missiles in Canada.
It was also suggested in the article that a possible reason for Russia’s “will to power” was American triumphalism. It is certainly fathomable that Russia may still hold the desire to reclaim some lost dignity from its fall after the cold war. However, that may be a very minimalistic way of approaching the issue because of how much both Russia and the international political climate has changed during the cold war. I would venture to propose that the somewhat failing position of the US as the global hegemon along with the loss of much of its soft power in recent years has catalyzed much of the rejection of American dominance of the world stage. With the EU, China and even India rising in power rapidly, Russia too may have felt the need to present itself as a real challenger on the global stage. Thus, it may be possible that it was not solely Russia that made a shift from international cooperation to international competition, but the gradual change in the global circumstance that has triggered that switch.
Another reason proposed in the article referred to statements by Condoleezza Rice in her article, “American Realism for a New World”. It theorized that the Russians may have misread her message and now believed that the US needed Russia more than Russia needed the US. While it is possible that this was in fact reason for Russia’s boldness, it seems unlikely when considering Rice’s statement itself. In my opinion, Rice was simply trying to bring to light the importance of global cooperation in the face of the numerous threats of today as opposed to make to US appear needy. Because in reality, as much as the position of the US has changed in recent years, it still holds a great deal of power and is by no means “needy”.
A relevant point raised by the article however, was one that questioned how the US could be both a realist and a missionary at the same time. The US has made numerous human rights violations during the course of the wars in the Middle East in order to implement a democratic form of government there. Moreover, with issues such as the genocide in Sudan, the US was quick to criticize the human rights violations, but, like most other nations, failed to take any action. However, this is where Russia may have a slight advantage over the US. While Russia has on occasion publically condemned acts of violence on the global stage, it has never pledged to be a guardian of human rights across the globe. The US on the other hand has dangerously been straddling both roles. I would argue that in doing so, the US is guarding its own national interests with its own form of realism.
Overall, I believe that it comes as no surprise that Russia wants to present itself as one of the nations poised to challenge the US’ supremacy. Perhaps President Medvedev could have been a little more sensitive in his choice of words for “zone of Russian influence” and “privileged interests” certainly had overtones of the cold war. It is likely that it was Medvedev’s use of these phrases in particular that caused such a stir in the US. What their true intentions are however remains unclear. While it is certainly plausible that Russia has resurrected its dreams of pre-cold war glory, it is also possible that it simply seeks to protect its own national interest against the US.

[Katie McGuire]

Under Vladimir Putin’s presidency, Russia reestablished itself as a dominant force in global politics and has recently flexed its muscles towards the US by attacking Georgia. Given Georgia’s relatively-new NATO status, the United States and its allies should defend it, and even Henry Kissinger, who many title the epitome of realism, wrote that “Russian reform will be impeded, not helped, by turning a blind eye to the reappearance of historic Russian imperial pretensions.” Unfortunately, U.S. troops remain caught up in Iraq and Afghanistan and Russian leaders have found an appropriate moment to reacquire their lost sphere of influence from their Soviet “power-house” days.
Russia’s actions appear entirely realist. Without the idealist approach that the United States attempts to weave into its foreign policy, Russians have more breathing room to “seek to preserve their independence and to increase their power without regard for the more cosmopolitan considerations of an international political order,” as Kissinger put it.
This idea sheds light on the Russian response to Secretary Rice’s comments. Ambassador, I think you may have over-asserted yourself in saying that the Russians chose to compete with us because we claimed to need them more than they need us. Secretary Rice’s comments simply articulated the global challenges we face in the near future and the necessity of cooperation to solve these problems.
Unfortunately, cooperation will not come easily from the former Soviet Union, whose realist tendencies leave them absorbed in reestablishing themselves as a global power after the communist collapse. As Samuel Huntington points out, “communication with traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia … [is] virtually impossible” if they choose the non-Western path. The reason behind their challenging us lies in their unfulfilled aspirations to control what they believe is rightfully theirs.
The United States remains caught up in the Middle East with little military power to address other global issues. To succeed, we must recollect ourselves and answer the fundamental questions about our values and goals for the next ten years. Unilateral action should be questioned, and we must decide how much of our power we are willing to sacrifice for our “moral” obligation to spreading democracy, especially given the rising influence of countries like Russia and China.
Russia’s advance symbolizes the necessity of reorganizing the United States’ foreign policy. Russia has expressed little interest in solving the world’s problems when their interests are not at stake, and our failures in the Middle East demand reevaluation. We must focus our now limited resources on the problems of the present and clearly articulate our goals for the future.

[Kate Staykova]

The first of the two main questions the blog post poses is wrongly put. (Why are the Russians using the realist paradigm to shift from international cooperation to international competition and why now?)
First of all, “the realist paradigm” does not entail a clearcut shift from cooperation to competition but rather, in the words of H. Kissinger, “a reconciliation and balancing between competing national interests”. As such the question takes it for given that the whole purpose of the Russians behind Medvev’statement and Putin’s oil pipe inspection was to challenge the U.S., that it was an act of agression towards America and rejection of its world power. In Medvev’s speech, however, there is no such claim. He states that “Russia is not looking for isolation” and that it “…will develop, in as much as possible, friendly ties with Europe, U.S. and other countries in the world”. He speaks against unilateral dominion of the U.S. of the world, which, in his words, “… is unstable and threatened by conflicts”. This opposition to a unilateral world order is the essence of the realist paradigm natural for a new world order “of five or six major powers and a multiplicity of smaller states” (Kissinger, The Diplomacy, 805). Yes, the Russians are using the realist paradigm but for the purpose of defining their national interests rather than to outright challenge the U.S.
Yes, it is in Russia’s interest that a multilateral world order is formed and Russia may want to rise up to a power equal in political leverage to the U.S. and the other superpowers. But this should hardly come as a surprise given its “territory, extending over eleven time zones from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok” (Kissinger), its energy resources, its growing economy and military power. Such endowments would place any country in the position to claim its “rightful place” as a world power, wouldn’t they?
The other national interest of Russia proclaimed by Medvedev, i.e. “the spheres of influence” where she has “priviledged interests” is deeply rooted in the long imperialist and expansianist history of Russia. This is the sphere of influence “… that tzars and commisars have coveted all around Russia’s vast borders for 300 years” (Kissinger).
Both national interests stated by the Russian president are centuries old interests of Russia. Their public formulation is re-assertion on Russian demands that, which, in the context of Russian history and from Russian perspective, are from being unfounded, unexpected or unreasonable. To say the least, their expression on the 31st of August by the Russian President is far from being “emboldened” by the ambivalency of the Secretary of State, Condolezza Rice in her statement from August, this year.
This leads us into the second main question the blog post poses (Have the Russians responded to the Americans’ call for cooperation with an outright rejection, which may be interpreted as their reaction to what they perceived to be admittance of weakness on the part of America?) As I tried to show, the Russians’ intention was not to challenge America. At most, Medvedev’s statement was delivered shortly before the EU Emergency meeting regarding Georgia. Also, as I said above, these claims are century-old and are endogenously driven, rather than exogenously. The statement by the Secretary of State cannot have possibly encouraged the Russians to make their claims. First because their claim had been a calculated move in their traditional strategy of expansionist foreign policy. And secondly, because Rice’s statement was far from sending wrong signals of ambivalency and call for cooperation.
Yes, the Secretary of State elaborates on the “marriage between realism and idealism” in American foreign policy but she also points out that “at times there are short-term tensions between them” and that also America has always known “where our long-term interests lie”. This is nothing short of an admonition that America is ready to deal realistically with realitity and despite her idealistic goals in the long run America is ready to apply its strength reastically in present situations that pose threat to her. These are the signals the Secretary of State gets across.
Then the real question becomes if by claiming a sphere of interest Russia in any way threatens America’s interests? On the one hand, if America acquiesces to Russia’s claim there is a chance that America signs Russia’s carte blanche to further expansionism. On the other hand, however, if the U.S. opposes Russia will this not propel it into Sino-Russian pact against the U.S. which entirely goes against U.S. foreign interest? The leaders of both countries in applying the paradigm of realpolitik need to implement policies “based on mutual respect of each other national interests” (Kissinger, The Diplomacy, 817).

[Alexandra Jenik]

The U.S. cannot afford to base its foreign policy on a combined realism and idealism approach. The current situation in the Middle East as well as the most recent clash between Russia and Georgia reveal that the U.S.’ current policies are failing miserably. In regards to Iraq, the supposed “idealism” that led the U.S. to free the Iraqi people from Saddam and promote democracy, has only revealed the deep complexities of establishing democracy in the Middle East. In the Georgia-Russia conflict, we have seen the reemergence of a Cold War Russia, as a result of the U.S.’ failure to utilize realism in its foreign policy.
The Bush Administration’s missionary policy towards Iraq, grounded in idealism failed to take into account factors such as sectarian violence and the general sentiment of the Iraqi people towards continued American presence in the region. Larry Diamond, a learned political scientist sums up the over-simplified policy and writes that the Bush Administration has gone about promoting democracy in a, “catastrophically ill-considered way, which has done much to discredit the cause of democracy promotion in the world and wound up thru its inconsistency, ineffectiveness, arrogance and ultimately hypocrisy in setting back the prospect of democratic change in the Middle East.” The U.S.’ policy in Iraq consists of too much idealism and lacks a realist approach. A smarter policy would have entailed the U.S. taking a more evaluative approach, and being more flexible in implementation. A policy that reflects a greater understanding of the complicated situation would have resulted in a less negative image of democracy promotion in the Middle East (a far cry from what it is today).
It is interesting that Secretary Rice argues for realism when it comes to U.S.’ relations with Russia because the Bush Administration’s failure to take a more aggressive and realist approach towards Putin and now Medvedev over the past eight years has only resulted in Russia becoming a more powerful and intimidating force in the global arena. We are now seeing the consequences of taking a back seat to the changes we have witnessed over the past decade in Russia. If the U.S. is so concerned with promoting democracy (as we say we are), then the U.S. has failed Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia’s president whose quest for democratic change has defined his time in office. The U.S. should have been a more involved advocate for Georgia and posed a greater force in counter-acting Russia’s dominance in the region. Russia’s recent actions in the Ossetia region reveal a staggering blow to the spread of democracy. It is difficult to reach a healthy balance between realism and idealism, especially when it concerns promoting democracy in regions of the world which may view it negatively. But, it is obvious that the policies of the Bush Administration are not clearly devised to strike a balance, which in turn has been hurting our foreign policy.