A Warmed Over Quartet Score or a New Tune in the Middle East?

According to Glenn Kessler in the Washington Post, Oct. 31, the Administration’s supplemental budget request sent to Congress on the 30th includes $435 million in additional aid for the Palestinian Authority, which is s six-fold increase in direct aid to the Palestinians.  $150 million would be for an immediate cash transfer to prevent a fiscal crisis and $130 would be in additional project financing.  $40 million is set aside for improving the Authority’s administration, $25 million for narcotics enforcement, $25 million for security forces loyal to Mahmoud Abbas, and $20 million would be for immediate improvement in health care at government clinics.  $15 million would be for refugees and $10 million for security for experts overseeing project assistance.  The package is targeted to enhance the position of Abbas and his Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, increase the number of Palestinian jobs through project assistance, and to compete with Hamas in critical areas like security and health care.   The Administration appears to be sweetening the pot for the Palestinians prior to the November summit in Annapolis.  But the pot may well be tainted since some members of Congress are already indicating that the funds for the Palestinian Authority are not a given and may be pulled from the legislation if the the November conference does not move the peace process forward.

While the Secretary is once again on the road to the Middle East to husband the conference through to some kind of agreement on principles, the political portents are not very encouraging.  Prime Minister Olmert already is facing rebellion in the ranks of his own party from those who are opposed to any concessions on the critical issues, like Jerusalem, that President Mahmoud Abbas says he must have.  And Abbas faces a fragmented Palestinian Authority and the prospect of renewed violence out of Gaza if he makes any concessions to Israel.  Almost any agreement faces the hostility of outside forces as well. 

The Syrians are deeply concerned that a final settlement of the Palestinian problem would leave them as odd man out with no prospect of getting the Golan back.  The Israelis will have very little incentive to trade off the Golan if that is the only problem left in the Arab-Israel agenda.  Freeing up the Israeli military from duty in the West Bank and positions around Gaza, as an agreement with the Palestinians would presumably do, would make Syria and Hezbollah more vulnerable and easier for Israel to deal with.  It is therefore likely that the Syrians will put pressure on Hamas and its leadership in Damascus to sabotage the Annapolis meeting by generating a confrontation on its eve to keep Olmert at home.

The Iranians, for their part, want to keep the pressure on Israel to keep the idea fixed in Israeli minds that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could have serious consequences in the form of terrorist attacks by Iran’s allies in Hezbollah and Hamas.  Last Saturday, Aytollah Khameni proposed a boycott of the Annapolis meeting.  He suggested, what countries like Saudi Arabia fear, that the meeting has been designed by the Americans to bolster Israel’s position and serve its interests rather than Palestinian interests.   

It would be truly a miracle if the weakest Israeli Prime Minister in years and the leader of the rump Palestinian area could find common cause on peace and make it stick.   The one thing going for this conference is that the parties may fear failure more than success.  However, looking at the facts on the ground it is a close call.

It is understandable that the US Administration needs a success given our low standing in the world.  But it is not at all clear why President Bush chose to pursue the Palestinian issue so late in his tenure and when his credibility and authority are  at an all time low.   US policy is seen as having failed in Iraq, failed in Iran, failed in Lebanon and failed in the war on terror.  It is certainly the common wisdom in the Arab world that the US will fail again in Annapolis.   Countries in the region are increasingly inclined to ignore the United States, defy our President and wait for our elections.  In the meantime, a lot more can go wrong.  Let us hope that the troika of Rice, Olmert and Abbas have something more up their sleeves than warmed over quartet music and the formation of yet another committee. 

Comments

[Stuart]

Some would argue Bush has nothing to lose in his Middle Eastern policy. Maybe that's the logic behind the Annapolis conference. Although such a compromised position doesn't give Bush much leverage, perhaps it will enable him to engage frank and honest rhetoric in an effort to facilitate substantive discussions.

Of course, one could just as easily argue that Bush has a lot to lose. Another failed peace conference would strengthen Hamas and other groups opposed to peace. Another failed peace conference would reinforce the pessimistic outlook many parties hold. In truth, another failed peace conference could do a lot of harm.

[Christina Culver]

The Bush Administration’s request to budget $435 million in aid to the Palestinian Authority appears at first glance to be an effort to bolster the Palestinian’s position, or “sweeten the pot” before the upcoming November summit. While monetary aid will certainly enhance the position of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, and to a certain extent assist the Palestinians with their security and civilian troubles, these effects are not the main purpose of increasing aid. Instead, Palestinian aid likely serves as a step towards the improvement of the United States’ world standing. As Ambassador Walker points out, America “needs a success,” and the summit, as President Bush has structured it, will be a success regardless of its final outcome – so he hopes. The November peace talks have purposefully encouraged low expectations, and short timelines thus setting the stage for failure.

While Condoleezza Rice has visited the Middle East three times in the last six weeks to assist in the pre-summit negotiations, she has also maintained low expectations. On the eve of her last visit, Rice admitted: “I absolutely don’t expect there will be agreement on a document.” This stance lowers the expectations of all parties involved, including the Syrians and Iranians which fuels their inclination to ignore the seriousness of the United States’ actions.

The United States’ low expectations and consequential minimal political pressure are coupled with unreasonably short timelines. The New York Times reported last week that “U.S. officials have said they hope to host the conference over two days in the week starting November 26.” Two days will not provide sufficient time to address fundamental issues (including security, timelines, borders and sovereignty; to name a few) that must be discussed to progress towards a final agreement.

So the question remains: If the Bush administration has seemingly set up the summit to fail, why are we hosting it? The answer is simple; the U.S. aspires to improve its world standing by appearing to put its best foot forward in support of Israeli-Palestinian peace. Budgeting $435 million in Palestinian aid creates the illusion that the U.S. is neutral in the Israel/Palestine peace process, while simultaneously making the transfer contingent on a successful summit, which as we have already established is not sought and unlikely. It is also worth noting that despite the six-fold increase, Palestinian aid still pales in comparison to the $2.46 billion in aid the United States provided Israel in 2007, putting into question America’s neutrality. Similarly, Rice’s multiple visits to the Middle East give the impression that substantial efforts are being made to ensure that both parties are prepared for the summit when in reality, no amount of planning could prepare Israel and Palestine to reach an agreement – regardless of its vagueness – in two days. At the conclusion of the summit, however, the United States will be able to claim that full political and monetary support was provided to both parties regardless of the outcome, thus placing the blame for failure on the Middle East, or conversely, the credit for success on the U.S. Either way, the United States will be one step closer to clearing its name.

[Julianne Jaquith]

Resolving the issues that currently make the Israeli-Palestinian conflict intractable would be a major achievement for the Bush administration. If the Bush administration were able to use this conference as the next step in the establishment of a Palestinian state, it would allow the administration to redeem itself and would probably save its reputation. However, I am skeptical that the Bush administration has come up with the solution that will ultimately resolve a conflict that has plagued the world for half a century. First, in the current political climate, both the Israelis and the Palestinians are constrained by divisive factions within their governments. Olmert must contend with all of the interests within his coalition. Each of the respective parties has a different perspective on key issues as well as a varying willingness to compromise. He knows his coalition will fall apart and his term will end if he fails. Abbas must contend with the influence of Hamas, a non-governmental terrorist actor, who has little official influence, but has worked to provide essential services to the Palestinian people when the government has not been able. If the conference fails or Abbas makes concessions, there will undoubtedly be widespread violence in Gaza. Because both actors face such constraints, they will be reluctant to compromise on key issues.
Another major issue that makes me believe that this conference will not be successful is the duality of the American perspective. Since September 11, 2001, George W. Bush has divided the world into “good” and “bad,” or those with the United States and those against the United States. Bush has been unwilling to negotiate with those that are “against” the United States. However, a number of those “against” the United States will have clear, legitimate, interests in the outcome of the conference. One of these groups is Hamas. By excluding Hamas’ voice and making aid contingent upon the repression of Hamas, I think it will actually make Hamas more likely to react strongly and violently. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has evolved into one of the most challenging diplomatic efforts in history; however, the Bush administration wants to solve it through a simple designation of "good" and "bad". I just do not think this will work. It is rigid and it ignores the details that make this issue so seemingly unsolvable. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about so much more than whether the actors are “with us or against us.” While I cannot myself propose an alternative solution, the eventual solution for this problem must be willing to take on the intricacies of the issues and cannot be solely based on a glib designation of "good" and "bad".

[Nico Drohojowski]

There are a few issues I wish to address in the posting titled, A Warned Over Quartet Score or a New Tune in the Middle East? The first being that the Iranians want to keep pressure on Israel because of there possible attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities. President Ahmadinejad has already threatened Israel in a speech that he gave at Columbia University just a few weeks ago. He called for Israel to be wiped of the map and that Palestine is an innocent nation. He is siding heavily with the Palestinians as well as threatening Israeli’s as well. Although he also said he would not attack unless attacked first, he may be baiting Israel as well as the United States in to a Middle Eastern War, which would divide many countries because of the economic interests, primarily oil.
The second point I wish to address is the weak Israeli Prime Minister. Although his own people may not like Olmert, he is trying to unite Israel as well as set specific borders between Israel and Palestine. In the upcoming conference in Annapolis, nothing may be accomplished, much like Camp David, but at least a dialogue will be continued. Although this may seem to be a baby step, it is still a step in the right direction. There is a common cause however, unlike the miracle written about. Both sides wish to exist peacefully. The problem lies in the details, borders, security, refuges, and Jerusalem to name a few.
The last point I have is the views that other countries have on the US. President Bush has certainly shifted feelings of other nations during his tenure, but at the same time, nations in need still call upon the US for aid/help. This is a complete contradiction. I don’t know what can be done about it, or if anything needs to be, but if nations (specifically Europeans ones) wish to complain and point out what a bad job the US is doing under Bush, don’t partake in our plans. I am not one to support President Bush, but then again I’m not asking him for help of participating in his plans willfully.

[Megan Kidd]

The recent budget request to provide $435 million in additional aid to the Palestinian Authority seems like a good idea in the short run in order to enhance the position of Abbas, and provide immediate improvements in the lives of Palestinians. However, the funding is also suggested in an effort to bolster the Palestinian government in advance of the Annapolis peace conference. Although the additional aid will help Palestinians, it also has many implications that may end up harming the already low expectations of the potential success of the conference.
One of the goals of the proposed budget is that the funding will compete with Hamas in areas like security and health care. However, Hamas’ control of the Gaza strip is very strong, and the funding is likely to not have a large impact in this realm. Considering that Hamas also has the support of outside Arab forces that are not being considered in this funding proposal, such as Syria, the additional aid is likely to indirectly increase support for Hamas. On Monday October 30 in Gaza, several thousand people attended a Hamas rally, where Hamas lawmaker Mushir Masri told the crowd that Hamas is using arms supplied by the U.S. and Israel. Also, there is a planned Hamas-led meeting that was aimed to coincide with the U.S.-led Annapolis summit that has been postponed, but not cancelled. The Hamas leaders have met with Syrians and Iranians and discussed this “rejection summit” conference. Abu Marzouk said earlier in October that the purpose of the Hamas-led conference was to send a clear message to the international community and the United States that Abbas does not represent the Palestinian people in these negotiations. Syria has warned that it will not take part in the U.S.-hosted conference unless it addresses Syrian demands for the return of the Golan Heights, which is not on the top of the Annapolis agenda.
Because the United States has ignored the outside Arab forces, such as Syria, this may cause problems for the hopes and expectations of the Annapolis peace conference. The U.S. is not paying attention to outside agents, and only trying to gain immediate Palestinian support for the conference with the proposed budget plan. Expectations for the success of the conference are low, and it is unlikely that the Hill will go for this proposal. With this on the table however, it stimulates the other Arab players that are not included in these plans to join together, and increase support for Hamas. The United States must also try and include the Syrians, Iranians, etc. in their plans in order to gain their support so that they will attend the Annapolis conference because they are also affected by this conflict.

[Asima Ahmad]

President Bush appears to have made a calculated move with his sudden interest in the Palestinian issue. In less than 445 days he is out of office, but presently U.S. foreign policy continues to fail internationally. As a result, the reputation of the nation continues to plummet. By expressing interest in the Arab-Israeli matter now, Bush can use the conflict as a way to repaint a small portion of his past years in office. He truly has little to lose in this situation and only a positive reputation to gain. If the peace conference goes smoothly, America’s status may be bolstered and Bush receives the pat on the back. If it fails, Bush will still go down in history books as another American President who attempted to solve the seemingly impossible conflict in the Middle East. What strikes me is despite how late Bush jumped in the game, both Israel and Palestine are more than willing to engage in substantive talks. Also, both sides claim they will not shy away from the main issues that plagued past negotiations.

At a news conference on November 5th, President Mahmoud Abbas expressed Palestine and Israel’s insistence on reaching an agreement before the end of Bush’s time in office. Earlier this week, Secretary Rice acknowledged the previous attempts made for peace by her predecessors and asserted that since their tactics failed, she plans to “do it” her own way. Considering the fact that both Israel and Palestine’s leaders are facing extreme pressure from their constituents, leaving them little room to grant concessions to one another on key issues like Jerusalem and refugees, Secretary Rice seems to have her work cut out for her. Even more, the groundwork for how the four main concerns are to be dealt with remains unknown. That point does not even address the conflicting interests of Hamas, the United States, Israel and other Arab countries like Syria and Iran as Ambassador Walker pointed out. No wonder Hamas has outright rejected the Annapolis conference; its success appears dismal at best. However, failing to accept attempts towards peace certainly will not lead to a solution. Hopefully Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is right when stating that if both sides approach the situation with determination, there is ultimately a chance for success.

[Olivia Reynolds]

The absence of an official date for the Annapolis peace conference is only one of a litany of reasons why the conference is unlikely to be successful. Encouraged by the US, the conference originally aimed to create a document that will obligate Israel and Palestine to create a Palestinian state, recognize the state of Israel and serve as a foundation for final peace negotiations. After reassessing the negotiating environment, the objective is now to create a framework for future negotiations. The US decision to readjust expectations is prudent given neither Olmert nor Abbas currently have the political stability to negotiate lasting peace agreements.

Olmert cannot be expected to make progress in peace negotiations when he lacks the support of his party. Should Olmert make any concessions on the critical issues such as border lines and Jerusalem, the plan will almost certainly be rejected by his party and fail to be adopted. Hamas continues to attack Israel from the Gaza strip and Olmert cannot risk making compromises with Palestine when Israeli security is at jeopardy. Israel also faces the threat of violence from Syria and Iran if negotiations with Palestine cut off Syrian access to the Golan Heights or irritate Hamas and Hezbollah. Olmert is facing too much pressure to protect Israeli security to pursue successful peace negotiations with Palestine.

Abbas cannot credibly negotiate with Israel when he must cope with Hamas and factions of the PLO who reject the Annapolis conference. Violence between Hamas and Israel demonstrates Hamas’ commitment to delay peace talks. Furthermore, some Palestinian factions plan on attending the Damascus Conference in Syria, postponed explicitly to interfere with the Annapolis conference, signifying that the PLO is no longer unified against Hamas, and Abbas can no longer rely on the full support of the PLO. Abbas must also manage concerns that the conference is designed to bolster Israel’s position. US promises for $435 million in aid contingent on progress in peace discussions set Palestine up to be blamed if peace is not reached. Abbas is stuck in a no win situation hinting that attempts to negotiate peace with Israel will be futile.

How can Olmert and Abbas collaborate on a lasting peace agreement when they are struggling to retain the support of their own people? Why should either party succumb to US pressure to resolve critical issues when any progress will have immediate negative ramifications on Israel and Palestine’s domestic politics and positions in the Arab world? They can’t. Peace agreements founded on US pressure rather than a commitment to peace will be fleeting. Until their political leadership positions are respected and secured at home, neither Olmert nor Abbas can make lasting peace agreements. Accordingly, it behooves all parties to treat the Annapolis peace conference as the first of a series of talks designed to achieve lasting peace.

[Matt Bachman]

Skepticism over Leadership an Incentive for Progress?

The Bush administration has a mountain to climb at this month’s Annapolis Summit discussing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Low poll ratings both at home and across the Arab world reflect broad skepticism that President Bush, Prime Minister Olmert, and President Abbas will make any progress with negotiations. With failed diplomacy in Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and a failing war on terror, the United States' Middle East policy is widely viewed as a total failure, which undermines the negotiating power of President Bush. Furthermore, political discord within Israeli Prime Minister Olmert’s own political party, and lack of domestic support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas make concessions on key issues such as Jerusalem unlikely. As a result, analysts in Cairo just today referred to the summit as nothing more than a “PR exercise”. However, as President of the American Task Force on Palestine explains, the US might be able to save some face if 1) it can use the Summit to lay out a comprehensive initial written framework of that both parties agree to, 2) the facts on the ground in the weeks before the conference reflect a commitment to the peace process, and 3) both parties agree to a timeframe for follow through at the end of the Summit.
Laying out a comprehensive framework will be especially difficult because of each leader’s poor political situation at home. Olmert’s “fractious” party will make him push for broad wording on key issues, while Abbas’ lack of political support at home forces him to demand maximal details to show strength in the face of the Israelis and the US. As a result, the US will need to exercise “deft and sustained diplomacy” to bridge the gap between these two leaders and create a peace process that will stick.
Secondly, the facts on the ground need to indicate each side’s commitment to a two state solution in the weeks immediately preceding the Summit. Israel must freeze development of illegal settlements, while outside terrorist forces cannot make attacks that threaten Israeli security. Both the Israeli government must respect that a majority of Palestinian and Israeli people support a two state solution, and that this solution can only be created through diplomacy and not creating illegal facts on the ground.
Thirdly, a combination of diplomacy, written commitment to a peace process, and “sustainable on-the-ground changes in the near future” could build trust between both parties and increase the chances that they will follow through in the months following the Summit. While neither Abbas nor Olmert are in good enough political standing at home to make significant concessions on key issues at the conference, their poor political position—along with the poor standing of President Bush—may be the reason none of these leaders can afford to conclude this Summit without achieving progress toward peace.

Source:
Asali, Dr. Ziad A., middleeastprogress.org/

[Mariam Ballout]

Internal disagreements can be a serious obstacle to negotiating freely and productively, and it seems as though Israel is always experiencing internal struggles that make it perceivably difficult for Israeli officials to make key concessions. While internal politics are truly a serious impediment Israel must overcome in order to make concessions, I get the feeling that internal politics can always be used to excuse failure to make important concessions, purposeful or not, and the international community needs to show Israel that it will not accept this excuse. When the stakes are as high as they are now for negotiations to succeed, the United States must flex enough muscle to show Israel’s internal dissidents that failure to compromise is not an option. It is true that Prime Minister Olmert is facing rebellion in the ranks of his own party from those extremists who oppose any concessions at all, but those directing the peace process seem to have no problem ignoring and discrediting the equally extreme Palestinian factions within Hamas that refuse to make concessions with Israel. It is hard to imagine Abbas being permitted to use extremists not willing to make any concessions as an excuse not to compromise at all on key issues. Perhaps if those Israelis who refuse to make any concessions were regarded by key players as extremists in the same way as their extreme counterparts in Hamas, Israel would have no choice but to accept a decision by Olmert to make concessions against the will of extreme parties’ (like Yisrael Beiteinu).

In addition to internal politics, the bottom-line reasons “political portents are not very encouraging” comes down to lack of trust and lack of equal pressure. The fact that funds for the Palestinian authority desperately needed to ameliorate humanitarian crises actually might be pulled if the conference does not succeed proves that Palestinians have reason not to trust promises. While Abbas already has greater impetus for a successful negotiation than Olmert, this threat of the possibility of pulling aid shows the US is applying great pressure to the Abbas delegation to make all concessions necessary for the conference to succeed. If the US were applying similar pressure to Israel by directly or indirectly putting its aid in question, internal strife would quickly become a less popular and less credible reason for Israelis not to make concessions. More even pressure would make viewpoints like Khameni’s that “the meeting has been designed by Americans to bolster Israel’s position and serve its interests rather than Palestinian interests” less convincing, and remove legitimacy from motions by Arab countries to boycott the conference.
What is needed for the Bush administration to achieve its first clear success in the Middle East is not a miracle, but an application of more equal pressure on both sides. Each side must be equally forced to quit making excuses, acknowledge the lives on both sides at stake every year the conflict drags on, and make real concessions now.

[Bianca Dragan]

The money will not make a great difference for the Palestinians taking into consideration the corruption and the political instability triggered by the election results, with Hamas in charge of the Gaza Strip. Even with the money to fund Palestine, as a state capable of fulfilling its security needs and of truly representing its people, I agree that the Annapolis conference is bound to fail. It would be indeed a "miracle" if Olmert and Abbas "could find common cause on peace and make it stick." To begin with, there is a lack of trust between the parties involved. Thinking back to the Camp David negotiations, the lack of trust between Barak and Arafat was not helpful. They were never really capable of communicating. Ben-Ami explained in "Scars of War, Wounds of Peace" that this happened because the Palestinian leader, “a curious combination of megalomaniac possessed at the same time by an inferiority complex, felt humiliated and overmastered by his arrogant interlocutor, always more inclined to dictate his position than to negotiate them” (Ben-Ami, 253). The Palestinians again feel weak and have set their expectations too high, whereas the Israeli feel that there should be an equal process of give and take. So for now, they show a vague position on the major issues the Palestinians want to address. Both sides are greatly pressured by inside and outside forces to make and "not" to make concessions. Nobody has articulated convincingly that the goals of the conference; therefore, nobody can properly define what would make a "successful conference." In addition, to acquire peace the negotiations need to include all the parties involved. This means all Arab countries need to come to the conference. For one reason, the Palestinian president cannot make crucial concessions without the support of the Arab countries. If he ignores them, he might be assassinated and the peace efforts would have been in vain. Arafat repelled President Clinton’s attempts to pressure him to make a decision by constantly repeating, “Do you want to come to my funeral?” (Ben-Ami, 256). Saudi Arabia is being blunt about the outcomes of the conference: no major issue seriously addressed, no Saudi Arabia at the conference. Syria refuses to participate if it does not get back the Golan Heights, an issue that Israel is not willing to compromise about. At the same time, the Israeli, Palestinian and U.S. leadership is too weak to make what would be a historical peace, a “Nobel Prize worthy” peace. Olmert is battling both his own personal illness and corruption allegations. Also, the fallout from Israel's unsuccessful war in Lebanon in 2006 decreased his popularity. Abbas has been weakened by the election results investing Hamas as the winner of an astounding parliamentary victory. Lastly, the Bush administration is extremely unpopular, mainly because of Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. However, one could argue that all three are going to compromise because they want to remake their legacies by camouflaging their failures with a historical peace. However, an agreement to reach peace in the Middle East needs more than three egomaniacs trying to restore their credibility.
These past few months, the Secretary of State has repeated numerous times that failure is simply not an option. And she is right; the stakes are extremely high. If the conference fails, then the Middle East will be more complicated than before this attempt to restore peace. For the Palestinians, a failure would mean anarchy and the end of the Abbas government, which is going to be replaced by the Hamas government. For the Israelis, a Hamas state is a bad, frightening neighbor to have in the West Bank.
Finally, I believe Karen DeYoung's citing of a State Department official on the Middle East situation in Washington Post, Nov. 6, best summarized the approach we should take towards this coming conference: "you never say never in the Middle East. You're always got to be ready for bad news."

[Alexandra Jenik]

The news that negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians will resume in Annapolis before the 2008 elections represents another poorly planned, and sure to fail endeavor embarked upon by the Bush Administration. With the U.S.’ image in the international community at an all time low, it seems that the Bush Administration thinks that the U.S. has nothing more to lose. Why not refocus the U.S.’ disjointed and failing foreign policy on an issue that has been ridden with conflict for decades? The push to initiate negotiations has been viewed by many in the Arab community as an attempt on the part of the U.S. to turn the peace talks into a photo-opt. Mending the U.S.’ image is surely on the top of the Administration’s list considering the fast approaching election.
While the U.S. may have ulterior motives, both the Palestinians and the Israelis are also driven by complicated forces, and must carefully monitor their actions before and during negotiations. Both Abbas and Olmert, who are viewed as weak leaders in the eyes of their constituents must present strong fronts in order to placate the more conservative and radical parties, who can easily sway opinion and derail peace talks. The Israelis and Palestinians are ambivalent that an agreement will actually be reached when there have been so many failed attempts. An Israeli Labor Party lawmaker recently commented, “The assumption on this side is that Palestinians can’t deliver. Speeches are wonderful, but we have heard speeches for too long.” The Palestinians are also worried that considering the U.S.’ track record in supporting Israel, the U.S. will fail to put enough pressure on the Israelis to make concessions. With all these different forces working against each other and with most of the same key issues up for debate, the outcome of the negotiations seems bleak especially when it comes down to the details of the issues.
Although there will be many different forces at work during the negotiations, on a positive note, both Abbas and Olmert have already expressed an interest in making some changes before the Annapolis meeting. According to a recent article in the Washington Post, both sides have agreed to begin implementing confidence-building measures, and in addition, the Palestinians have increased police forces in Nablus, a city that is known to have a more extremist contingent. The world should be optimistic that the negotiations will be successful, but it is difficult to ignore the looming issues that have halted so many negotiations in the past. But, it is possible that negotiations have finally reached a point where failure is no longer an option, and the talks will only lead to the developmental stages of a joint agreement.

[Andrew Neumann]

The possibility of success at Annapolis holds the potential for huge positive benefits for the three main leaders involved. A resolution of the conflict, or at least significant progress forward, would go a long way towards repairing the reputations of both President Bush and the United States, not only in the region, but around the world as well. The same is true for Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas; both leaders would have their positions solidified considerably if they could further their peoples’ interests while at Annapolis.
These massive gains have always been available to any set of leaders who could resolve the issue, but few have been willing to make a genuine attempt, as failure would normally coincide with a loss of support. It is this reason that has put these leaders in a unique position, as all three seem to have little to lose, and all currently appear to be on their way out of power. Such a situation should make the parties more willing to compromise and work toward a realistic solution; however, if the groups over-extend themselves and subsequently fail, their political careers may be brought to a close even sooner.
Another important consideration is the behavior of the terrorist groups in the region – Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad – who always seem to oppose negotiations of any kind, and tend to increase their attacks whenever peace talks are mentioned. If the negotiations at Annapolis are short-lived and fail to produce anything new, it will be partially due to these groups, especially Hamas. Since most of the members of the Quartet consider Hamas a terrorist group, they will side with Israel, and work to exclude Hamas from the process. In such a case, it is conceivable that Hamas would launch a new series of attacks against Israel, giving Olmert and the Israeli delegation the excuse they need to cut the negotiations short before any concessions are made, and allow them to return to Israel saying, “We tried, but Abbas just couldn’t control Hamas!”
While these leaders are in a unique position where each has little to lose, it does not seem like they will have the foresight to use it to their advantage. In a region where insults and accusations of blame are as thick as Pompeian ash, Olmert and Abbas both face ebbing support, yet seem content to leave their blinders untouched and continue with the only technique they have used to bolster their positions, crying foul-play on the part of the other side. Annapolis seems doomed to failure even before the delegations arrive; unremarkable leadership and failure to engage all of the concerned parties will condemn this series of talks to the footnotes of this conflict.

[Josh Meah]

The key to peace in the region may finally be included in the forthcoming negotiations: Syria. Just recently, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert openly stated that Syria belongs in the peace negotiations. By including Syria in the peace process, Hamas is placed under some sort of control, and a terrorist attack is unlikely to hit Israel prior to the meet.
Indeed, an agreement between Syria and Israel might well be the key to long-term peace in the region. Solving the Golan situation would increase Israeli security by turning Syria from an enemy into, minimally, a non-enemy. This would undercut Hamas’s power in Gaza, which simultaneously empowers Fatah (and Abbas) in the West Bank. Thus, all major parties at Annapolis have an interest in appeasing Syria.
I even wonder if perhaps the peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine might be a front for negotiations between Syria and Israel. Historically speaking, Israel has always made very calculated decisions regarding its foreign policy, and with Olmert indebted to a democracy built on party loyalties, he might have a calculated idea up his sleeve that the international community hasn’t quite caught onto yet.
Finally though, Olmert might actually have the popular support to make something happen. Public support for Olmert has been on the rise since he disclosed being diagnosed with prostate cancer (not to mention a few persuasive speeches). Of course this public support will wane in the future, but it does open up an opportunity for Olmert to attempt something great – even if that opportunity only lasts for the second.

[Will Bartholomew]

Under these circumstances, it appears that the Annapolis meeting is destined to fail in getting a real peace process back on track. The only question that remains is whether the Annapolis meeting will simply achieve nothing or make things worse. In my opinion, the pressures created on the various parties by this meeting will lead to a setback in the peace process.

Mahmoud Abbas' Palestinian government is in an especially tight spot on the eve of this meeting. It is clear that they need to win back the Palestinian people from Hamas, and the way to do this will be to stem corruption and outcompete Hamas in providing jobs and social services to the Palestinian people. The grants from the United States would greatly help in this regard, but if the aid is conditional on the peace process moving forward Abbas may be tempted to cave into Israeli demands just for the sake of the aid, and Abbas is already under fire for being too complicit with Israeli. If Abbas looks like he is not fighting for the best interests of the Palestinians, more will turn to support Hamas.

Ehud Olmert also under pressure in Israel, but it is pressure to not concede anything to the Palestinians. Israel is in a position of extreme strength right now, they have most of what they want right now and what remains they are taking unilaterally. Terrorist attacks are down as the security wall seems to be serving its purpose. In regards to Gaza, except for a few random rocket attacks originating from that area Israel really has no interest in what happens in Gaza. It would be foolish to think that from this position of strength Israel will simply give to the Palestinians some of what they demand. Israel has no incentive to negotiate, and thus they will be actively working to see that nothing comes of the Annapolis talks.

This disinclination to give the Palestinians anything will lead Israel to propose laughable concessions to the Palestinians if indeed they propose anything at all. Abbas, under pressure from the United States, may be tempted to take them, which will probably weaken his position in the eyes of Palestinians. Thus it is logical to think that nothing will come of the talks, but if any agreements are reached they will probably be disadvantageous to the Palestinians because the Israelis simply have no incentive to negotiate on anything. Additionally, the Syrians and Iranians for their own reasons will be actively working to make sure that the talks fail. The conditions are not ripe for negotiating a real peace right now, the best that can be hoped for is that nothing bad will happen, either in Abbas making an unpopular concession to the Israeli's or in the form of some terrorist attack supported by Syria or Iran.

[Austin Finan]

It should be understood that the outcome of the conference in Annapolis should not detract from the good intentions of the substantial additional aid package of $435 million that the Bush Administration has proposed for the Palestinians. However, the perpetually bleak forecast of the negotiations is becoming as much a part of the furniture as the table which the feuding parties gather around. Given the credence of the previous statement, it is highly likely that the mediation efforts of the United States will go overlooked by the international community.
The November summit in Annapolis is a pressure cooker. While the intentions of the conference may seek to alleviate tensions between the Palestinians and the Israelis, there are several other parties who believe they have a considerable stake in the outcome. The unfortunate reality here is that these external pressures are hindering the potential for any progress to be made between the concerned parties.
If Abbas and Olmert are indeed dedicated to resolving the key issues and representing the interests of their immediate constituencies, they will approach the summit autonomously and with a positive attitude. In particular, the real onus lies in the hands of Abbas, who has the opportunity to cash in on a rather lucrative incentive, especially if Congress is pleased by the results of the summit. Considering the magnitude of the unprecedented aid package, Abbas owes it to the Palestinians, the Israelis, and the U.S. to be cooperative in the negotiations. If pressure from the Syrians and religious ideologues, like the Aytollah Khameni, continue to dictate the outcome of such conferences, the patience of the U.S. and other non-Arab (non-Muslim) factions around the world is likely to wear thin. It goes without saying that the U.S. must continue to preside over negotiations if the Palestinians and Israelis are ever going to reach a final settlement. Nevertheless, interest and efforts on behalf of the U.S. may dwindle if tangible progress is not made soon. If such is the case, the likelihood that the Palestinians and the Israelis will be successful in resolving future conflicts is grim.

[Arthur Giovannangeli]

As the Ambassador stated, the fear of failure may be one of the most important factors in the upcoming summit in Annapolis. All of the proposed money and aid to the Palestinians, while providing an incentive for the Palestinians to be cooperative, puts tremendous pressure on the Palestinian Authority. With substantial American financial assistance and support, the Abbas government will feel ample pressure to succeed, both in the Annapolis summit and in governing its population. The United States will not want to see its money put to waste and will expect significant results in terms of services provided to the Palestinian people and openness to peace talks. Hamas is also likely to remain a factor for if the Abbas government in unable to effectively use the funds it receives Hamas will have more reasons to claim that they are the true government of the Palestinian people. Getting successful concessions from Israel in the Annapolis summit would go a long way towards easing all of the pressure and expectations that the proposed United States’ funds will create.
Both the United States and Israel stand to lose a lot if the Annapolis summit ends in an utter failure. Both nations would lose a great deal of international credibility if the conference were to go poorly. President Bush is nearing the end of his final term and therefore his chances to improve his legacy as a President are getting sparser. If Bush wishes to leave the Presidency on a high note than he must make sure that the Annapolis summit goes well. If it were to fail than it would add another black mark to an already questionable Presidency, and perhaps the lasting impression he leaves on historians. Bush cannot want to be remembered as a poor President and therefore must endeavor to make sure the Annapolis summit succeeds. Israel must also prove that it is serious about the Palestinians to the rest of the world, in order to discredit its detractors. If the Annapolis summit were to fail Israel would likely take all of the blame in the Middle East, many nations already claim that the summit is simply a United States’ move to help Israel’s position in the region. If Israel were to approach the summit seriously, however, it would discredit such nations as Iran and Syria, giving Israel a better position in future dealings with such states. The internal pressures on the Olmert government, however, may prevent Israel from making any serious concessions during the summit. All sides enter the Annapolis summit unsure of what it is that they will actually be able to gain but very aware that the cost of failure might be tremendously high.

[Andrew Gumbiner]

While much can be said about the failures of this Administration’s policy regarding the Iraq, the War on Terror, and attaining peace in the Middle East, the only hope that the Bush team has is an $435 million dollar economic package to the Palestinians and making it clear to all parties that this is only the first of many peace talks. Sometimes, this being one of the cases, a checkbook can speak louder than words, and might be the only possibility to marginalize Hamas’s power and influence a tentative first agreement the upcoming talks in Annapolis. In order for any success to take place in the talks between Olmert, Rice, and Abbas several critical things must take place, which would subdue both sides. First, the United States must show all parties that it is a fair and equal arbiter who only wants peace in the region, without overtly favoring the Israelis. This is not only critical to only persuade the Palestinians of U.S. neutrality, but the rest of the Islamic world, including Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran. While it may seem that this is an insurmountable task, it is imperative that the United States maintains a general position of equality between all parties, and seek a solution that will open-up frank discussions between both sides. Second, it is essential to give much needed monetary assistance to the Palestinians, which will improve their opinions of the United States, as well as undermine Hamas’s quest for power over the Palestinian people. If the United States can marginalize radical political/religious groups such as Hamas through economic assistance to the Palestinians, there is a real chance that the Palestinian power structure could unite, and shift back to more moderate ideologies proposed by Abbas. Given that Hamas serves as an important source of economic and social assistance for many Palestinians, U.S. money for government clinics, health care, job expansion, and solidifying the Palestinian Authority is the only hope to persuade Palestinians to leave Hamas’s protective political and economic shield. Finally, and possibly most importantly, it is essential that the United States assures Israel that it will, as always, support and protect the Israeli cause under all circumstances. While it is true that Olmert is experiencing significant opposition domestically, it is critical that the Israeli Prime Minister knows that the U.S. will always protect Israeli interests against foreign actors such as Iran, Syria, and terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, regardless of domestic pressure..
While it is clear that the November peace talks are taking place at an inopportune time with the Palestinians, Israelis, and the Americans all facing significant domestic and international pressure, the only hope is that each party can view these negotiations as the first part of a long set of ongoing talks. This slow step-by-step process would calm all parties including the Israelis, Palestinians, and other Middle East actors because no decisions would be final and each party could slowly comprehend proposed changes. With only tentative, preliminary agreements and a large economic package to the Palestinians, the talks could prove to be an excellent starting point, but certainly not an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

[Reid Snyder]

As the November (now perhaps December) conference in Annapolis draws close, opinions of the meeting are domestically and internationally dubious. Despite the recent $435 million pledge sent to congress on October 30th, I can’t help but feel skeptical about potential peace progress. Given past negotiation paradigms, we seem set for further procrastination and a failure to achieve major peace. The large increase in American financial aid to Palestine is a positive step, if it comes to fruition. It is important for the United States to realize the need to assist Palestine in the quest for a two-state establishment, yet it appears a bit late for the Bush administration. Political factors throughout the Middle East present numerous challenges to the players in the conference.

The most important major factors at stake are the weakness of the Palestinian and Israeli leaders and the lack of unification amongst Arab states. Considering the political situations of President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert, I don’t foresee any credible progress. Neither leader has the power foundation amongst his people to make any major concessions. Match this with the frustrations of Syria and Iran and the immediate future is looking bleak. Neither of these Arab nations wants resolution, as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict serves as a cushion for Syrian interests and an anti-American success for Iran. Given these factors, I don’t find any reason to appear optimistic toward the coming conference. It seems that this will serve as the cherry on top for the sequence of failures in the Middle East that have defined the Bush administration. The Arabs are undermining each other, Bush has zero credibility in the region (let alone at home), Olmert and Abbas are treading political water, and the same dividing issues remain─ the deck seems stacked against peace.

[Philip Holdredge]

The upcoming Annapolis conference has been touted as an opportunity for Israel and Palestine to make some significant headway in the peace process. However, this conference seems like a half-baked attempt to bolster President Bush's diminished international image, at best. As stated in the blog post, the conference certainly runs the risk of ending up as "warmed over quartet music" resulting in "the formation of yet another committee." This is highly likely considering the weakened reputations of the three main parties within their respective countries. However, all the parties appear to have nothing to lose and everything to gain, which may mean that Bush, Olmert, and Abbas will work harder to ensure that the conference shows some form of progress.

That said, there are many problems facing this conference. Since all of them contribute in equal, but different, ways, I figured I should address them in the order that the blog post brought them up. First, the significant aid package is sure to “sweeten the pot” (even if it is still a quarter of the yearly aid to Israel). It is a shame that members of Congress are actively threatening to remove this aid if the conference does not bring about progress. They would not do this to the Israelis, who need the aid far less than the weakened Palestinian government. However, this is not the only problem with the way the government has handled the aid package. Although this serves as a good incentive to “perform” well at the negotiations, the Palestinians are in dire need of assistance and the money should have been given to the Palestinian government well in advance of the conference. The money would have helped Abbas’s position--the money would have made the general Palestinian population more supportive of an agreement, enhanced the Palestinian bargaining position relative to Israel, and the money would have allowed Abbas to make the necessary security reforms that could potentially prevent terrorist attacks designed to derail the negotiations.

The second problem is that all of the parties lack the influence to make agreements. Abbas has to deal with Hamas refusing to engage Israel in negotiations and make concessions. Olmert is currently dealing with investigations into his conduct and has to deal with opposition parties that have little faith in the negotiations. Additionally, Bush failed to make moves toward peace early in his presidency which would give him authority in the negotiation process.

The final issue I noticed with how this has been handled related to how to deal with the external forces working against the negotiations (Syria and Iran). The Syrians oppose these talks because of their fear that any settlement will leave them without the Golan Heights. I think that a better, subtler push should have been made to include Syria in these discussions, since this has plagued previous negotiations. It seems that any agreement between Israel and Palestine needs a simultaneous agreement between Syria and Israel, such that the two agreements are contingent on the other. Although this would be a logistical nightmare, it would certainly be better than trying to negotiate an agreement while leaving Syria to remain confrontational with Israel. Additionally, there is nothing that the US could do to ease tensions with Iran in the lead up to the conference, since US-Iranian issues stem from deeper problems. However, counteracting the Iranian propaganda is possible, by reassuring other moderate Arab countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, that the negotiations are not one-sided and will benefit Palestine far more than the Israelis. This is especially true because the longer this remains unsolved, the Israelis will continue to expand settlements, making an equitable final solution even less likely to occur.

[Chestine Rosado]

As the attempt to resolve the Middle East conflict moves forward, it is important to take a look at the strides that are being made to come to a peaceful conclusion. As mentioned in the blog, the budget request sent to the congress is very large. I feel that the break down in the 435 million dollars is for the most part fair. I would however invest more money into the health care system then into narcotic enforcement. I feel that while narcotics do become a big problem, there are other ways to spend money to help establish a stronger independent state. I also agree with those congress members that feel that this money is not guaranteed and may very well not be awarded if there is no step towards peace in the November Conference.
The November Conference will serve as yet another attempt to put an end to this Conflict. However, looking at the current beliefs that both sides carry, it almost seems as if this conference is doomed before it even begins. As the Ambassadors mentions in his blog, “Almost any agreement faces the hostility of outside forces.” Neither side for example is willing to budge on there claims to Jerusalem. With many countries weighing in on the matter there are many threats that have to be considered if a resolution is reached without 100% satisfaction from everyone involved. Furthermore as stated in the blog, it is the belief of some countries that the meeting has been a sign that America is backing up Israel because of what they serve to gain from it. This attitude too lends to some of the negative feelings centering on this conference, especially with the reputation that America has to the rest of the world.
The conflict in the Middle East has been ongoing for decades and like with everything in life, money equals power. Will the amount of money being discussed be enough to convince one side to fold in order to attain peace and put an end to this conflict? Or is pride going to get in the way once again of coming up with a peaceful resolution?

[Katie Plummer]

The Bush Administration has put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the back burner and done little to resolve the issue since Bush’s 2002 speech in the Rose Garden. In my opinion, the sudden change of heart is very much related to the many failures of Bush’s foreign policies as you mentioned. The Clinton administration put a lot of time and effort into resolving the conflict despite being unsuccessful; therefore, the current administration may feel that they could redeem themselves in some way if tangible steps toward a peace agreement were made during this Annapolis meeting.

While there are many external along with internal factors that complicate the issue, the request for funding to assist the Palestinians is step in the right direction for the United States. This request shows the U.S.’s dedication to peace not only for Israel, but Palestine too. It also gives the Palestinians more of an incentive to go to and strive for a peace agreement at the Annapolis meeting. At this point, the United States needs to do everything in their power to make this meeting a success because of the many obstacles that are trying to sabotage the peace process (i.e. Hamas) and the dire need for Bush to turn around his unsuccessful foreign policy.

Although the meeting does not look hopeful, the Palestinian leadership is more moderate than it has been in previous years, which would make it easier for a compromise to be made with Israel. If there is no peace agreement made during this meeting then it will be a long time until peace is achieved, if at all. This fear of failure will definitely be looming over both the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams because relations will only get worse between the two groups, which could lead to more violence and terrorism. All in all, there might be many factors working against the meeting coming up later this month, but the overriding notion of failure might be the key ingredient that Secretary Rice will use to make something happen.

[Alex Caruso]

The international community has little confidence that progress will be made in upcoming peace negotiations, as Ambassador Walker said, a lot can go wrong. Although the conference seems doomed, it should be understood that this feeling isn’t new. Moreover the pessimistic feelings leading up to the conference are merely an extension of old feelings; key issues such as Jerusalem, refugees and the right of return, borders and security, and sovereignty, have plagued the peace process for the last 40 years. It is not the time for people to start malting and condemn the peace process now.
The fear of failure should rather be used as a catalyst in the upcoming negotiations. It is not in the interest of the Israelis or the Palestinians for the negotiations to break down and for the region to experience more instability. Therefore the prospect of peace should be viewed as an incentive for the participating parties to move towards an agreement. Although this is a simplified analysis it is promising and deserves consideration.

[John Kibbe]

It is true that the best thing the November Conference has going is that the parties may fear failure more than success. Unfortunately, this realization does not hide the fact that at this point, neither party is unified enough to find a common cause on peace and make it stick. Both sides have been working closely as of late in an attempt to gain confidence that the November Conference will end on a positive note. Condoleezza Rice has publicly stated numerous times in the past few weeks that both sides are making strides in the right direction. How optimistic, however, can one actually be about the situation? Olmert and Abbas cannot themselves negotiate a solution or a future timeline for solving the many issues plaguing the two parties. Instead, any positive steps that are made in the November Conference are going to first have to appease many different factions within both the Israeli and Palestinian camps. President Abbas is in the midst of pushing for the establishment of a Palestinian state, even though the Palestinians remain extremely divided. Gaza is still under the control of his Hamas rivals, and any wrong move within Abbas organization can lead to violence and increased support for Hamas. Even those who are in support of his moderate government can potentially lose all abandon him if any unwanted concessions are made part of a future plan during the November Conference. Olmert, on the other hand, is leading a publicly divided government. Factions within the Israeli government have made it extremely clear that they will not accept any concessions on critical issues in the establishment of Palestinian state. Only further complicating the situation, there are numerous neighboring Arab nations who need to be represented if any progressive plan for the future is going to be drawn up. Although the United States has made it clear that these third parties need to be present at the conference, the chances that this actually happens already seems grim. Iran and Syria clearly have no intentions of attending, while Hamas has planned a conference in Damascus at the same date in an attempt to publicly dispel the significance of the conference in Annapolis.
Secretary Rice has been recently quoted in her assertion that “it’s time for the establishment of a Palestinian state and it’s time for Israel to live in the security that is going to come with a peaceful and democratic neighbor”. Although this assertion may be an ideal solution to the problem, it simply is not realistic at this point. What Palestinian state can possibly be established without Olmert making some sort of critical issue concessions that his government will not allow him to make? On the other end of the spectrum, how much security can Abbas realistically offer Israel? His government is still yet to regain control of Gaza, which will undoubtedly be one of the territories in Israel’s new ‘peaceful and democratic neighbor’. The November Conference will become a warmed over quartet score because neither leader has the necessary backing or influence to make it anything more.

[Sara Bryant]

For years, countries have made great efforts to help aid negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian people without success. With the offers of generous aid packages and many proposals for peaceful agreements on permanent settlement issues, the two sides have been surprisingly unwilling to draw any definitive conclusions. In the past, the United States has attempted to successfully bring peace negotiations between the two sides one of the top items on their political agenda. Now, nearing the end of his presidency, President Bush is making a last attempt to bring the two sides to peace by holding talks in Annapolis, MD. Modeled after the 2000 Camp David summit, Bush’s November conference has begun receiving a lot of speculation and threats of defiance. Bush is running on a flawed plan with no real chance of succeeding. There is no possible way that with Bush’s record-low international and domestic approval ratings this November summit will make headway, if it even ends up happening. Although Bush’s aspirations for Annapolis are noble, it will take the cooperation of Abbas and Olmert, along with the possible influence of the Syrians, to make a final settlement agreement possible.
The United State’s generous aid package offer to the Palestinian Authority to help fund and protect the establishment of a Palestinian state was a necessary step for the United States in their effort to bring peace between the two sides. I do, however, agree that this gesture alone will not suffice. Despite how this would benefit Abbas, economically, he refuses to cooperate with negotiations that would compromise any of their interests. In addition, the Syrians’ pressure to fight negotiations and concessions makes it nearly impossible to come to agreement. We should include the Syrians in separate negotiations so that they will help, rather than hinder, the prospect of peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Abbas, too, needs to realize that the United States and other countries are willing to provide the necessary aid to make the creation of a Palestinian state possible. While there are offers on the table, I do agree that they are too rushed and will likely end up back firing because Abbas and other Arab nations will feel pressured and that there may be an underlying secret agenda. The Bush administration has made an effort that comes too late and during a time when no one trusts him. I think that our best hope for a final agreement will only come with the election of a new US administration.

[Justin Sherman]

The Administration recently submitted a supplemental budget request to congress that included $435 million in additional aid for the Palestinian Authority. The proposal is well intentioned because it hopes to “sweeten the pot for the Palestinians prior to the November summit in Annapolis” (ambassadorblog.org). The funds, however, are not guaranteed and Congress can pull the additional aid if the November conference fails to move the peace process forward.
Such an approach might prove to be offensive to the Palestinians and be a roadblock in the peace process for several reasons. By creating a monetary incentive for the Palestinians and not the Israelis, the U.S. is putting more pressure on the former to move the peace process forward than the latter. Essentially, the U.S. is saying that the Israeli’s are already willing to move forward and do not need any financial incentive. On the other had, the Palestinians need incentives to move the process forward and the U.S. is offering financial aid as a reward. The U.S. ultimatum, move the process forward or receive no aid, automatically puts the Palestinians on the defensive. For the Palestinians, advancements in the peace process will require cooperation by both sides and by promising incentives for one side and not the other, the Americans are basically putting more pressure on the Palestinians than the Israelis. This will hurt the United States because it will further convince the Palestinian Authority that the U.S. is not an even-handed and neutral negotiator.
Also, financial incentives will not lead to any major concessions by the Palestinians. Some of the primary issues that have hindered progress in the past, such as Jerusalem, do not come with a price tag. Religious ties and spiritual devotion to the city make it a complicated issue that cannot be solved by foreign aid or financial trade offs. Also, Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad face large amounts of domestic resistance that will handicap their ability to make serious progress. If the leaders do make serious concessions domestic opinion might interpret their actions as an attempt to garner additional funds to combat Hamas and strengthen their political position as opposed to making the best decisions for their people.
Additionally, the November conference will likely be unsuccessful because of domestic Israeli politics. Prime Minister Olmert is facing tremendous amounts of domestic pressure from right-wing parties and conflicting opinions within his own party. Considering the dissenters in his own political party and the other domestic organizations that are against serious concessions, the Israeli Prime Minister will unlikely be able to make serious progress in the peace process.