Like the elephant in the room that no one sees, the Administration has chosen to ignore the fact that Hamas is popular in the West Bank and Gaza and that its popularity may be growing. We seem also to be ignoring the fact that the answer to Hamas is not weapons. It is not civil war, disarmament or armed confrontation. The answer to Hamas, lies in building up Abu Mazen’s credibility with his constituency and providing for the basic needs of the Palestinian people that today too often are provided by Hamas.
The Jihadists, like Iran, reject the existence of Israel and they reject America and its position in the region which they see as thwarting their plans. They seek, a new Caliphate in whatever territory that can be controlled with the view toward expanding outward. The Caliphate would be built from Islamic states, under a strict and uncompromising reading of Islamic law, and with fundamentalist Islamic leaders. But, their primary short term agenda, on which every thing else depends, is to build their base among their Sunni Islamic constituency.
People expect governments to provide 100% of service to 100% of the people. The Palestinian authority does not have the resources to do that whereas Hamas has the privilege of not providing 100% to 100%. It has the luxury of providing the froth on the top of the services the PA or UNRWA provide. And thus it gets the credit for a fraction of the price while the government falls short of expectations.
It is perhaps time for the Administration and the Palestinian Authority to stop thinking in the stock phrases, political speeches and tired policies and practices of the past and start concentrating on what will build up the political power of moderate Palestinians now so that, at a minimum, they can take on Hamas on equal terms. Short term, short lead time civil works like public housing will create more jobs and immediate income than massive Halliburton style projects for the future. And quick capital infusion by the international community to finance such projects can begin to turn the situation around.
A practical short term crash program for economic enhancement cannot take place in an environment where criminal gangs roam the streets. It has to take place in tandem with a short term crash program to provide security inside Gaza and the West Bank. We and the Israelis need to recognize that the problem of Israel’s security starts with the problem of Gazan and West Bank internal security. Give Abu Mazen the laws, courts, jails and police to enforce the law on his own streets and investment and jobs will follow. That is the only way to improve conditions and reduce the attraction of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
What we need to understand is that the West Bank and Gaza are a microcosm of the war of ideologies that is taking place in the broader Middle East. They are on the front lines of al Qaeda’s plan for a new caliphate – a caliphate that neither we nor most existing Arab or Islamic countries are going to welcome. This is no longer just a Palestinian problem or an Israeli problem. It is a problem that is tied to a growing effort by Jihadists to capitalize on poverty, hardship, unemployment, and loss of hope throughout the region. We need an aggressive action program and strong partnership between Abu Mazen and President Bush to stop the erosion of moderation and modernization that is taking place in the region.
Unfortunately, we did not see such a commitment or determination in the public statements of either President Bush or Abu Mazen on October 20. This was an opportunity for the President to seize the initiative, move from his preferred position behind the pulpit, and get out into the world to put specific and concrete action behind his words. This was a way he could have shown true leadership and begun to restore America’s image and influence in the world. Unfortunately, it appears that the President and Abu Mazen both missed opportunities in Washington.
The current administration's most successful tactic in garnering American support for its foreign policy decisions has been harnessing the emotional impact of 9/11. Bush rightly recognized the need to bring together a shaken nation after that trauma, and was able to reach a consensus about how to exact revenge by targeting the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, to continually take advantage of that kind of passion, often seeming to value it over evidence and logic, is undeniably wrong. In the case of Al Qaeda, perhaps the anti-terrorist strategy has been misguided. Osama bin Laden has remained a target for Americans' emotional need for revenge since the September 11th attacks, and this concentration of feeling seems to be largely symbolic. As Amb. Walker highlights, the significance of his actual role in Al Qaeda is questionable, especially due to the increasingly decentralized structure of terrorist cells in the global organization.
For Americans and the Bush administration, Osama bin Laden provides us with an emotional focal point, which in the past five years, has translated into a strategic focal point. Targeting bin Laden and other high-ranking Al Qaeda leaders will probably continue to be crucial, both strategically and symbolically, but unfortunately that focus is only a small step within the wider (and likely impossible) scope of targeting a wide network of terrorist cells and individual extremists.
Posted by: Emily Byron | September 27, 2006 at 01:10 AM